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Abstract
Increased level of complexity in almost every discipline and operation today raises
the demand for knowledge in order to successfully run an organization whether
to generate profit or to attain a non-profit mission. Traditional way of transfer-
ring knowledge to information systems rich in data structures and complex algo-
rithms continue to hinder the ability to swiftly turnover concepts into operations.
Diagrammatic modelling commonly applied in engineering in order to represent
concepts or reality remains to be an excellent way of converging knowledge from
domain experts.
The nuclear verification domain represents ever more a matter which has great
importance to the World safety and security. Demand for knowledge about nu-
clear processes and verification activities used to oﬀset potential misuse of nuclear
technology will intensify with the growth of the subject technology. This Doctoral
thesis contributes with a model-based approach for representing complex process
such as nuclear inspections. The work presented contributes to other domains
characterized with knowledge intensive and complex processes.
Based on characteristics of a complex process a conceptual framework was es-
tablished as the theoretical basis for creating a number of modelling languages to
represent the domain. The integrated Safeguards Modelling Method (iSMM) is
formalized through an integrated meta-model. The diagrammatic modelling lan-
guages represent the verification domain and relevant nuclear verification aspects.
Such a meta-model conceptualizes the relation between practices of process man-
agement, knowledge management and domain specific verification principles. This
fusion is considered as necessary in order to create quality processes.
The study also extends the formalization achieved through a meta-model by
contributing with a formalization language based on Pattern Theory. Through
the use of graphical and mathematical constructs of the theory, process structures
are formalized enhancing the ability to analyse, compare and transform models.
In the example domain all possible connections between critical nuclear processes
were formalized providing also for probability-based analysis of weapons acquisition
paths that will help design objective-based inspection processes.
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Chapter1
Introduction
1.1 Overview
The work presented here stretches over several research fields. The objective of
the research is to contribute to computer science and knowledge management.
Moreover, ahead of the expected challenges, the application domain chosen for
the study contributes to the nuclear verification regime presently implemented by
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The suggested Nuclear Verifica-
tion Conceptual Framework and its realization through the introduced modelling
method is meant as an instrument for bringing eﬃciency and eﬀectiveness to the
nuclear inspection processes. The work presented studies the specific nature of
the inspection processes in a domain that is complex and has a crucial mission of
mitigating the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation.
With today’s growing challenge of ever increasing need for energy versus the
depletion of resources commonly relied upon such as gas and oil, a number of coun-
tries are considering refurbishing, reviving or extending their nuclear programme.
Table 1.1 shows the number of Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) undergoing construc-
tion in respective countries [3]. The number of already operational plants is almost
five times as high excluding other nuclear activities and material worldwide. Some
countries with no previous experience are also considering to start a peaceful pro-
gramme. These changes and the subsequent increase in nuclear production give
rise to the already existing concerns about World security and safety. In addition
to the increased presence of radioisotopes there is always the concern of activi-
2ties such as illicit trade or production of undeclared nuclear material followed by
weaponization [4].
As it is already set forth in the statute of the agency, the organisation has the
obligation to verify nuclear material and activities. With these rights and privileges
the organisation assumes a great responsibility in assuring the international com-
munity on the compliance of all member states with the Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT). Increased visibility realised in the light of ongoing international concerns
puts a great weight on the IAEA to remain relevant and to adjust its ways to the
ever changing nuclear context. All this in a politically complex environment while
aiming cost eﬀectiveness [5]. This work should find application in the field of nu-
clear inspections with an objective of discovering new means for preserving relevant
knowledge and using it to bring eﬃciencies in the way Safeguards is implemented.
A model-based approach is created using the nuclear verification programme
at the IAEA as the example domain to demonstrate the use of models with well
defined purpose. The aim is to focus the research on methods that create means
for depicting the nuclear verification data and process structures through the use
of diagrammatic models. This is expected to help preserve the core knowledge
necessary for creating eﬃcient and eﬀective processes that will oﬀset the challenges
anticipated with the ongoing nuclear renaissance [6].
The framework which sets forth the conceptual foundation for the approach
suggested consist of two levels or layers. The first, top layer is made of domain
specific models, each created by modelling languages to describe state’s nuclear fuel
cycle, nuclear installations, objectives of the inspection, inspection processes and
inspection organizational aspects (e.g. roles, assignments etc.). This conceptual
layer covers aspects of the nuclear verification and serves as knowledge space that
can shape the design of inspection processes. Nuclear processes are modelled and
analysed after which safeguards objectives are derived and linked to the inspection
processes that lead to their fulfillment. The next layer consists of domain inde-
pendent models for describing the KM and technology aspects of the verification
strategy. By using modelling languages such as PROMOTE and UML knowl-
edge products and supporting technologies in the respective order are identified,
modelled and linked to inspection processes. Relying on Process Oriented Knowl-
edge Management (POKM), inspection process models are seen as a navigation
3Country Units Capacity 
(MWe)
Existing 
Units
% of Total
Capacity
Argentina 1 692 2 3.5%
Bulgaria 2 1906 2 19.6%
China 19 19920 11 1.3%
Finland 1 1600 4 16.0%
France 1 1600 59 54.4%
India 6 2708 18 2.6%
Iran 1 915 0 0.0%
Japan 1 1325 54 17.7%
Pakistan 1 300 2 2.4%
Russia 9 6894 31 10.5%
Slovakia 2 810 4 29.9%
South Korea 6 6520 20 24.1%
Taiwan, China 2 2600 6 12.6%
Ukraine 2 1900 15 25.7%
United States 1 1165 104 10.1%
Table 1.1. Nuclear Power Plants currently under construction; Source: PRIS Database
IAEA as of 2010-12-31
mechanism, integration layer or an entry point to knowledge products and tech-
nologies modelled through these modelling languages. Inspection processes created
are therefore a reflection of domain specific models and maintain the link to do-
main independent models that describe the knowledge and technology relevant to
nuclear verification.
POKM is seen as a mechanism for managing and provisioning knowledge prod-
ucts. It is considered to be an approach that can operationalize process knowledge
hidden underneath business processes. With the IAEA inheriting the process en-
gineering principles and adopting common practices under the umbrella of process
4and quality management the goal is to have existing methodologies and technolo-
gies within the organization integrated under a process-oriented and model-based
framework. With the aim of establishing an integrated view of the future or-
ganization a conceptual framework based on inspection, knowledge management
and technology principles is introduced. This conceptualization serves creation
of process models that integrate information structures across the Department of
Safeguards. An approach, that is knowledge driven, process managed and aligned
across all spheres of support and core processes.
The motivation is to find eﬃcient ways for capturing and synthesizing increas-
ing amounts of information in a structured, transparent and repeatable manner
and turning the same into knowledge used for making process design decisions.
This is particularly important in this phase of nuclear safeguards where criteria
based evaluation of states verified is becoming part of the past. Safeguards criteria
will continue to be applied however there is an increasing presence of qualitative
information under the so called Information Driven Safeguards (IDS)[6].
To tackle some of the challenges previously discussed, the proposed solution is
to use models, namely diagrammatic models to depict diﬀerent views considered
in the department of Safeguards when designing inspections. These artifacts are
integrated into a verification knowledge space which represents expert knowledge
of nuclear processes and subsequently the inspection processes made explicit with
models that can provide procedural knowledge and functionality to inspectors[7].
The idea is to be able to progress from concepts (e.g. formalized with meta-models)
to inspection activities (i.e. instances of process models showing inspection activi-
ties at a facility, site or state). All this should be done in a methodical, structured
and repeatable manner according to the modelling procedure. Modelling method
created is meant to operationalize knowledge into useful inspection process models.
Through diagrammatic process models and domain specific models we are able to
integrate the management perspective and the verification perspective. The out-
come is processes that are eﬃcient but also meet safeguards objectives in order to
mitigate any risk of nuclear proliferation.
From the proposed conceptual framework the integrated Safeguards Modelling
Method (iSMM) is conceived through the integration of a number of meta-models
that are conceptualizations of three aspects or perspectives of the framework. In
5agreement with the Open Models Initiative a modelling method consists of a mod-
elling technique and algorithms/mechanisms used for processing models. Model
types created with iSMM can be used to design verification scenarios and plan
inspection activities. The three perspectives of the nuclear verification frame-
work safeguards, knowledge management and technology are encapsulated in iSMM.
Safeguards as its name implies is represented with models that depict nuclear fuel
cycle activities, inspection objectives and the resulting inspection processes. KM
perspective serves as a way of representing activities such as acquisition, storage,
access and flow of knowledge in support of safeguards. Finally, the technology as-
pect, is broadly named to represent a range of IT and other technologies supporting
safeguards as well as enabling knowledge management. The three perspectives are
considered to be the necessary structures for describing the nuclear verification
domain.
Modelling activity under iSMM generates content/models with languages which
are based on some of the already existing notation and metaphors commonly used
by inspectors in the organization. Model types that represent the safeguards per-
spective of the framework were created for this specific domain whereas the KM
and Technology perspectives are represented by domain independent languages
that already exist. The KM will be modelled with the existing PROMOTE mod-
elling language[8, 9, 10] whereas the technology related aspects will be represented
using techniques such as UML [11].
Starting from a higher layer where modelling languages are used to represent
nuclear activities and diversion scenarios in a state, the subsequent layer represents
scenario-based inspection objectives that are the link and means of measuring the
completeness of inspection reference processes. To be able to externalize some of
the domain knowledge into models which can also be processed there has to be
a certain level of formalism to which the syntax of the created models adheres
to. Models can be used to represent a system under study by solely serving the
purpose of ”a picture is worth a thousand words” or could be formalised to allow
their processing through mechanisms and algorithms. All models are derived from
their meta-models imposing on them a degree of syntactical correctness. This said,
some models are meant as Knowledge Management Models in comparison to more
formal models referred to in [12] as Knowledge Engineering Models. The former can
6be interpreted also by humans and therefore can be incomplete in terms of their
capability to be processed by machines. They however still serve an important
purpose in the framework by providing knowledge artifcats and context in the
inspection knowledge space.
Depending on the processing requirements for iSMM models the level of for-
malism has to be adequate in order that the intended processing is possible. In
some cases formalization with meta-modelling needs to be followed with additional
level of formalism that can be achieved for instance with graph theory, petri-nets
or graph grammars[12, 7]. In order to formalize the process structures in addition
to the data structures represented say with Nuclear Fuel Cycle Model (NFCM),
creation of a meta-model is in this example not suﬃcient for processing. In ad-
dition to a range of alternatives for formalizing models this study applies Pattern
Theory (PT) which oﬀers mathematical and graphical constructs that are used to
represent rules and possible relations between various nuclear activities modelled
with the NFCM language.
The iSMM considers processing of the NFCM used to represent acquisition
paths of nuclear material that can be used to attain a nuclear weapon. As an exam-
ple PT formalism is used in order to make NFCM processable and oﬀer model-level
functionality. The theory oﬀers constructs called generators that can be combined
into configurations to graphically or mathematically formalize modelling elements
their inputs, outputs, attributes and their possible connections [13]. Configurations
can be considered as formalized process structures that can represent a potential
acquisition path and can be evaluated or compared. For example as a result of such
formalism a general algorithms can be applied to check the correctness/consistency
of the model. Compare structures in diﬀerent countries or its variations over time
in the same country. Additionally, specific algorithms can be used to automatically
generate say safeguards objectives out of the modelled acquisition path. Finally,
the results show potential to have expert friendly models that can be translated
to PT language. PT, can serves as an intermediate language that can be further
transformed to data structures or other models such as UML. A number of other
applications are also possible as a result of the formalism demonstrated that can
contribute to future research in the specific domain and beyond.
Results of the research can be validated by an existing procedure at the IAEA
7that is based on conceptual grouping of tools and methods for verifying a member
state. The so called State-Level Integrated Safeguards Approach is an example of
a inspection plan which is designed for a state as a whole by finding optimal com-
bination of technologies and methods to reduce inspection cost while maintaining
the eﬀectiveness. With the use of the domain specific modelling languages pro-
cedures, mechanisms and algorithms are encapsulated into a modelling method.
The artifacts created as a result of the modelling activity represent content that
depicts a Safeguards Approach through the use of diagrammatic models. In ad-
dition to domain knowledge that is externalized iSMM facilitates the creation
of process models and a verification strategy that considers safeguards concepts,
knowledge management practices and use of advanced technologies. By compar-
ing a safeguards approach currently created in the organization as a document
to an approach that is model rich easily accessible, visualized, can be processed
and queried represents some of the practical contributions to this domain. The
result is content that can be used as a work plan or an inspection path that is agile
and documents clearly inspection activities [14]. Moreover, the modelling method
and the overall approach suggested can be applied to any domain characterised
with complex processes that can not be acquired oﬀ the shelf. A model based ap-
proach formalized by mathematical means can help easily capture expert domain
knowledge and use the same in the designing of core processes.
1.2 Motivation
Knowledge as a subject has diﬀerent value depending on the context where it is
applied. In the private sector knowledge turns into profits and profits maximize
the shareholder wealth. Along the financial value attached to knowledge, organi-
zations which are knowledge intensive but exist in a non-profit environment have
also realized the importance of preserving, sharing and even creating new knowl-
edge. The IAEA started eﬀorts few years back to help member states preserve
the nuclear knowledge they need to maintain the vital nuclear plants. Recently
this organization recognized the need for an inward focus on knowledge and its
management as a necessary measure to maintain its relevance on the international
nuclear scene. Preserving nuclear verification knowledge is important and may
8become crucial in holding the non-proliferation regime on its feet. High quality,
eﬃcient and credible knowledge-based conclusions are becoming even more impor-
tant in redefining the role of the Agency. Increasing number of nuclear facilities
worldwide combined with the large amounts of information introduce new chal-
lenges in ensuring IAEA’s role as the institution in charge of providing nuclear
non-proliferation assurance. Quantitative information collected in the field as well
as qualitative information from open source requires ever more knowledgable staﬀ
to turn it into actionable intelligence where eﬀective safeguards is also eﬃcient.
Already adopted process oriented view of the organization needs to be utilized not
only as a catalyst for increasing eﬃciency but also ensuring the level of quality in
verification work performed by inspectors. Reducing costs at the risk of a prolif-
eration incident is not an acceptable scenario for the IAEA since its implications
will always exceed the material loss caused by any existing redundancy. Credi-
bility as the trademark of the organization needs to be maintained at any price
therefore a process oriented view should not only encourage eﬃciency but serve as
a mechanism to manage knowledge required for performing inspections activities.
In light of this, the research tries to contribute with a conceptual framework and a
modelling method in order to streamline verification objectives and management
needs. This should help preserve procedural knowledge, ensure design of quality
verification activities that are cost eﬀective at the necessary price for reducing the
risk of the use of nuclear material for non-peaceful purpose by any state.
1.3 Contributions
This work contributes to the field of computer science and knowledge management.
It is dedicated to the work of Safeguards Inspectors faced with the upcoming
challenges of Information Driven Safeguards. The model-based approach and the
pattern theory formalization language is expected to contribute to any domain
where models can be used to make domain knowledge explicit and apply the same
for improving core processes in an organization.
Chapters ahead review KM literature and the nuclear inspection domain in or-
der to built a foundation in a form of conceptual framework. Carefully considering
information, domain and processing logic the framework serves as basis for for-
9malizing nuclear verification data and process structures [7]. Through the concep-
tually intertwined nuclear inspection information structures and existing process
management structures, inspection activities modelled are necessarily knowledge
based in contrast to otherwise general reference processes. Design of inspection
activities is seen as driven by knowledge requiring more structures than typically
necessary for business process modelling. Based on this conceptual foundation
the modelling method is created which entails techniques for modelling the do-
main with languages that help structurize and externalize knowledge necessary for
quality inspection. To achieve this in addition to formalizing structures through
meta-modelling the research oﬀers an example of a formal language that allows
processing of models and application of complex algorithms that can be generic or
specific. Inspectors will be able through the use of models to better prepare for,
analyse and conduct inspections.
In summary, for the domain studied this work comprises of the following major
contributions:
1. Application of Pattern Theory for formalising process structures
2. A conceptual nuclear verification framework which is knowledge based, tech-
nology aware and process oriented
3. A modelling method named integrated Safeguards Modelling Method (iSMM)
used for representing Safeguards information structures
4. A model-based approach to operationalizing knowledge used for designing,
analysing and documenting inspection processes
5. An extension of the Process-oriented Knowledge Management approach with
domain specific process models
The work is meant to contribute to the daily work of inspectors with a platform
that is knowledge rich (i.e. knowledge base) supporting process orientation for
performed inspection activities. Modelling languages defined and used serve as the
lingua franca for preserving, exchanging nuclear verification information structures
for use by future Safeguards.
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1.4 Thesis Organization
Chapter two consists of a literature review section on KM and specifically on
applicable KM strategies for a non-profit organization such as the IAEA and the
Department of Safeguards - the verification mission of the IAEA. Various KM
methods are used to study the KM in the context of an organization with a very
specific and important mission.
Evaluation
Conceptual 
Design (iSMM)
Requirements 
Analysis
(Inspection 
Processes)
Literature 
Review
Formalization
(Pattern Theory)
Implementation
(Example Case)
Table 1.2. Thesis Organization
Next Chapter three, describes the inspection domain oﬀering an overview of
verification concepts as defined in the Safeguards Manual. Furthermore, it de-
scribes verification frameworks such as Integrated Safeguards (IS). It attempts to
characterize the inspection processes by empirically classifying them in terms of
their process complexity and knowledge intensity.
Chapter four deals with a model based approaches and presents the verification
conceptual framework and its perspectives. The conceptual work is then formal-
ized to be transformed into modelling languages which depict various aspects of
the verification domain. Also, objective-driven modelling is considered where Ob-
jectives are meant to be the link between domain specific models and inspection
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process models. Objectives are seen as criteria which meets the verification obliga-
tions derived from the analysis performed on the modelled acquisition path in the
fictitious state Ruritania. This chapter concludes also with a brief introduction of
the KM modelling language and UML that are domain independent and cover the
other two perspectives of the framework.
Chapter five attempts to present a way of formalizing modelling languages
with the use of Pattern Theory. The example model formalized is NFCM which
is used to represent the acquisition path. Since with this language we model all
nuclear activities in a state the formalism is applied to define through graphical and
algebraic constructs the rules and the logic of combining any two nuclear activities.
The example also looks into the potential use of the theory to create probabilistic
models that extend the boolean function that only defines the relation between
two generators as true or false. The same structure formula can be extended to
accept a continuum of values that can characterize relations between modelling
elements as more or less probable.
Chapter six compromises of the evaluation of the approach. The model based
approach and its extension with pattern theory is evaluated in terms of its appli-
cability in the nuclear verification domain. Moreover, the general application of
the approach is discussed dealing with complex processes in other domains. Other
formalizms such as graphs and Graph Grammars are considered. Furthermore, PT
evaluation is provided by comparison to the Petri Net formalizm.
Chapter seven oﬀers some of the technical details necessary for the implementa-
tion of modelling languages using the ADOxx framework. An overview is provided
of the classes implemented and the repository of models which are defined in the
previous chapters. Moreover, an example case is shown for a fictitious state of
Ruritania. Models generated to represent a state-level Safeguards approach in this
state is exemplified.
This thesis is concluded with chapter eight oﬀering an outlook of future re-
search which this work leads and contributes to. Appendix A oﬀers a glossary of
terms whereas Appendix B documents the script for the notation of the modelling
language Nuclear Fuel Cycle Model.
Chapter2
Knowledge Management and
Nuclear Verification
2.1 Nuclear Knowledge Management
Knowledge Management eﬀorts within the IAEA commenced several years ago.
They were traditionally directed outside the IAEA with an objective of supporting
nuclear knowledge needs of member states.
The NKM eﬀorts at the IAEA were focused mainly on preservation of knowl-
edge that exists in the nuclear community across member states facing the reality
of the ongoing nuclear expansion met by the generation change amongst nuclear ex-
perts [15]. By contributing to educational programmes the objective is to preserve,
create knowledge in support of the development of peaceful nuclear technology.
The four discernible elements of Nuclear Knowledge Management (NKM) at
the agency are [15]:
• Enhancing Nuclear Education and Training
• Preserving and Maintaining Nuclear Knowledge
• Pooling and Analyzing Nuclear Knowledge
• Promoting Policy and Guidance for Nuclear KM
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The focus of IAEA’s activities from the start remained mainly on preserv-
ing nuclear knowledge by enhancing the education and training systems in the
field nuclear knowledge. In 2002, the IAEA started implementing a special sub-
program known as Nuclear Knowledge Management (NKM). The focus of the
subprogramme was to develop guidelines for NKM. Such guidelines are meant to
help networking the nuclear community and coordinating education and training
so that existing knowledge is transferred to the next generation of scientists and
institutions [15, 16]. In its medium term strategy covering 2006 until 2011 the
agency puts increased emphasis on nuclear knowledge management as an impor-
tant part of its international mission. With the increased aspirations for energy
independence by states the demand across the globe to further capability of peace-
ful nuclear energy is expected to increase [6]. This strategy sought by new nuclear
states will create a nuclear knowledge demand. Under the present context and
vision the IAEA organizes its strategy around three broad pillars: Technology,
Safety and Verification.
IAEA’s medium term strategy was adjusted due to the reality that nuclear
power is more so an option feasible in meeting energy demands by member state
committed to remain eﬃcient, safe, secure and clean, and not contribute to prolif-
eration [17]. In this research we will focus on knowledge management in the domain
of nuclear verification implemented by the inspectorate. The IAEA organizational
structure consists of several departments one of which is the department of safe-
guards responsible for the verification programme. The research will study on the
knowledge management initiatives relevant to the nuclear inspections and the ver-
ification domain where knowledge management and engineering can contribute to
the information driven safeguards.
2.2 Safeguards Challenges and Knowledge Man-
agement
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the last decades has been the
international authority in matters of nuclear verification. Traditionally, the inter-
national safeguards regime was mainly concerned with the correctness of declara-
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tion of nuclear material and activity provided by member states regularly. Member
states obliged with their safeguards agreement periodically report their inventories
of nuclear material which is then verified through on-site inspections. These safe-
guarding measures were fortified over time with the introduction of strengthened
safeguards followed by the protocol additional [18]. Knowledge management in
this study benefits from, however it is not related to the nuclear knowledge man-
agement programme discussed before. An eﬀort to internally improve knowledge
management within the inspectorate may also contribute to the nuclear knowl-
edge management programme however its focus is not on managing knowledge at
nuclear facilities instead it is focused on leveraging knowledge management and
engineering concepts and technologies specifically designed to support the verifi-
cation process. This eﬀort is geared towards researching internal measures that
should support IAEA’s operations divisions in the department of safeguards.
2.2.1 Integrated and Information Driven Verification
Nuclear inspections and other related activities are complex and knowledge in-
tensive. This amplifies the importance of knowledge management as a tool for
increasing eﬃciency and eﬀectiveness of knowledge workers. The intention is not
to disclose any operational details and the information presented here is subject
for clearance by the department in accordance with information security policy.
The descriptions provided ahead should give suﬃcient background for the reader
to place the research in context and help understand the application of research
contributions in practice.
Under the so called traditional safeguards the IAEA was focused on verifying
the correctness of state declarations. Nuclear material movement within the state
and between them is accounted for and matched through a well defined inspection
regime and criteria. This includes regularly scheduled inspections with an objective
of verifying that nuclear material is not diverted and all material is exclusively
for peaceful purposes. Verification measures were boosted with the strengthened
measures proposed by the IAEA in 1995. Since some of the measures required
additional authority a comity was formed to negotiate a standardized model for
such an authority. The result was the additional protocol model [18]. Figure 2.1
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shows how Safeguards has evolved since 1991.
With the introduction of the so called strengthened safeguards followed by the
Additional Protocol model (AP), IAEA was provided with better means to verify
state declarations in terms of their correctness and completeness. This milestone
has lead to increasing amount of information. The traditional approach of im-
plementing safeguards was focused on ensuring that declared nuclear material is
not being diverted for non-peaceful use. By using broader range of information
the state’s nuclear programme as a whole is considered. In addition to state dec-
larations and information obtained through Agency’s verification activities other
information is combined from open source as well as other sources. Use of infor-
mation analysis and tools in harmony with a view of the country as a whole lead
to state-level safeguards which is ”information driven” [6].
Figure 2.1. Evolution of Safeguards
In order to meet the challenges of the future strengthening of safeguards en-
visages an Integrated Safeguards approach which aims at integrating traditional
and strengthened measures to achieve the optimal combination. Under the com-
prehensive safeguards agreement verification any undeclared nuclear facilities may
exist undetected. With the conclusion of the additional protocol in states with a
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) the capability of the IAEA to detect
any undeclared activities or material is improved. Such an approach creates op-
portunities for the reduction of eﬀort on verifying declared nuclear material and
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allows for attention to potentially undeclared activities. Such combination of op-
timal measures are implementable in States where the Agency was able to draw a
conclusion that there is no indication of undeclared activity or material reducing
the traditional eﬀort on less sensitive nuclear material [18].
The reasoning behind this approach as mentioned before is to introduce mea-
sures that represent the optimal combination. Cost cutting measures could be
introduced through the use of technology, and tools IAEA has at hand by re-
ducing the number of inspections while in accordance to its legal authority and
obligation. The question researched here is focused towards contributing to the
field of knowledge management with tools and methodologies in support of the
state-level view and integrated safeguards approaches as a part of the future infor-
mation driven safeguards. It provides a knowledge based support in strengthening
the verification process in terms of adaptability, transparency and eﬃcacy through
the application of knowledge management and engineering ahead of the expected
nuclear renaissance.
Integrated approach stipulates development of the so called state-level view
by considering all nuclear and related activities within a state. This diﬀers from
the traditional facility-based approach. One of the challenges in developing and
maintaining a state-level integrated safeguards approach is continuously evaluating
state activities and consolidating large amounts of information stored in databases,
discovered through open source or collected through verification activities. Devel-
oping, reviewing and evaluating a state level approach is considered a knowledge
intensive task by having to consider the overall nuclear programme in a state and
any potential acquisition paths acquiring fissile materials with a potential use in a
weapons programme.
2.2.2 KM strategy context for nuclear verification
IAEA as one of the international organizations is based on a model that was cre-
ated and evolved to suit its very specific mission as specified in the statute of the
IAEA approved in 1956 article XII which lays out the grounds for the department
of Safeguards [19]. The Safeguards project, studied in this thesis, deals with the
responsibility of the agency to examine nuclear equipment and technology in mem-
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ber states by sending designated inspectors in their territory and verifying reports
provided by states. IAEA is financed by regular and voluntary contributions [18].
To better understand the economic model of the IAEA it is important to define
its objectives in accordance to the IAEA statute. It is also important to define
what makes and organization such as this successful. Since, innovation and profits
are not the objective the question raised is what are the fundamental drivers for
improving the Safeguards programme. KM eﬀorts undergoing in the organization
are an indicator that Knowledge Management is considered to play a vital role in
improving its services in the future. In order to align the organizational objec-
tives with KM eﬀorts a strategy based view is considered for devising a knowledge
management approach that will support the verification process.
In its short-medium term strategy for the verification mission the IAEA sets
forth an objective of providing assurance about the compliance of member states
with their obligations. Furthermore, it emphasizes the importance of the eﬀective-
ness of the safeguards systems. Through strengthened measures it should continue
to increase its capability of detecting undeclared nuclear material. Also, provisions
for integrating new types of information in an eﬀective and eﬃcient manner into
the state evaluation process. Also, to remain ready for the current arms reduction
initiative[17].
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Figure 2.2. The three dimensions of the suggested IAEA strategy that should be
considered in devising the KM strategy for the organization and more specifically the
Department of Safeguards
Competition or a competitive environment cannot be completely excluded as
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a challenge for an organization such as the IAEA. However, it is most crucial to
remain relevant. It A related aspect which is equally important is to be credible
and finally eﬃcient and eﬀective in meeting all safeguards objectives in light of
expected increase in nuclear activities [6]. Its mission has to remain as important
as it already is to the international community. It is however not the objective to
study the organization and the political context but just so to understand the best
suitable KM strategy which can align its mission with KM approaches and tools
that can improve the overall performance of the organization and help overcome
some of the future challenges.
Next section discusses author’s view of the three high-level strategic challenges
and their relation to a KM strategy for the verification programme at the IAEA.
Relevance - definition in the Princeton dictionary for the term relevance was
having a bearing on or connection with the subject at issue. It a term used to
describe how pertinent, how connected or applicable something is [20]. Mission of
the verification regime is to ensure peaceful use of nuclear technology and with no
real rivalry providing similar services internationally. There are state systems that
perform safeguards on the national level however there is no other internationally
body that is responsible universally. One of the main objectives is to remain
relevant on the international stage. Therefore, the objective of sustaining its role as
the only international body that provides assurance to the international community
on the matters of nuclear verification. Relevance as a strategic objective compares
to the competitive advantage that a private company needs to maintain. In the case
of the verification this means continuing to provide to the international community
credible assurance that nuclear material is not diverted for non-peaceful use in
accordance the obligations of each state under the NPT treaty and its safeguards
agreement. Failure to timely detect proliferation occurrence can bring into question
the relevance of the non-proliferation treaty and the safeguards systems as its
verification mechanism. It is therefore suggested that loosing relevance compares
to a company loosing its competitive advantage.
Eﬃciency and Eﬀectiveness - It is a priority for the board of governors that
the verification programme among others at the IAEA continues to improve its
response to increasing demands while ensuring cost eﬀectiveness by introducing
eﬃciency [21]. With increased future development in nuclear technology it can be
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expected more of the IAEAs verification will be needed while the resources may
not proportionally grow.
Credibility - It is not often enough for the department of safeguards to provide
evidence about any undeclared activities discovered. Such evidence has to be
also credible. With increased eﬀorts to integrate new information in the state
evaluation process it is becoming more challenging than ever to synthesize and
derive conclusions that are based on facts that support the evidence. Under the
information driven safeguards the use of satellite imagery, open source information
has shown to be a powerful tool in strengthening safeguards measures. Integration
of other sources of information in addition to the verification data collected in the
field requires additional eﬀorts to validate the information and reach conclusions
on the states nuclear activities. Credibility is therefore another important part of
the verification strategy.
The above strategic challenges for the verification regime were derived from the
medium-short term strategy as an attempt to the steer the KM strategy.
2.3 Strategy-driven Knowledge Management
To have an overview of the knowledge management requirements for nuclear verifi-
cation programme we start with a top-down view of the organization. The starting
point is the strategy which can be used to drive the knowledge management strat-
egy. In some literature KM Strategy is referred to as Knowledge Strategy mainly
focusing on profit making entities. For example, the two known strategy based
approaches proposed by Zack and Hansen for generating a KM strategy may not
be fully compatible with the model of an organization such as the IAEA and espe-
cially its verification arm. It is however possible to inherit some of the principles
and adapt the two approaches. By combining the economic aspect [22] and knowl-
edge resources required to close any strategic gaps [23] the next section provides
an overview of the IAEA verification objectives and potential KM strategy.
Development of a KM strategy begins by defining the business strategy and
goals. The question posed here is what should the right strategy for Knowledge
Management be in an organization which does not necessarily operate in a such
a competitive environment and how do benefits of KM materialize. The govern-
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mental sector, which perhaps resembles and is more similar to an international
organization such as the Agency, can be used as a starting point and basis for
comparison. However, it has to be noted that even there the two diﬀer since in
comparison international organizations, government sectors too have a direct re-
lation with their customers, namely tax payers. International organizations are
financed through member states contributions and in return the Agency provides
services one of which is assurance of non-proliferation. The ”way of doing business”
can only be partially compared to business modus operandi in the profit making
sector.
Although the IAEA may not face the same challenges common to the private
sector it has challenges of its own created by the environment and reality it is
surrounded by. A status equivalent to competitive is remaining relevant for an
international organization such as the agency. Instead of increasing market share
an international organization may need to increase its influence so to best justify
its mission. IAEA and similar organizations also run based on a certain economic
model. Hansen et al claims that the way to build KM strategy is to base it on
company’s economic model [22]. Michael Zack equally believes that organizational
strategic context helps to identify knowledge management initiatives that can sup-
port the organizational mission, strengthen its competitive position, and create
shareholder value [23]. Both Hansen and Zack propose a top down approach in
devising the KM strategy. Hansen proposes that KM initiatives are directly linked
to the economies of reuse serving as the basis for creating any KM strategy. Both
approaches emphasize the linkage between the organization’s purpose and objec-
tives to its KM initiatives. As it is the case most of the companies focus on the
digital capture, storage and distribution of knowledge failing to align it to the
organizational goals [24].
The two strategy driven approaches introduced oﬀer guidance in developing
strategic knowledge however diﬀer in what drives them.
In literature there is a number of approaches that oﬀer guidance in creating
a knowledge management strategy by aligning it to its business strategy [22, 23,
25, 26]. A comprehensive summary of approaches is presented in [27]. Knowledge
is considered to be a strategic resource therefore organizations ability to capture,
store, apply and share it leads to better performance and therefore competitive
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advantage [23]. Strategy is defined by Princeton as ”an elaborate and systematic
plan of action”. Such a plan gives direction relative to the current position of a
company or organization. Knowledge strategy remains to be one of the important
functions of today’s knowledge organizations. To devise a strategy there has to
be a focus where knowledge assets are the most needed or can add the most value
for an organization to gain competitive advantage, become a market leader or in
the case of the IAEA improve and extend its mission. In literature knowledge
management strategy also referred to briefly as knowledge strategy has many foci
as seen by researchers and practitioner. Karl Wiig groups KM strategies in six
groups based on the strengths and nature of the organization [28]. Similarly along
those lines Day and Wendler oﬀer a practitioner’s view and mention five knowledge
strategies implemented by large corporations [26].
The two main views considered in devising a verification KM strategy are those
introduced by Zack and Hansen. One is known as the customer view focusing on
the customer and the product whereas the second view is more of a management
view where knowledge as a resource is to employed in reducing and strategic gaps.
2.3.1 Customer/Product View on the Knowledge Manage-
ment Strategy
Hansen, in his approach for strategic KM (or strategic knowledge) links the eco-
nomic model of the organization to a customer and product based KM strategy.
The emphasis is on the value that the KM adds for its customers. The codifi-
cation strategy is applicable to organizations that can reuse knowledge whereas
the personalization strategy is applicable to those that provide highly customized
products[22]. One approach is to focus on the storage, indexing, accessing of knowl-
edge, which is referred as codification whereas the second approach is to focus on
the person-to-person means and social networking attributed with the term person-
alization. The two approaches of codification and personalization are not mutually
exclusive however it is recommended that one represents the primary strategy with
the other strategy supporting it. With codification the emphasis is on capturing,
storing explicit knowledge which can be reused to achieve eﬃciency, and quality of
standardized products provided to the customers. On the other hand the personal-
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ization strategy is based on person-to-person knowledge flow that is necessary for
services such as consultancy that are customized for the customer. It is therefore
the approach from Hansen sees strategic KM from from the customer perspective.
Profile of the customer and the type of product or service determines the choice
between a personalization and codification strategy. The origins of the codification
and personalization strategies are from the epistemological separation introduced
by Polany in 1967 who identified the two aspects of knowledge, namely tacit and
explicit knowledge. In terms of the KM strategy and the approach in favor the
two aspects were aligned to the Gilbert Ryles’ ”knowing what” and ”knowing how”
[29]. Knowledge held by individuals in a non-written, explicit form is referred to as
tacit knowledge. In 1995 Nonaka presented methods of converting or transforming
tacit knowledge to explicit knowledge although Polany indicates that some tacit
knowledge will always remain.
2.3.1.1 Verification Information Products
Regularly the IAEA is obliged to report to the board of governors on the verifi-
cation activities. These reports are written documents issued on the subject state
provided of an exceptional situation such as Iran, or Iraq in the late 90s. These
products are result of several knowledge processes with the organization in coopera-
tion with the state and other institutions. They represent synthesis of quantitative
information collected in the field combined with qualitative information collected
through satellite imagery and open source depending on the legal authority given
to the IAEA. After being reviewed by experts in the field and after considering
state specific data (political context, past activities) a report is prepared for the
board [18]. Other reports created and sent to the member states are statement
of inspection activities (90a, 90b) or in some cases states are informed of design
information verification and examination activities. Moreover reports sent to a
state informing about CA activities (10a, 10b) [30].
In addition to the frequent reports and ad hoc reports explained above the main
information product generated by the IAEA is the Safeguards Implementation
Report known with its abbreviation SIR. This report is generated every year and
it covers all states under with a safeguards agreement. A report on the obligatory
compliance by the state is created detailing any failures to comply since the last
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SIR report. Summarized information on the status of identified issues is followed
by details concerning the state or group of states in question. In comparison to the
SIR report which is confidential information, the SIR technical report is considered
as classified information.
2.3.1.2 Product-based Strategy
Looking at the IAEA and the verification programme from Hansen’s angle it is
important to define who the customers are and what are the products and ser-
vices oﬀered. Some of the identified products and services by the department
of safeguards are listed as attributed by the type of KM strategy as described by
Hansen. For example the Safeguards Implementation Report is based on the verifi-
cation data and results from the field and can be considered to imply a codification
strategy as best suitable to support it. This in comparison to Safeguard Approach
which is designed for each state and is customized to the state in question would
lean more towards a personalization strategy using the characterization from the
Hansen framework. It is recognized that any knowledge strategy cannot exclusively
support one of the two approaches however emphasis is given to one. Classifica-
tion of the strategy by end results is also apparent in Treacy and Wiersema’s
value disciplines [31]. It is suggests that an organization can excel at one or most
two value areas; customer intimacy, product leadership or operational excellence.
These values can be used in having a focused and well placed KM strategy.
Table 2.1 provided, indicates that most of the IAEA products created under
the traditional safeguards require codification strategy by storing, indexing and
accessing quickly quality information presented to the Board of Governors. On
the other hand customized products such as SG approaches and ad-hoc reports
require knowledge that cannot be easily found in explicit form. Such products
represent more ambiguous situations which are politically sensitive and require
knowledge of a wide range of nuclear activities a particular state may be involved.
Any strategy, including a knowledge strategy has a dynamic component the
present knowledge strategy for the verification appears to be mainly on the codifi-
cation side of the knowledge spectrum however personalization required is also not
minor therefore requiring a strategy that balances both. There appears to be a
correlation between the way of working under Traditional Safeguards and the po-
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Codification and PersonalizationInternalRecommendations that cover of concerns specific to a stateState Evaluation Report 
(SER)
CodificationExternal10(a) is the report informing the State about the activities performed 
under AP. 10(b) is to inform the State of the results of activities in 
respect to any questions and inconsistencies
Statements under and 
Additional Protocol
CodificationExternalReport submitted by the IAEA BoG to the GC of the IAEA. It contains 
the Safeguards Statement
IAEA Annual Report
PersonalizationInternal and 
External
It can be facility based or state based. It represents the collection of 
measures to allow the IAEA to meet its SG objectives/
SG Approach
CodificationExternalLetter sent to the state whenever a DIV/E is performedReport on design 
information examination 
and verification
CodificationExternalReport containing technical conclusions reached through verification 
activities.
Statement on Conclusions 
(90(b)) Statement
CodificationExternalA formal report sent to the State after each inspectionStatement on Inspection 
Results (90(a)) Statement
CodificationExternalA periodic report generated yearly detailing the compliance of states 
since the previous SIR report
Safeguards 
Implementation Report 
(SIR)
Codification and PersonalizationExternalWritten documents on the subject state provided for exceptional 
situations (e.g. Iran, Iraq etc.)
Reports to the BoG on 
verification activities
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Table 2.1. List of some of the IAEA reports for which Safeguards is responsible. Using
Hansen’s approach of developing a strategy based on the customer and the type of
product an attempt is made to match IAEA’s information products with one of the
knowledge strategies.
tential knowledge strategy. The latest trend under the integrated and information
driven safeguards can be said still relies on the codification strategy however more
and more it will need to adjust to the personalization strategy according to the
type of knowledge required and activities necessary for providing services based
on real-time synthesis (conclusions) on information rather than reuse of existing
knowledge.
Based on the approach [22] some of the questions to be asked in order to
discover the choice of the two broad KM strategies are:
• Do you have standardized or customized products?
• Do your employees use tacit or explicit knowledge to solve problems?
• Do you have a mature or innovative products?
The table shown attempts to summarize safeguards products and services in
order to better understand the applicable knowledge strategy broadly grouped
as codification and personalization by Hansen. Once again this framework was
created for firms in the private sectors however it gives a an overview of verification
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related products and how they relate the knowledge approach and overall strategy.
The most left column lists a number of information products and services for
which the Department of Safeguards is responsible. Most of them represent reports
which can be broadly classified as internal and external based on the intended
audience[32]. The strategy that follows each product is the based on two main
questions:
1. Is this a periodic report generated by reusing codified knowledge or does it
require analysis of vaguely defined knowledge?
2. Is it mostly based on written documents and data collected or does it require
mostly expert knowledge not available in written form?
3. Is it a periodic report or special adhoc report?
By answering these questions an overview of the organization and the knowl-
edge strategy is provided along the lines Hansen attempted with for-profit firms.
As mentioned before, often there is no clear link between the services and the
customer or the member state as the IAEA is sponsored by member states and it
serves the international community as a whole.
It can be noted most of the products require a codification knowledge strategy
since they are based on the principle of codifying, storing and disseminating of
knowledge that is reused in order to provide the service. Ad hoc reports which are
generated for special cases by definition rely more on expert tacit knowledge since
they deal with a unexpected situation for which knowledge may not be readily
available for reuse. Furthermore, the Safeguards Approach was chosen to require
the personalization strategy since each approach is created specifically for a state
and its nuclear programme considering also information sources other than synthe-
sis of data collected during the verification. In some cases Safeguards Approaches
are simple and are prepared for individual facilities based on a model/template
therefore relying mainly on codified knowledge. Also, this products in terms of the
audience is both external and internal since the approach is agreed by both, the
department and the state.
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2.3.2 View of Knowledge as a Strategic Resource
Also in agreement with Morten T. Hansen that strategic knowledge should be based
on the strategic vision of the organization, Michael Zack presents a framework
which is more seen from a resource management view. For example, by following
the organizational strategy and performing Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities
and Threats (SWOT) analysis using Porter’s five forces framework organizational
strategic gaps can be identified. Strategic gaps represent the distance between
what the company has planned and where it stands at present. According to the
author this gap is directly related to the knowledge gap between the knowledge
resources a company has and should have to fulfill its strategy[23]. By identifying
these gaps through analysis of the company and by mapping the knowledge in the
company, weaknesses can be identified. Such weaknesses can then be dealt with
using a relevant KM strategy.
Zack claims that key to success is a resource-based view of the company and
goes forward to identify components of the KM strategy. Depending on how well
the KM supports the organization, knowledge is classified into core, advanced and
innovative [23]. Depending on knowledge gaps being internal or external versus the
competition an organization can be exploiter and explorer in the respective order.
This is a less applicable characterization for the agency as it is meant to measure
the gap vis-a-vie the competition. Moreover, another view of knowledge sources
can be internal, external or boundless knowledge. Internal knowledge may reside in
peoples heads, documents or procedures in contrast to external knowledge which
can be sourced from outside the organization such as publications, universities,
government agencies and so on. This aspect is important in identifying the degree
a organization depends on knowledge resources laying within the organization or
those to be sought externally. Based on the strategy of the company, the sources
of knowledge it depends on and the type of knowledge it needs companies are
classified as aggressive or conservative. Such examples of knowledge management
strategy are largely meant for profit-making entities as they mostly utilize KM as
means of remaining competitive through innovation and productivity. The next
section will try to look at the Agency’s knowledge management strategy for the
verification domain using a hybrid of the previously mentioned approaches. A
discussion what the perceived knowledge gaps, the type of knowledge it requires
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
 























Table 2.2. Safeguard Stretegic issues presented using the strategic gap framework from
Michael Zack
to remain relevant in the international community or commonly referred to as
competitive. This involves eﬀective and eﬃcient safeguards supported by a proper
knowledge management strategy, which is a prerequisite for a successful mission
in a knowledge driven organization.
Some of the main questions to ask in this approach are:
• What are your knowledge gaps
• What are your internal knowledge gaps
• What are your external knowledge gaps (compared to competition)
• Compare your dynamic learning capabilities
Based on the strategic framework for mapping knowledge the organizations
knowledge gaps are seen relative to the competition. In the case of the IAEA this
28
is not applicable however identifying the types of knowledge required and how they
link to the strategic issues or gaps may still enhance the understanding of what
would be a suitable knowledge strategy. On the left, most, column the strategic
issues are listed which were discovered during the strategic planning exercise at the
department of safeguards (SWOC analysis) [33]. These issues are presented here
using Zack’s strategic mapping framework. The second column (Knowledge Type)
shows the classification of knowledge which can be ”Core, Advanced or Innovative”.
Core knowledge is the basic level of knowledge that will keep a business going
however will not give it a competitive advantage compared to its competitors.
Advanced knowledge on the other hand is knowledge which can give a firm a
competitive edge. Finally, the innovative knowledge is of the type that makes a
firm the market leader. To better put this classification in use for the purpose of
the verification knowledge strategy it is slightly adapted where core is the basic
knowledge for the organization and the verification mission to remain relevant,
advanced would increase its credibility whereas innovative knowledge can bring it
forward for instance by of extending its mission (i.e. disarmament agreement) and
becoming the only authority on nuclear issues.
The classification shown in the table is based on the strategic issues identified
and by answering the following questions in order to link it to the knowledge
resources:
• What knowledge type would best address these issues in meeting strategic
objectives stated in the medium-term strategy?
• Can the required knowledge be applied by exploiting the knowledge resources
in-house or it needs to be explored outside the organization?
• Does it require closing a knowledge gap internally or externally (institutions,
governmental agencies etc)?
Here an assumption is made that all the strategic issues are linked to potential
knowledge gaps that exist. Knowledge gaps that cause the strategic gaps need
to be addressed by the knowledge strategy. The table oﬀers an overview of the
dependency of the organization on knowledge resources however classified and gives
somewhat an orientation for sourcing knowledge resources under the verification
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knowledge strategy. Furthermore, it is important to find means of minimize the
dependency of the organization of knowledge resources insuﬃciently available while
utilizing knowledge already available in the organization.
2.4 KM Spectrum and Verification Strategy
In addition to the reviewed approaches for creating a knowledge strategy for the
verification programme at the IAEA it is useful to create a KM landscape of
applications that are presently used or are in development within the department
of safeguards. Next figure showing the ”as is view” of the safeguards systems
and activities is integrated with the product-based and resource-based view ofKM
strategy discussed earlier. Literature suggests various ways of segregating the KM
spectrum however one research performed by Binney comes to mind as the most
applicable and general to fit the classification of KM elements in a organization
such as the IAEA. He synthesizes the KM activities and related technologies into
six categories [34]:
1. Transactional KM − knowledge is embedded in the application of technology.
Here the knowledge is presented to the user in the process of completing a
transaction
2. Analytical KM - knowledge is created from various data sources by turning
it to information which can become knowledge
3. Asset management - Management of explicit knowledge and intellectual prop-
erty
4. Process-based KM - represents the improvement of processes and working
practices.
5. Developmental KM - it covers activities for increasing the competencies of
knowledge workers
6. Innovation/Creation KM - includes providing an environment in which knowl-
edge workers as individuals and as a group can collaborate for creation of
new knowledge
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

  


























 














































Table 2.3. as is KM Spectrum of Safeguards KM systems and activities
The table shows an overview of the KM activities according to Binney extended
with the application landscape at the Department of Safeguards. Furthermore, a
connection is made to the knowledge strategy analysis based on products and
services and strategic issues. The spectrum shows how starting from the left the
emphasis is on codification and explicit knowledge whereas the other end considers
mostly KM activities organized around implicit and tacit knowledge. Implicit
knowledge being non-explicit knowledge likely to be codified [34].
The information products and the associated KM activities only give a vague
idea on the existing relationship between knowledge management and the actual
products of the department. Most of the products are based on the codification
strategy therefore rely on transactional, analytical and asset management KM
where explicit knowledge is the main contributor to the eﬃcient generation of
quality products. The process-based KM is also an aspect which is identified and
is considered to be an important component of enhancing procedural knowledge.
Other activities which are more dealing with implicit knowledge are equally impor-
tant and are being increasingly sought for under knowledge activities of integrated
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and information driven safeguards [18].
2.5 Process-oriented KM
From the knowledge management strategy reviewed in this chapter there are ele-
ments which lead to a codification based approach however there is a great need
also for personalization and lots of focus on tacit and implicit knowledge pertaining
to the verification programme. It is therefore necessary to develop an approach
that represents a balance of activities that are focused on both implicit and explicit
knowledge. A known approach for externalizing implicit knowledge while easily
managing explicit knowledge through a process view is Process-Oriented Knowl-
edge Management (POKM). The process orientation appears followed by processes
modelling represents an important part of identifying knowledge activities and dis-
covering procedural knowledge. It also provides a link to all KM aspects while
remaining aligned to the business processes and therefore the business strategy.
The process-orientation within knowledge management was mentioned since
the start of knowledge management in the mid nineties [14]. Some years later,
there were several initiatives that made process-orientation the major part of the
organizational dimension of knowledge management. A list of approaches includes
[35] Income approach which linked knowledge resources to processes; the Work-
ware approach distinguished between tacit knowledge and explicit knowledge in a
process, where implicit knowledge is aimed to be expressed in a diﬀerent notation
rather than process sequences; the EULE2 is an agent based supporting system
considering knowledge flows as processes; the K-Modeller is a modelling method
for knowledge-intensive business processes; the ARIS extension provided additional
modelling elements for platforms like Hyperwave.
Two research initiatives studied process-oriented knowledge management very
intensively. DECOR [36, 37], was an EU-Project linking ontologies with business
processes. The focus was the ontology support of business processes. Further-
more, PROMOTE was an EU-Project providing a holistic modelling language for
process-oriented knowledge management based on the business process manage-
ment paradigm [38]. Since then PROMOTE [39, 40] continuously improved in
commercial projects [41] and in the EC-Projects Akogrimo [9], AsIsKnown [41]
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and BREIN [8].
Beside PROMOTE that evolved from a serious research initiative towards a
commercial product. KMDL is another approach that reached commercial level
today. KMDL focuses on key processes and provides a dedicated model languages
for the analysis of processes [42].
Overall process oriented knowledge management has three view-points:
1. The process is seen as content. Usually this is managed by traditional busi-
ness process management approaches that make the implicit know-how of an
organization explicit in forms of process models.
2. The process is seen as the entry point and as an integration platform of
knowledge management. The majority of process-oriented knowledge man-
agement approaches focused on this view-point, as it raises the eﬀectiveness
of knowledge management. Processes of the daily work are analysed, and
supported by knowledge management.
3. The process is seen as the management approach for knowledge. As are
business processes managed the approach evolves to the management of the
KM activities from a process-oriented standpoint.
For the implementation of inspection models and a knowledge management
approach for the department of safeguards the PROMOTE approach was chosen.
All three views of POKM are interesting in the context of the inspection modelling
framework. The inspection processes to deter the potential weapons acquisition
are considered knowledge intensive and will therefore be supported in a process-
oriented with knowledge resources. PROMOTE covers the knowledge management
perspective of the inspection modelling framework presented later on.
2.6 Knowledge Engineering and
Knowledge Management
The outcome of the modelling activity does not have to lead to a creation of a
knowledge system typically the case with approaches such as CommonKADS [43].
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The harmony between these perspectives leads to the inspection modelling
as an activity for documenting conceptualizations of the verification domain on
a platform that allows primarily analysis of inspection processes as a result of
identified safeguards objectives for a specific state. To achieve this also a level of
formalism is required to empower the use of models in the framework. An example
would be the use of algorithms to validate the knowledge or in practical terms
validate models that represent a conceptualization. Such a formalism is possible
also through pattern theory providing us with algebraic constructs that can be
used for example to check the consistency of models both syntactically and and
semantically.
Knowledge engineering is defined as the task of building knowledge systems.
It is also considered synonymous with the modelling activity today. However, this
definitions and terminology inherits to a great deal the work of past decades where
information systems were segmented from the knowledge system on the basis of
their purpose. Presently most information systems are partially knowledge system
something that has followed the natural evolvement of the business and other areas
which have seen increase in their complexity.
If modelling as an activity was traditionally related to knowledge engineering
in a strict sense this is even more so today. However every system can be at least
partially considered a knowledge system.
In literature and practice the two fields of knowledge management and engi-
neering are seen as two quite separate fields that deal with diﬀerence problematic
regardless of the knowledge focus they have. One is seen as a management ap-
proach where knowledge is viewed as a resource whereas the second one deals with
transferring of knowledge to systems. If knowledge management is the field which
deals with methods, tools and approaches that can best management knowledge
in the organization it can be said that this field also is related to knowledge engi-
neering as a knowledge providing instrument. Does knowledge management mange
eﬀorts such as knowledge engineering? No, however since KM is considered to be
a socio-technical system the technical part may involve knowledge engineering and
therefore is in directly related to KM.
In the case of inspection modelling the idea of knowledge management in the
department of safeguards requires eﬀorts that deal with issues of knowledge man-
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agement and are supplied with knowledge objects conceived through knowledge
engineering approaches such as modelling. Use of diagrammatic models to repre-
sent concepts of safeguards does not only have to be seen as an eﬀort for creating
specific artefact for the department that can be used in designing and implementing
information and knowledge systems. Quite the opposite they can serve as content
for documenting and visualising safeguarding concepts contributing to the working
level as knowledge space for designing and specifying inspection processes to best
meet safeguards objectives. Under the open models initiative the use of modelling
methods considers components (language, procedures and algorithms) which rep-
resent chunks of a packaged knowledge with functionality to solve repeatable and
single instance problems.
As it is the case with inspection modelling the objective is to contribute to
the management of knowledge however through a knowledge engineering approach
which is a component of a socio-technical environment. Models used under the
framework represent conceptual integration of sub-domains of verification which
lead towards verification approaches that are coherent, eﬀective and cost aware.
Additionally, this conceptualization can be followed by a level of structure and
formalism that can align such approaches to with the technology in the department.
As discussed in the previous section an eﬀective way of a managing and accessing
knowledge is through a process view. It is therefore that POKM is applied here as
an approach.
Where the paths of KM and KE in this thesis cross is POKM seen as a knowl-
edge management approach which is model based. Models here are used for rep-
resenting business processes, knowledge processes as well as other structures that
a part of an approach. Models are artefacts that oﬀer guidance and content for
tracking and managing the implementation a knowledge management. On the
other hand use of models and modelling as an activity is synonymous to knowl-
edge engineering where they are used to capture concepts from experts eventually
transformed to data structures and rules of a knowledge based system. The com-
mon element between POKM and KE here is therefore a model as a representation
or content that can support knowledge management provisioned through knowl-
edge engineering techniques. Inspection models which are domain-specific are inte-
grated with the PROMOTE modelling method in order enable and sustain POKM.
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Moreover, knowledge represented through models with certain level of formalisms
represent conceptualizations that can be processed to oﬀer functionality for both
implementing systems and improving the performance of business [12]. Based also
on the principles of MDA/MDE the use of models is also favoured as an approach
for abstraction in developing information systems by documenting requirements of
a system and contributing to the analysis, design and source code generation. Very
much like the activity that use to only be present in the development of expert
systems.
In the case of the inspection modelling, models created based on the modelling
method are integrated into a common framework which supports knowledge man-
agement by having process models as an entry point while also entailing knowledge
engineering principles for creating, extending and maintaining modelling methods
in support the POKM. ”Knowledge assets are those bodies of knowledge that the
organization employs in its processes to deliver value” [43]. Models representing
technology are a part of the framework to enable the alignment of KM through
KE and the technology available.
The framework provisions for engineering modelling methods as specified in [7]
to extend the ability of creating meaningful models that can be used in imple-
menting POKM as a management approach and supporting it with models that
represent knowledge content and can be used to build knowledge based inspection
processes specific to the nuclear verification domain. An example of an impor-
tant conceptualization is the so called SG approach which represents a conceptual
roadmap to ensure that the implementation of safeguards in a state or facility
covers all possible nuclear weapon acquisition paths. An approach can be designed
by using inspection models that are integrated with the models of the PROMOTE
approach where the PROMOTE can be seen as knowledge provisioner or a console
application that steers the inspection management. This fusion of models that
have been classified in [44] by use and form represent a union of process oriented
knowledge management and knowledge engineering techniques.
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2.7 Conclusion
Since the framework from Michael Zack mostly is targeting the strategy vis--vis its
competition we need to look at the same from the safeguards perspective to ensure
that agencies mission remains relevant. What makes it relevant in comparison to a
private company is not so much competitive advantage in terms of its product but
rather the quality of its products (introduced earlier) considering that there is no
other organization oﬀering such services. So, the quality of the services provided
by the IAEA about verification is a dimension that needs to be reflected in the
knowledge management strategy. For a knowledge organization such as the IAEA,
remaining relevant will mean that no state diverts nuclear material under its watch.
Few such occurrences will question the existence of such an entity under the cur-
rent principles of verification. Therefore maintaining relevance as a organizational
strategy needs to also be a part of the strategic knowledge management. Finally,
in terms of the knowledge management strategy, the inspectorate at the IAEA
needs to not only know more (usually the relation with the competition in the
private sector) to eliminate its competitors but it needs to know better and know
faster. There is a timeliness element involved in the model of the IAEA which is
important as it is in the private sector for rather ”aggressive companies”. Should
the organization know too late about existence of a nuclear material diversion as
a result of negligence there are very few measures that can repair this damage
caused. Eﬃciency and eﬀectiveness are therefore the other important component
of the knowledge strategy that can contribute to the strategic objectives of the
organization.
Chapter3
Inspection Concepts and
Requirements
3.1 Introduction
This chapter provides and overview of inspector activities and regimes for imple-
menting Safeguards in IAEA member states. The type of activities, frequency
and scope of activities are based on the safeguards agreement between the agency
and the particular state. The safeguards agreements are commonly based on the
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) model referring to the Information
Circular (INFCIRC) 153 type agreement which was later extended with the proto-
col additional (INFCIRC 540). A group of states such as India, Pakistan, Cuba and
Israel have are safeguarded under a special agreement INFCIRC 66. The chapter
presents the inspection types and activities documented in the Safeguards Manual
and Safeguards Glossary and provides an overview of the same from a knowledge
management perspective. Inspection processes are evaluated for their complexity
and knowledge intensity based on the method introduced by Eppler[2]. Based on
a empirical study conducted with safeguards inspectors the objective is to identify
inspection activities that deserve the most attention and serve as requirements.
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3.2 Nuclear Inspections
The formal definition of inspection is provided in the Safeguards Manual [45] This
specific type of inspection represents a number of activities which are performed by
inspectors at a nuclear installation in order to verify material that was previously
declared by a state. Subject to the agreement with the state the IAEA inspector
verifies that material and locations are used solely for peaceful applications.
According to the Safeguards Manual there are two main types of installations:
Facilities and Locations Outside Facilities (LOFs) which are a subject to verifi-
cation depending on the safeguards agreement in force. Installations are further
categorized as power reactors, research reactors, critical assemblies, enrichment
and so forth attributed with a unique code (A, B, C etc.) decribed in [30]:
3.2.1 Inspection Types
Depending on the type of agreement between the states and the IAEA there are
diﬀerent types of inspections that can be carried out accordingly. Oﬃcial defini-
tions and details can be found in [45] however this section will only summarize
each:
Initial Inspection: is a inspection carried out in accordance with the safe-
guards agreement. Its objective is to verify that the facility constructed is in
accordance with the design details provided to the IAEA. This type of inspection
will take place as soon as the facility in question is included under safeguards.
Ad-hoc Inspection: Is the type of inspection that can be performed by IAEA
inspectors before a subsidiary arrangement with the state has been reached. A
subsidiary arrangement represents the document containing administrative and
technical procedures explaining how the provisions of the safeguards agreement
should be applied [30].
Routine Inspection: This type of inspection allows the IAEA to perform
routine inspection at a facility or location outside. It entails verifying that all
record are consistent, verify all nuclear material and other routine activities such
as audits, examinations, perform measurements etc.
Special Inspection: Such an inspection is normally carried out in addition
to the routine inspection eﬀort. It may be that the IAEA requests access to a
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location which is additional to the access agreed upon with the state for routine
inspections. A special inspection is performed in consultation with the state [45].
They are often carried out as a result of a study or report showing that this type
of inspection is desirable.
3.2.2 Inspection Regime
This section discusses various inspection regimes. Regime is defined as a set of con-
ditions, most often of political nature. Regime is a model of rule or management.
The organization that is the governing authority [20].
Inspection regimes depend on the arrangement between the IAEA and the
State. Visits by inspectors can be carried out under one of the following regimes:
Unannounced Inspection: provides the IAEA the right to conduct inspec-
tion without advance notice.
Simultaneous Inspection: is an inspection at two or more facilities done
within a short period of time. Short enough as to ensure that any borrowing of
nuclear material between these facilities would be detected. This is an inspection
that requires an approval on case by case basis. The inspections are usually carried
in the same day.
Inspection Serving Timely Detection Purpose: is an inspection at which
the inventory verification and other activities associated with the timeliness com-
ponent of the inspection goal are carried out.
Short Notice Inspection: is an unannounced inspection with a short notifi-
cation agreed with the state/operator of the facility.
Random Inspection: represents an inspection carried out on the principle of
random selection; It may be random in terms of timing of the inspection or to the
selection of the facility or location to be inspected.
Short Notice Radome Inspection (SNRI): is a routine inspection that
must meet the definition of both inspections on short notice and random inspection.
Limited Frequency Unannounced Inspection (LFUA): such an inspec-
tion is carried under a safeguards approach which is specifically developed for
enrichment plants using centrifuges. Subject to the agreement with the state an
enrichment plant can be inspected on short notice.
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New Partnership Approach Inspection: an inspection carried out under
the New Partnership Approach regime agreed between the IAEA and EURATOM.
3.3 Inspection Concepts
The guiding conceptual framework of modern Safeguards is Integrated Safeguards.
It represents combination of optimal measures for increasing eﬃciency and ef-
fectiveness. Here cost cutting measures could be introduced through the use of
technology, and tools IAEA has at hand by reducing the number of inspections
while in accordance to its legal authority and obligation. It is meant to combine
measures and activities specifically designed for a nuclear site of a state as a whole.
It aims to make the most use of strengthened safeguards to provide the most eﬃ-
cient means to realizing full eﬀectiveness. Next there is will be a brief description
of the Safeguards Approach which is the main information product that makes
explicit the carefully designed measures for a facility, site or state.
3.3.1 Safeguards Approach
Safeguards Approach is designed to allow the IAEA to meet the applicable SG
objectives. It takes into account the features of the SG agreement with a particular
state. As defined in /citesgman approaches can be designed for a facility, type of
facility or state as a whole under integrated safeguards.
Facility Approach - follows the analysis of all possible diversion paths for
facility and the requirements of the undersigned SG agreement. The approach
considers what is required by a diverter in terms of facilities and if these are present
in a state. Factors considered in the design are facility design features, application
of measures of containment and/or surveillance, attributes and accessibility of
nuclear material as well as the analytical and measurement methods available to
the IAEA. As experience is gained through the verification activities, the approach
is modified as required [45].
Under the so called integrated safeguards (IS) there are generic approaches for
each facility type. The technical objectives remain the same. Activities to meet
the objectives are defined in the model integrated safeguards approach for each
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facility type. Such an approach as stated in [45, 18] is based on the premise that
IAEA has drawn a conclusion of ”non-diversion of declared nuclear material and
the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in the state concerned.”
State-Level Approach (SLA) - Safeguards approach on a state-level is
meant to cover all nuclear material, nuclear installations and nuclear fuel cycle
related activities in a state. Such an approach implements safeguards measures at
all facilities and outside locations in a state that have the AP already in force. IS
approaches for each type of facility are combined with the implementation of AP
measures, especially complementary access (CA) [18].
The approach has to take into account the state’s safeguards evaluation, states
nuclear fuel cycle and the interaction between state-specific facilities and other
features such as the ability to carry out unannounced inspections in the state
accountancy system for accounting and control of nuclear material [45].
3.3.2 Safeguards Criteria and Inspection Goals
There is another component that is a part of the safeguards approach and that is
the Safeguards Criteria. According to [45] it is used for ”planning the implemen-
tation of verification activities and for evaluating the results of these activities.”
Such criteria are applied based on the approach designed as described previously.
Criteria for each type of facility under safeguards is defined showing the scope, fre-
quency and the extent of inspections needed to achieve the safeguards objectives.
Criteria also defines activities to be coordinated across a state. To maintain the
continuity of criteria based evaluation, criteria are also being developed for facil-
ities under integrated safeguards. Moreover, state-level criteria under integrated
safeguards is in its workings.
Another important aspect of the verification is the so called Inspection Goals.
As specified in the criteria, inspection goals are performance targets. These perfor-
mance goals apply to verification activities for individual facilities and for activities
co-ordinated across the state. For a facility inspection goal consists of the time-
liness and quantity components. The quantity component is related to the scope
of activities in order to conclude that there has been no diversion os 1 SQ in ma-
terial balance period. On the other hand the timeliness is attained with periodic
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Figure 3.1. Breakdown of the criteria based safeguards and its evolution to integrated
and state level approach
activities necessary to conclude there was no sudden diversion in a calendar year
[45].
3.4 Inspection Process
The department of Safeguards has identified nine macro-processes. In addition to
core there are also management and support macro-processes. The core macro-
process which is of interest here consists of Safeguards Planning, Information
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Collection and Analysis, Verification and Evaluation processes. In this section
processes related to the Verification broadly named as Inspection Process will be
summarized. The verification macro-process consists of the following [46]:
• Scheduling verification activities in a State
• Preparing, conducting and reporting Design Information Verification (DIV)
• Preparing, conducting and reporting inspections
• Preparing, conducting and reporting complementary access
This section describes activities as listed in the current SG Manual categorized
as general inspection activities. Furthermore, details about the DIV/DIE activity
and CA activity will be provided. In the last section an attempt is made to
empirically show the knowledge profile of inspection activities using the matrix
combining process complexity and knowledge intensity .
3.4.1 General Inspection Activities
Various activities that may be carried out during or in relation with the inspection
are:
1. Examination of Records: Examination of records may include activities
such as examination of accounting and operating records, their reconciliation,
comparison of facility records with the State reports etc. (reports the state
is obliged to submit to the IAEA)
2. Verification of Nuclear Material: Material balance area can be shortly
referred to as MBA. This activity is performed since an operator could try to
conceal the diversion of nuclear material by understating inventory increases,
overstating inventory decreases, or both. The verification performed ensures
that such under or over statement take place.
3. Verification of Non-Nuclear Material and Specified Equipment and
facilities: In some types of agreement the application of IAEA safeguards
may include also non-nuclear material, and specified equipment and facili-
ties. The types of material for which safeguards may be requires are those
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necessary for the production of special fissionable material subject to the
agreement. Examples include heavy water, nuclear grade graphite etc.
4. Sampling for Destructive Analysis (DA): sampling and analysis is an
accounting verification method. It means taking a representative portion of
solid, liquid or gas from an item or batch, selected as a sample for destructive
analysis. As defined in [30] Destructive Analysis determines the content of
the nuclear material and if necessary the isotopic composition of chemical
elements. There is also so called Non-destructive Analysis. DA verification
of nuclear material includes taking samples, ensuring the integrity of the
sample during transport, packing, sealing and shipment to the laboratory.
5. Environmental Sampling (ES): it is an activity that may be carried out
during inspections or DIV visits or Complementary Access. ES may also
provide confirmation of the declared activities and nuclear material present,
but this is usually a secondary objective as the lack of a nuclear signature on
an environmental sample should not be interpreted as the absence of a given
activity.
6. Containment, Surveillance and Monitoring Measures: This activity
consists of a set of measures. Containment is defined as those structural fea-
tures of the facility, container, or equipment which are used, in conjunction
with seals, surveillance or monitors, to maintain the continuity of knowledge
of items and area by preventing undetected access or movement of items.
Seals, together with the containment to which they are attached, constitute
containment measures [30]. Surveillance represents the collection of informa-
tion about locations and movement of nuclear material, equipment or con-
tainment by using cameras that are connected to recording devices. These
recordings are reviewed by inspectors.
7. Confirmation of the absence of Unrecorded Production of Direct-
Use Material from Material Subject to Safeguards.
8. Verification of Operator Measurement System: The purpose of this ac-
tivity is to verify the quality and functioning of operator’s measurement sys-
tems which aims at determining the limits of accuracy of the stated amounts
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of material for inventory and inventory changes and thus of the material
unaccounted for (MUF). Such an activity allows the IAEA to estimate the
measurement errors in order to check that the estimates are in accordance
with the design information for the facility and are consistent with the In-
ternational Standard of Accountancy.
9. Evaluation of Specific Inventory Changes: This inspection activity re-
quires that certain inventory changes are verified by the IAEA if the nuclear
material amounts involved exceed predefined limits. Such limits are prede-
fined in the Safeguards Criteria. Some examples of inventory changes are
measured discards, transfers to and from retained waste, accidental losses,
exemptions etc.
10. Material Balance Evaluation (MBE): is a tool that entails statistical
evaluation of the material balance. In order to asses the correctness of the
nuclear material declared by the operator of the facility various components
of the material balance are evaluated. This activity is performed in order
to detect potential diversion into MUF. To detect diversion into D by oper-
ators falsifying accounting records and verifying the operator measurement
systems.
11. Utilization of Safeguards Equipment and Devices: Various equipment
is used to perform inspection activities. In order to use IAEA equipment
cost-eﬀectively and ensure the quality of the data collected it is important
to practice inventory control and performance monitoring of the equipment.
Furthermore, evaluation of the inspection data is an important part of the
post inspection activities.
3.4.2 Design Information Examination and Verification
Design Information or shortly DI includes design features for facilities relevant
and is used to establish the safeguards approach for a facility by determining the
material balance area, (MBA), key measurement point (KMP) and other strategic
points. Using design information the verification plan (DIVP) and the essential
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equipment list (EEL) is established [45]. Design information is submitted by the
state using the Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ).
In order that a safeguards approach is established for a facility a set of measures
have to be identified for the implementation of safeguards in order to meet the
applicable safeguards objectives. Safeguards approach is based on a) determination
of possible diversion strategies and pathways; b) determination of the potential
misuse of the facility; c)determination of the appropriate safeguards measures to
meet the criteria; d) results of the design examination and verification.
3.4.3 Complementary Access
Where most of the verification activities under the traditional safeguards focus on
the nuclear material declared, complementary access plays a key role in deriving
safeguards conclusions on the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities
in states with AP in force. Additional protocol is a model designed to strengthen
the eﬀectiveness and improve the eﬃciency of the safeguards system. It is impor-
tant the complementary access as a tool under AP is carried in accordance with
provisions in the additional protocol and in a consistent and non-discriminatory
manner.
3.5 Inspection Knowledge Profile
3.5.1 Inspection Process Analysis
The above discussed processes require analysis to identify them as being knowledge
intensive or complex. The general inspection activities followed by design informa-
tion verification and examination (DIV/E) and complementary access (CA) are
discussed. Based on attributes of the selected processes the process complexity
and the related knowledge intensity will be considered. Using a process-oriented
approach where knowledge is a derived from a process and is about process Eppler
suggests a matrix that classifies processes as [2]:
1. Low process complexity combined by weaker knowledge intensity (Class 1)
2. High process complexity by weaker knowledge intensity (Class 2)
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3. High process complexity by stronger knowledge intensity (Class 3)
4. Low process complexity by stronger knowledge intensity (Class 4)
From a knowledge management perspective the most interesting processes are
those in in class 3. Table 3.1 was adopted form an approach presented in [2] and
shows the classification of attributes of a knowledge intensive and complex process.





            






            





Table 3.1. Attributes used to evaluate inspection activities for their knowledge intensity.
Adopted from Eppler[2]
Agents described in the tables 3.1 3.2 can be humans, communities or infor-
mation processing machines. Since processes may be knowledge intensive and at
the same time simple or complex the evaluation considers also another dimension,
namely attributes of a complex process. As it was the case with the knowledge
intensity, table 3.2 shows that attributes which characterize a process in terms of
its complexity. Number of steps involved, number of involved agents and interde-
pendencies give a closer look at processes which are more complex and therefore
require more procedural knowledge. Processes identified as core within the de-
partment are broken down to inspection activities which are taken from the SG
Manual. In addition to so called general activities, complementary access and
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DIV were considered. Data was based on answers collected from inspectors where
knowledge intensity and process complexity for each activity was attributed as
”Strong” or ”Weak” and ”High” or ”Low” in the respective order. The objective
is to identify which knowledge is crucial for the success of these processes. How
can that crucial knowledge be managed and systematically exploited [2].



            






            





Table 3.2. Attributes of complex processes. Process complexity of inspection activities
is evaluated as suggested by Eppler [2].
3.5.2 Results
Data used to generate the profile was collected from inspectors and is shown in ap-
pendix A. Each process can be rated as Strong (1) in terms of knowledge intensity
or Weak (0). The same with the process complexity which was characterized as
High (1) or Low (0). In defense to this empirical study all processes were grouped
to be at the same level although from the process mapping in the Department one
may have the impression that some of them are at a higher level of detail than
others. Inspectors participating in the survey added that in some cases answering
with TRUE (strong, high) or FALSE (weak, low) was not always easy. Further-
more, a remark was made that some of the activities do vary in complexity and
knowledge intensity depending on the type of facility inspected. For bulk facilities
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(i.e. reprocessing plants, enrichment, fuel fabrication etc.) some of the processes
may be more complex than for item facilities (i.e. reactors). Nevertheless, the
results oﬀer an overview of inspection processes and give a characterization for the
study pointing out where the critical knowledge is or may be needed.

















 
Figure 3.2. Knowledge Profile of Inspection activities based on Eppler’s matrix com-
bining the knowledge intensity of the process and complexity. The two activities that
fall in the category Class 3 - are complex and knowledge intensive
In Figure 3.2 a profile of knowledge is depicted. Knowledge profile is a term
adopted from work performed by [47] to show the knowledge profile of the human
brain. Here, we refer to the profile of knowledge requirements needed in performing
inspection activities. Based on the survey conducted it was discovered that Design
Information Verification/Examination (DIV/E) and Complementary Access (CA)
relative to other activities are considered to be the closest class 3 of the suggested
classification. These processes are complex and are also knowledge intensive. The
third activity MBE is aslo shown as a complex process which places it at the center
of the matrix. The attributes that has mostly contributed the MBE being complex
is the interdependency and number of agents involved. This can be explained by
the fact that MBE evaluation is performed in coordination with a number of or-
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ganizational units requiring more communication and coordination for inspectors.
This activity is also knowledge intensive however less so in comparison to DIV and
CA.
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Figure 3.3. Classification of the Inspection Processes based on Eppler’s Matrix
Another conclusion derived from the survey was that these processes, their
complexity and knowledge intensity is dependent on the type of facility inspected.
There are two broad categories of facilities: bulk handling facilities and item fa-
cilities. Process complexity seems to be higher for bulk handling facilities since
usually these facility tend to be physically larger and involve more complex pro-
cesses (e.g. Pu separation). The same is true for the knowledge intensity dimension
which seems to be stronger in the case of bulk handling facilities. These results
merely give priority the CA process and the DIE process for as best candidates for
process-oriented knowledge management and use of models to explicate domain
knowledge as means of designing processes. Next section looks at these activities
and related concepts in further detail.
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3.6 Conclusion
This chapter oﬀered an overview of the complexity of the domain and oﬀered in-
depth looks at the nature of inspection processes. IAEA can be comfortably said
that it represents a knowledge based organization. A great number of services
provided by this organization is put under scrutiny of the international commu-
nity. Verification activities represent a politically sensitive domain which requires
convergence of knowledge resources across the organization as well integrating
knowledge from outside sources. Knowledge of various nuclear processes combined
with the ability of the inspectors to routinely collect data in the field is necessary
for eﬀective safeguards.
From the inspection processes studied it was discovered that most knowledge
intensive activities which are also complex are the Design Information Verifica-
tion/Examination and the Complementary Access which is slightly less complex
but certainly knowledge intensive. It was established that these processes vary in
their complexity and knowledge intensity based on the type of facility and obvi-
ously the size of the facility. Despite, it remains to be true that these processes
requires attention by finding ways to optimize their execution making them as
eﬃcient as necessary and as much as possible knowledge driven.
By looking at various sources and intensities of knowledge present when dealing
with DIV and CA processes, a concept comes across as central to the implementa-
tion of verification activities, evaluation and reporting there from. Both processes
are measures that are applied under IS in order to generate the SG Approach which
is the guiding metaphor in finding more eﬀective and eﬃcient ways of implement-
ing Safeguards. Under Integrated Safeguards (IS) where optimal combination of
measures is sought SG Approach becomes the crucial element in replacing the crite-
ria based approach under traditional safeguards. The approach which is developed
and evaluated also against the existing safeguards criteria entails not only processes
which are knowledge intensive and complex (i.e. CA, DIV) but it also represents a
platform where knowledge convergence can occur in achieving safeguards objectives
all of this while combining concepts, activities and tools in support of information
driven safeguards. This is true for both facility and state-level SG approaches.
An SG approach is commonly prepared with information resulting from the DIV
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design information examination and is strengthened with activities such as CA.
It is therefore suggested that SG Approach can be the knowledge space that can
be represented using a model-based approach organized through POKM. Hence,
the next chapter will try to introduce a conceptual framework that represents SG
related concepts with the use of modelling languages. The objective is to make
concepts such as SG Approach explicit and manageable in a form of models ap-
plying a process view. Knowledge represented through modelling languages can
be both interpreted by machines and used by inspectors.
Chapter4
Inspection Modelling: Conceptual
Framework
4.1 Introduction
This chapter discusses the focus of the research performed. Applying models to
describe the nuclear verification domain requires a modelling method that repre-
sents aspects of the verification system under study. Some of inspection related
concepts were discussed in previous chapters and will be presented here in a inte-
grated modelling framework abiding to the principles of the Open Models Initiative
(OMI) and considering similar approaches such as the MDE and MDA [48, 7]. To
this end inspection activities at a state level and facility are conceptualized through
a number of meta-models defining modelling languages that allow for the creation
of a model-based, adaptable, context-sensitive and objective-driven approach for
safeguarding - Safeguards Approach for Facility X or State Y. A distinction needs
to be made that the approach suggested here varies from commonly justified use
of models to drive and configure systems development. The objective is not to use
models solely in the context of software engineering i.e. by generating code out of
UML models [49]. Models here are used under the scope of a modelling method
to provide functionality such as:
• Automatically generate safeguards objectives for a state based on the state’s
physical model - focused on the completeness aspect of verification.
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• Derive instances of inspection process models on facility, site or state level.
• Instantiate work plans for inspectors by assigning tasks to identified roles.
• Generating content in a form of descriptive or prescriptive models for docu-
mentation, analysis, simulation and evaluation.
• Oﬀering an integrated modelling platform for creating knowledge-based pro-
cess models, which represent externalized knowledge content and are man-
aged through a POKM approach. i.e. PROMOTE and Process Oriented
Knowledge Management (POKM)
In order to contribute to the performance and eﬀectiveness of nuclear inspec-
tions engineering of methods and therefore use of models for conceptualizing in-
spection regimes represents means for creating a foundation of semantic content
and structure that provisions a knowledge environment for inspectors to gain from
the process knowledge and retaining the useful knowledge.
4.2 Modelling Framework
In order to introduce the modelling framework and its intended use we start by
reviewing some of the underlying principles that support the use of models and
modelling as an activity.
A Model in the Princeton dictionary is defined as the act of representing some-
thing. ”A model is a formal specification of the function, structure and behavior
of a system within a given context, and from a specific point of view (or reference
point)” [50]. Definitions across diﬀerent fields vary with meaning. For instance
in mathematics a model has a diﬀerent meaning compared to models used to rep-
resent an example or a sample of how something will/should look. One of the
generic definitions accepted for this research is that of Whitten saying that models
are used to ”represent reality or vision” [32]. He stated this in the context of sys-
tems analysis and design methods. Open models initiative iterates that models are
created with a purpose and represent a System under Study SuS [51]. According
to Karagiannis et al, models operationalize knowledge and are classified as either
being data, process or ”knowledge” models [7].Most of the definitions attempt to
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dehumanize the use of models by associating them to representation of visions and
idealized realities described with structures such as classes, objects [12]. The term
model is generalized in every day use and can represent any of the views above. In
this section a definition of models is oﬀered specifically attributed to the system
under study namely the nuclear verification and safeguards inspections. Models
described hereof are instances of a meta-model that conceptualize the verification
domain through modelling languages with semantic clarity based on the notation
familiar to intended users. These models constitute a modelling technique, which
in combination with a procedure as well as algorithms and mechanisms create an
integrated modelling method for safeguards [7, 52].
The definition of inspection models used here is as a result of an activity broadly
named as inspection modelling:
”Knowledge artifacts that facilitate through their analysis and eval-
uation understanding of inspection concepts and operationalize expert
process knowledge otherwise lost with reference process models.”
In addition to purpose, models can be also classified in terms of their use.
Karagiannis and Woitsch claim that models can be considered as interpretable by
either humans or machines. They may be understandable by both which is more
diﬃcult to achieve. Humanized models, which are understood and are interpreted
by humans are referred to as Knowledge Management Models [12]. Such models
may be partially corrupt whereas Knowledge Engineering Models are those that
require a level of formalism and should be also processable by machines. This
classification is based on the knowledge view of models where a representation of
domain knowledge is merged with the formalism required for knowledge engineering
[12]. Models provide an abstraction of physical systems that allow engineers to
reason about systems [53]. Visual modelling according to [54] is on the rise not
only for system engineering but also in the business domain.
The interest in models has been apparent in the industry and research amplified
by Object Management Group’s (OMG) initiative and followed by the investments
in the industry [55, 56, 48]. Models, used for generating requirements, describing
reality or vision, generating IT models and subsequently transforming them to
source code are discussed in initiatives such as Open Models Initiative and the one
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proposed by OMG, namely Model Driven Architecture/Engineering (MDA/E). In
the case of OMG the focus in mainly on software engineering where models are
viewed as the level of abstraction, an evolution from the object-oriented view.
The Model Driven Architecture (MDA) promulgates a top down approach where
platform-independent models document the business functionality and behavior of
applications separate from the underlying technology. Instances of such models are
created using a modelling language derived from the meta-meta model namedMeta
Object Facility (MOF) [48]. Through a chain of transformations enabled by tools
now readily available form diﬀerent vendors the aim is to establish a framework
for creating first-class artifacts that can be stored, exchanged over the network
and transformed from Platform Independent Models (PIM) to Platform Specific
Models (PSM). There is another level of abstraction above PIM called Computa-
tion Independent Models. CIM, sometimes called domain model hides technical
details representing more what the system is expected do, therefore a computation
independent view is captured with this layer [11]. The language of choice is the
Unified Modeling Language (UML). CIM for instance includes modelling the busi-
ness layer also with the use of UML. Domain models using languages such as UML
to represent computationally independent view are challenged with the complexity
of transforming such models to PSM models while ensuring the minimum semantic
gap [57].
UML is the language that has been widely accepted as the industry standard
in representing software engineering concepts from early requirements to detailed
technical models. UML language models as suggested by MDA can be transformed
from higher conceptual layers to more technical layers specifying implementation
details. Further definition of MDA is given in [48] where it is envisaged that the
technology will be available to also reverse code to models.
Another approach suggested by the OMI proposes similar benefits compared
to the discussed proposal from OMG. Models, which can also be considered as
artifacts are representations that are not only translated to source code but rather
represent elements of situational method chunks which can build an information
system [58].
There are other frameworks, which are seen in the context of enterprise infor-
mation systems such as the one proposed by Zachman [59]. The framework named
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Figure 4.1. Modelling Method Elements introduced under the Open Models Initiative
with the author proposes a matrix of modelling artifacts that represent diﬀerent
views of an enterprise. This framework however diﬀers from the OMG framework
as discussed by Frankel in [60]. Next section looks at the Open Models Initiative
(OMI) which possibly strikes the optimal balance of the two and focuses on a niche
not considered by frameworks MDA and Zachman.
4.2.1 Open Models Initiative (OMI)
Although, nowhere explicitly stated in the feasibility study there seems to be a dis-
tinction in the purpose and application of models as proposed by OMI in contrast
to MDA or even Zachman. It can be said that the modelling methods principle
is closer to the purpose of situational problem solving methods - a functionality
envisaged also for the inspection modelling method. Modelling methods as sug-
gested in [7] are made up of a modelling technique, mechanisms and algorithms
necessary to process models represented. This approach also supports the idea of
models being transformed, integrated through mechanisms and algorithms to and
with other types of models. Furthermore, it can support application of algorithms
to evaluate models. Figure 4.1 shows the components of a modelling method. It
does not have to be limited to generating code from models or reverse engineering
models analogous to Model Driven Engineering (MDE). It suggests a meta-meta
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model approach depicted in the figure where meta-models are engineered specific
to a domain and may be used for representing data models in software engineer-
ing (e.g. ERD) or diﬀerently represent process models (e.g. BPM). This view of
modelling and its application is the preferred one for the conceptual foundation
introduced under the Conceptual Nuclear Verification Framework. A model is seen
in the framework as a products of a method that consisting of a language or lan-
guages with a well defined notation, syntax and semantics. Any such modelling
language is also followed by a procedure that outlines the steps for achieving the
desired results. Such models can be formalised and processed by algorithms and
mechanisms providing functionality to use and evaluate [7, 61]. In order to pro-
cess models various formalisms may be used (i.e. graph theory, pattern theory,
petri-nets etc.)
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Figure 4.2. Model Integration Levels (Strahringer, Karagiannis)
The meta-model view in 4.1 shows the components of a method as introduced
by the OMI. An example that can be used is the Business Process Modelling
(BPM), a modelling technique with predefined modelling language notation (i.e.
BPMN, EPC) syntax and semantics. Mechanism and algorithms may be used to
evaluate such models. Examples of path analysis, simulation of cost, transport
times can be formulated. In contrast to OMGs architecture where the focus is on
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establishing a model driven approach for generating code through transformation
this approach suggests modelling methods as a set of constructs for conceptualizing
domains (mainly business domain) through the use of modelling language created
with the necessary formalism for processing to also provision analysis, evaluation
and simulation. Brinkkemper’s claim that ”method engineering is the engineering
discipline to design, construct and adapt methods, techniques and tools for the de-
velopment of information systems” had a motivational eﬀect on this initiative and
work from [61, 52, 7]. Based on research from Welke and Kumar, method engineer-
ing by Brinkkemper identifies three components: methods, techniques and tools
[62]. Hence, a modelling method can be defined as ”an assembly of method frag-
ments for a certain application scenario to achieve defined goals” [63]. A modelling
method as introduced in OMI represents the evolution of the method engineering
concept where models are used to realize methods which can be assembled in a
service for achieving desired results. Modelling is an activity for applying models
or method fragments that can be combined or used as input to developing in-
formation system or oﬀer functionality on its own. The purpose of the method
engineering is not limited to generating code something more so with the OMG
framework.
4.2.2 Metamodelling
Figure 4.2 shows the meta-model layers based on work from Strahringer adapted by
Karagiannis [64, 61]. Starting from the meta meta-model each layer is considered
as a modelling language created by the modelling language of the previous layer.
It is not limited to 4 levels however it is believed that going beyond level 3 might
not be necessary. This does not contradict also the modelling framework of OMG
where layers are described from M0 to M3.
Meta-models are models used to create a modelling language. According to
the meta-model the syntax of a language is also defined in contrast to approaches
such as graph grammar [7]. A meta-model defines all the language constructs
providing basis for a formalism in the models created. In some cases meta-models
are not suﬃcient for expressing all syntactical rules for creating a valid model
therefore such rules can be expressed with additional formalism such as the Object
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Constraint Language (OCL).
The proposed framework is based on the principle of method engineering where
a modelling technique and mechanisms are used to streamline activities and tools
for analyzing and evaluating a certain verification problems. Inspectors for instance
would be able to model the State inspected using modelling languages based on
integrated meta-models. Algorithms can be used in evaluating an approach for
safeguarding a State. This representation will allow for structured analysis of the
weapons acquisition path and risk based definition of objectives to be met in verify-
ing a state. Next chapter will provide an additional level of formalism which can be
used in formally representing modelling languages for application of algorithms and
mechanisms. The application of pattern theory will be introduced which contains
graphical and mathematical formalism suﬃcient to represent conceptualizations of
the physical model - state’s nuclear programme. Furthermore, this level of formal-
ism can enable applications such as automatic generation of state level safeguards
objectives and related inspection processes by linking means objectives to activi-
ties of the process. Constructs of pattern theory or generators can be used to also
support the transformation of verification concepts represented with high level in-
spection modelling languages to data and process structures. Such a formalism
can support transformation and mapping of computationally independent models
to technical models in UML.
4.3 A Nuclear Verification Conceptual Frame-
work
The conceptual nuclear verification framework is made out of building blocks that
conceive a new modelling method referred to according to purpose as the inte-
grated Safeguards Modelling Method (iSMM). This method is based on diﬀerent
facets focused on modelling aspects of Technology and Knowledge Management in
addition to the operational perspective termed Safeguards covering elements spe-
cific to the nuclear verification. For the KM aspect the PROMOTE approach and
its modelling language was chosen whereas for representing the technology aspects,
standard models based on UML can be used. The purpose of PROMOTE is to
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provision for inspectors process oriented knowledge management whereas technol-
ogy modelling refers to more technical models that will represent the technology
in support of the operational and KM processes. Modelling languages here can
represent information technologies or other used by inspectors in the field. The
framework oﬀers a comprehensive view of three aspects considered important for
verification method engineering with emphasis on knowledge management and the
enabling technology. All three perspectives have to exist in order to ensure the
needed preservation of inspection procedural knowledge for a structured and in-
formation driven safeguards.
Such a framework represents a high level structure that serves as foundation
for creating the modelling method based on the concepts introduced in previous
chapters and in [7, 61]. Modelling methods provide a theoretical basis for enabling
modelling activities by introducing major components such as modelling languages,
modelling procedures, mechanisms and algorithms that can be applied onto models.
Such models correspond to a meta-model that defines the syntactical elements of
the used modelling languages. Introducing a proper set of interconnected modelling
languages to support the three perspectives safeguards, knowledge management,
and technology of the conceptual framework is the work at hand. Before deeper
insights to the modelling method the above mentioned perspectives are introduced
in more detail.
Figure 4.3 depicts the three perspectives of the framework. The operational
perspective consists of five components: technical, strategic, legal, analytical and
on-site activity. It covers aspects specifically related to the safeguards system.
Most of the components do not need further clarification whereas the word ”tech-
nical” may be ambiguous since it is the term used to refer to equipment and
instruments placed at facilities. Such equipment is used for performing measure-
ments, which is an important part of inspection. Another component that may
require explanation is the ”analytical” component that stipulates analytical ser-
vices for samples taken at nuclear facilities. To oﬀer a complete overview of all
operational aspects of safeguards all these components have to be ”en suite” in
a framework with the right combination of modelling languages. The figure also
shows the knowledge management perspective, which covers aspects focused on
facilitating knowledge products in support of safeguards. Technology perspective
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Figure 4.3. Elements of the conceptual framework for nuclear verification. It consists of
three perspectives safeguards, knowledge management and technology. The operational
perspective consists of 5 sub-components.
depicted as the environment around the operational and knowledge management
perspective. It mostly refers to information technology that makes services accessi-
ble in support of data acquisition, processing, execution and evaluation of models.
Furthermore, it covers aspects related to the technical issues of the operational
perspective.
Safeguards Perspective: This is represented by modelling languages that
document the operational elements of nuclear inspections. Inspection procedures,
strategic and technical objectives, legal requirements and analytical processes used
to reach conclusions are incorporated here. Nuclear processes and the nuclear
fuel cycle are also represented in this view since they serve as specifications for
conceiving inspection processes. Reference models of facilities within a state and
the related safeguards objectives for each state/site/facility are modelled in order
to contextualize actual objective-driven inspection processes.
Knowledge Management Perspective: Based on process-oriented knowl-
edge management [8], here the so called knowledge management processes are mod-
elled describing the tasks for creating, storing and disseminating inspection knowl-
edge. The same way inspection processes are derived from the nuclear processes,
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knowledge perspective includes languages that help describe knowledge processes
relevant to the inspection process. Additionally, languages represented under this
perspective are used to map knowledge resources, represent knowledge structures
in order to identify knowledge necessary - ”what is known” and ”what needs to be
known” in supporting inspection processes. Skill Models, Knowledge Map Model
in combination with models from the safeguards perspective are used to establish
Process Oriented Knowledge Management (POKM) .
Technology Perspective: It includes modelling languages to represent the
technology layer. Languages here are used for instance to describe the IT Archi-
tecture or more technical ones representing orchestration of services provisioned by
SOA. Languages such as OWL-S, OWL-WS and UML can be used to represent this
perspective. Another interesting outlook of this perspective is the growing trend to
perform inspections through remote monitoring therefore modelling these technical
aspects will improve the alignment of such technology to organizational processes
and objectives. In remote monitoring data such as containment and surveillance
in addition to unattended safeguards is made available for review at the IAEA
headquarters. Such an approach would require an enterprise architecture where
remote monitoring services are also modelled part of the IT architecture. Consid-
ering that safeguards largely depends on the application of equipment (i.e. Non
Destructive Assey NDA) this perspective is therefore broadly named as ”technol-
ogy” not to exclude representation of other technologies in addition to information,
communication.
4.4 integrated Safeguards Modelling Method (iSMM)
In order to support the three diﬀerent views introduced in the previous section
with models a set of modelling languages relevant to the nuclear inspection do-
main are defined. Although each of the modelling languages presented are from a
conceptual viewpoint independently defined, connections between these languages
are supported through inter-model relationships highlighting the coherence on the
model level. Thereby, the goal of modelling with iSMM is to externalize knowledge:
• about the processes applied at the facilities/states throughout all phases of
the nuclear fuel cycle
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• about verification approaches at the Facility, Site or State
• about verification objectives on the Facility, Site or State level
• on optimal processes required by the IAEA to perform the nuclear inspections
at facilities/states
• about KM activities in support of inspection processes and
• about technology supporting inspection and KM processes
Process-oriented models such as the nuclear fuel cycle model and the inspection
process model can be used to document and create a ”protocol” or an approach
applied by the IAEA in order to ensure that nuclear activities in states are ac-
cordingly inspected and comply with the undersigned safeguards agreement. The
Agency’s authority to apply safeguards stems from its Statute - ”pursuant to this
authority, the Agency concludes agreements with States, and with regional inspec-
torates, for the application of safeguards” [18].
This method will also require mechanisms and algorithms that will ensure that
inspection models are checked for their completeness and correctness. The tech-
nique involving modelling languages for representing formally inspection concepts
and procedures is generally referred to as Inspection Modelling. The integrated
safeguards and related concepts are explained in Chapter 3.
As depicted in 4.4 the operational perspective is viewed as the layer of ”busi-
ness” [8] representing inspections at facilities. In a sense an attempt is made to
”reconstruct” or map activities performed by the facilities/states in order to verify
them. Common reference models for each type of facility are available and can be
re-used for representing a facility/site or state (a kind of a template or a virtual
state file). A top-down and structured procedure is applied to represent verifica-
tion objectives derived from the top layer (nuclear activities i.e. physical model)
leading to the definition of the inspection processes. Because the nuclear processes
and inspection processes are represented at a diﬀerent abstraction level, inspection
objectives as used to link the two. The functionality of transforming physical mod-
els into inspection objectives can be also achieved automatically with the use of
algorithms discussed in the next chapter. The nuclear processes mapped define the
context for designing inspection processes which currently exist in the organization
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Figure 4.4. Conceptual framework and high-level requirements for the integrated Safe-
guards Modelling Method (iSMM).
only as reference processes. The layer broadly named as Inspection Process Models
actually contains of models related to the implementation of nuclear inspections for
specific facilities/sites/states it can be considered an inspection work plan (tasks,
objectives, resources etc.). On the other hand the KM models layer describes and
identifies available KM activities, roles, skills and resources that are needed to
actually perform inspection duties. KM models are also created to inter-reference
all levels of inspection models and nuclear process models . Moreover, such models
can serve as valuable content that makes creating valuable content for describing
verification strategies in a states but also managing the related inspection knowl-
edge. It can also be seen as a console that steers the use of knowledge products
and driving the inspection processes.
The layer consisting of technology models provides means to represent the
technology for implementing integrated safeguards through existing information
systems. In addition to identifying the technology supporting the safeguards as-
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pect the objective is to model technical details that are generated by transforming
higher level modelling abstractions in support of process execution (i.e. trough
workflows) or even source code generation [8, 48]. Due to a large and heteroge-
neous technologies available for supporting inspections this layer can also serve the
integration layer for information and other technologies at the inspection process
level [16]. These models are integrated by reference to models of the knowledge
management layer [12]. This integration will also help reduce the semantic loss
between the inspection processes and the IT and technical services available [57].
4.4.1 Operational Meta-Models
Based on the requirements outlined for the modelling method (iSMM), modelling
languages support the operational perspective by capturing (a) strategic issues in
terms of objectives of the participating parties (e.g. IAEA inspectors, member
states), (b) description of nuclear facility/site organizations and relationships be-
tween these facilities/sites, (c) inspection processes applied for nuclear inspection
activities, (d) nuclear knowledge within the IAEA and knowledge about processes
involved in a potential weapons acquisition, and (e) organizational issues of the
IAEA relevant for execution of nuclear inspections. To meet the requirements of
representing all relevant views existing language are used through their extension
or new languages are defined from scratch to suitably represent the System un-
der Study (SuS). Excerpts of meta-models and relationships between these meta-
models are shown in 4.5 where the core elements from a syntactical point of view
are introduced. In the forthcoming section a comprehensive description for each
meta-model is provided. These descriptions provide a link between the aspects
of nuclear inspection represented and the modelling language used to represent
these. The meta-models shown here represent the SG perspective of the overall
framework.
4.4.1.1 Nuclear Fuel Cycle Model
The Nuclear Fuel Cycle Model (NFCM) is meant to describe the planned or on-
going nuclear activities in a state. It identifies all known and declared nuclear
processes, which serve as basis for deriving the corresponding inspection activities.
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guards Perspective
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In addition to representing the fuel cycle in a state it can be used to identify,
describe and characterize every known process for carrying out each step neces-
sary for the acquisition of weapons-usable material. It can be used to represent
all plausible acquisition paths for highly enriched uranium (HEU) and separated
plutonium (Pu) as well as the associated equipment, material, technologies that
characterize such processes. Specific attributes known as Indicators associated to
nuclear processes and are evaluated in the context of the activities declared by
the state (cf. designed for relationship). NFCM models and associated models of
facilities provide context for generating verification objectives, which are met by
inspection processes.
4.4.1.2 Nuclear Facility Model
This type of model describes a nuclear Facility. Based on the design information
received from the state and the information collected through verification activities
Nuclear Facility Model (NFM) represents all aspects of a facility and its function.
It includes a conceptualization of how facilities are structurally organized in terms
of nuclear material accountancy. Each facility consists of at least one material
balance area (MBA) for nuclear material accountancy purposes; selection of those
strategic points which are key measurement points (KMPs) for use in determining
nuclear material flows and inventories. Model based representation of facilities
provides reference for nuclear material accountancy and the verification activities
that need to be implemented to ensure a permanent continuity of knowledge for
the material received, processed and shipped to other facilities. The model can be
used to represent one facility or a group of facilities based on a common location
referred to as site. For complementary access purposes this model can be used also
to describe any other type of location. Material flow between modelled facilities
can be used to represent their relationship. Such relationships can exist between
facilities within the same state or internationally.
4.4.1.3 Inspection Objectives Model
Based on the safeguards agreement with the state and the nuclear fuel cycle in
the state high level strategic safeguards objectives need to be defined. Once the
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state level or facility level objectives are defined lower level technical objectives are
also depicted. Modelling strategic objectives can be done using a goals model here
named as Inspection Objectives Model. Objectives model will show the hierarchy of
objectives decomposed trough the means objectives that represent the safeguards
criteria for inspecting facilities, sites or states based on the risks identified. Objec-
tives are linked to means-objectives that represent methods to achieve these. The
lowest level of means objectives in the hierarchy relates to processes and inspection
activities modelled using the inspection process model.
4.4.1.4 Inspection Process Model
Inspection Process Model represents a business process model extended for inspec-
tion activities and inspection pathways. Here random inspection activities as well
as complementary access activities are incorporated. Complementary Access (CA)
can be performed with a 2 hours or 24 hours advanced notice [45]. Details about
CA as an inspection activity are provided in Chapter 3. Inspection implementa-
tion activities based on the criteria and objectives can be graphed using inspection
process models. They can be used also to externalize expert know-how and serve
as an entry point to knowledge management models. It is the intention to create
inspection process models that can represent: knowledge content and are an entry
point to knowledge products represented with PROMOTE. Processes and activities
representing SG aspect based on safeguards objectives create an inspection path
which is not only knowledge driven but also aligned to the organizational goals and
objectives. Guided creation of inspection pathways tailored for the specific state
and nuclear activity will help implement integrated safeguards approach in many
of the states still under traditional safeguards. Such an approach is founded on the
principles of eﬀective but also eﬃcient inspection processes. Its conceptualization
and representation with a model based and knowledge aware method extends ben-
efits by introducing adaptability to changes by preserving procedural verification
knowledge.
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4.4.1.5 Organizational Inspection Model
The organizational aspect for actually executing inspection processes is expressed
using the Organizational Inspection Model. Roles and staﬀ involved in perform-
ing inspection activities are represented with this model. It covers organizational
aspects while establishing a link to inspection objectives and the modelled skills
represented with PROMOTE models. Furthermore, it can represent roles pertain-
ing to the activity of inspection modelling. At the IAEA for nuclear inspections
it can consist of a process designer that is in charge of designing optimal inspec-
tion processes in accordance with safeguards agreements and other legal aspects.
While senior inspectors are responsible for devising safeguards approaches other
inspectors can use inspection process models as content or process stepper [65]
for planning, preparing or training in general. The idea is to realize this in a so
called Inspection Knowledge Room where inspectors are familiarized with knowl-
edge made explicit through models. This model can also help organize security
roles and subsequently role based use of the modelling method.
4.4.2 Safeguards Perspective Applications
All of the above modelling languages described are a part of an inspection mod-
elling method iSMM. The inspection modelling represents a technique that uses
modelling languages integrated at the meta-model level. The meta-model ap-
proach here provisions for integration and syntactical correctness of the modelling
languages. Any constraints that can not be covered with the meta-model can
be formalised also with Object Constraint Language (OCL). This level of formal-
ism allows for instances of the meta-model to be processable using algorithms and
mechanisms. The level of formalism can be used to verify the correctness and com-
pleteness of modelled state activities. Furthermore, with the necessary formalism
of the language an example application scenario would be to automatically or semi-
automatically generate safeguards objectives. Modelling objectives and means to
achieve these objectives can be used to generate knowledge-based processes repre-
senting inspection activities for a State-Level Safeguards Approach (SLSA) then
customized and tuned for a particular state. Inspection activities are subsequently
derived from the identified safeguards objectives and are put in use for inspection
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Figure 4.6. Meta-model of interreferenced inspection models representing the opera-
tional perspective of the conceptual framework
by instantiating plans referred to as inspection pathways (or simply work plans).
Figure 4.6 represents the inter-referenced inspection models that define the SG
perspective of the framework. It can be assumed that similar inter-reference exists
with the meta-models of PROMOTE languages and technology languages such as
UML.
4.4.3 The Meta-Meta Model View
Applying the theoretical foundation provided under modelling methods as intro-
duced with open models and partially also under MOF, the conceptual framework
can be presented as shown in Figure 4.7. The three meta-models: Safeguards
or inspection meta-model (SG perspective), KM meta-model (PROMOTE) and
the technology meta-model (e.g. UML) are shown side by side. The three are
meta-models or a collection of meta-models, which can also represent a separate
modelling methods. They are integrated at either the meta-meta-model, meta-
model or even the model level; M0 in MOF L0 in Strahringer and Karagiannis
[64, 61]. The SG perspective is represented with the inspection models whereas
PROMOTE and UML meta-models will be integrated to support the SG per-
spective of nuclear verification. This hybrid of methods or languages represents an
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Figure 4.7. A structured view of the conceptual nuclear verification framework con-
sisting of the core inspection meta-model with models representing the SG perspective
and the KM and Technology meta-models which represent the perspectives in support
of SG. The focus as shown in the figure is on inspection meta-model
approach to combine ”best-of-breed” where knowledge management languages and
technology languages in a model-driven approach support the nuclear verification
domain and its core processes.
4.4.4 Modelling Procedure
Figure 4.8 shows the three building blocks of an integrated modelling method iSMM
representing the three perspectives of the conceptual framework discussed above.
The Operational Perspective which consists of modelling languages derived from
the inspection meta-model are surrounded by the KM meta-model (PROMOTE)
and the technology meta-model. There should also be a procedural aspect repre-
sented as a life-cycle for the inspection modelling method where high-level steps
are:
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Figure 4.8. Building Blocks of the integrated Safeguards Modelling Method. Step-wise
procedure for creating a Safeguards Approach.
1. Modelling the physical model and the state declared activities,
2. Modelling the SG Objectives and SG Criteria (algorithms are applied to
derive the objectives check their completeness against acquisitions paths).
3. Modelling inspection processes aligned to the derived SG objectives (means of
achieving the objectives). Also diﬀerent organizational aspects are modelled
to instantiate the inspection processes into usable work plans.
4. Modelling the knowledge in the organization and navigating through inspec-
tion processes that serve as an entry point.
5. Modelling technology aspects that support the inspection processes.
The next section will be looking at all the modelling languages representing
modelling techniques of the iSMM. In addition to the syntactical elements shown
in Fgure 4.5 languages will be depicted showing their notation and semantics.
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4.5 Modelling Languages
Language represents a notation of thought [66]. A modelling language is a lan-
guage used to express the statements in models of some class of SuS. This section
will depict the inspection modelling languages. In addition to syntactical elements
and notation an attempt will be made to show the origins of the modelling primi-
tives citing safeguards concepts and graphical representations already in use in the
inspectorate. The objective is to introduce modelling primitives that are closely re-
lated in some cases visually identical to those used by inspectors and other experts
in the department of safeguards.
There is suﬃcient justification why modelling in general and process modelling
specifically are favoured by any modern organization. Some of the aspects are
discussed in previous sections. One being that through models knowledge can be
operationalized [7]. Modelling represents a learning process and helps document
understanding of the people involved [67].
Before defining the inspection modelling languages an overview of guidelines
for designing modelling languages is provided based on available literature. There
have been eﬀorts in literature to present guidelines or rules for designing modelling
languages summarized next [68, 65]. Note has to be made that in some cases there
is an apparent overlap between the guidelines.
4.5.1 Modelling Guidelines
Correctness Principle (language adequacy) also referred to as language ad-
equacy in the newly introduced principles by Schuette covers requirements for syn-
tactical and semantic correctness [69]. Considering syntactical correctness means
that the modelling elements are defined using an approach such as meta-modelling
or graph grammar [7, 70]. The former provides for correctness of modelling lan-
guages by formalizing constructs based on a meta-model or model of the models.
Graph grammars is based on graph theory a formalism necessary in ensuring that
the modelling language is correct from a syntax point of view. On the other hand
the model must also be semantically correct. This can be established by ensuring
that each language element is unique and unambiguous allowing domain experts to
express statements that are not only correct syntactically but also their meaning
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communicates clearly their purpose [68, 7]
Relevance (construction adequacy) This aspect considers whether or not
all elements of the model and relationships are relevant to the system under study.
Secondly, determining whether all elements can be validated and all fit the pur-
pose of the model. This could be determined by considering if the model itself
contains less information than otherwise. This is also described in literature as the
minimalistic approach when dealing with data models [71]. The character of the
model, which can be too specific or too general, is related to the view of relevance.
Very general reference models tend to be too general. Examples of possible
criteria for determining relevance can be [65]:
• Models that represent a benefit to the clients
• Organizational models which are thought to hold a potential through reor-
ganization bringing improvements/savings
• Models representing processes that have many interfaces and serve trans-
parency (pertains to process models)
A rule of thumb is ”as much information as necessary, as little information as
possible” [65]. Also, when it comes to appearance it depends on the objective mod-
els are intended to fulfill therefore the objective should be set clearly beforehand.
Economic Feasibility Rule models have to be feasible based on two prop-
erties: robustness and adaptability. This guideline sets an upper-bound on the
modelling eﬀorts. Customers that apply models are responsible for monitoring
their costs and benefits. This principle is analogues to all types of solutions where
the benefits of using a model need to exceed the costs associated with it (i.e.
complicated to model, takes too long etc.)
Rule of Clarity Models are useful if clear to the reader, third party. This
is in particular important for determining if the correctness requirements are ful-
filled. Sometimes the syntactical correctness and the presentability/appearance of
models are in conflict. Under this rule generally one has to consider the aesthetics,
structure and the intuitive acceptability or how understandable it is.
Rule of Comparability - here we speak about two types of comparability
semantic and syntactic. The later can be achieved through a meta-model approach
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where elements of one meta model can be compared with the elements of the other
modelling language. When dealing with semantics the use of uniform symbols and
notation can help streamline semantic comparability.
Systematic Structure this is an important rule when dealing with layers of
modelling where for example upstream models become too complex and therefore
need to be followed by downstream models. Having processes models followed
by subprocess models should be complete describing the complete process leaving
no gaps. Integration of individual views needs to be considered. This is the
case also with other models such as inspection objectives model that represents a
decomposition of objectives that need to always point to a root objective (highest
level objective). The level to which models need to be followed by downstream
models is not specified. According to Davis [72] referring to the process models,
the informally expressed golden rule for decomposition is ”if it looks sensible it
probably is sensible if it looks silly it probably is silly.”
The so called new guidelines presented by Schuette extend this model in a model
called Guidelines of Modelling (GoM) where the correctness rule was redefined
under language adequacy further discussing the formalism necessary for a model
so that it can also be processed. This extends the former correctness and relevance
rules. The construction adequacy is also related to the former rule of relevance
where it is said that the modelling has to be tied to the purpose it serves for the
modeller and the intended user. A more problem solving orientation is given to
the purpose of modelling.
4.5.2 Representational analysis
Another practice known under the name representational analysis can serve as ba-
sis in evaluating modelling languages. It is defined as completeness or the extent
to which the modelling grammer has a deficit of constructs that map to the set
of representation theory. The the so called ontological clarity deals with the ex-
tent modelling grammar constructs are overloaded, redundant and excessive [73].
Bunge-Wand-Webber (BWW) may be a good starting point to study the represen-
tational capabilities of conceptual modelling languages. Bunge ontology extended
by Wand and Weber consecutively in 1993 and 1995 contains a set of real world
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constructs against which Weber suggests analysing the representational capability
of modelling techniques [74]. This is done in terms of completeness and clarity.
4.6 Inspection Modelling Languages
This section describes the modelling languages and presents their notation, seman-
tics and syntax. The languages are based on symbols, practices already existing
at the department so to bring familiarity and common understanding between the
modellers and users of the model. Languages presented make up the operational
perspective and represent a component of the iSMM.
4.6.1 Nuclear Fuel Cycle Modelling
This language enables high-level representation providing an overview of nuclear
activities in a state. Such a model has the objectives of representing the nuclear
fuel cycle by identifying every known nuclear process in a country characterizing
its nuclear programme. It is based on the oﬃcial declaration provided to the IAEA
- and can be supported using information from Open Source. The modelling con-
structs represent nuclear activities such as reprocessing, enrichment, reactors or
fuel fabrication. It is a modelling language to represent the nuclear process by
identifying activities their relation and the nuclear material flow from one activity
to the other. Nuclear fuel cycle is defined as ”a system of nuclear installations and
activities interconnected by streams of nuclear material.” [30]. The nuclear fuel
cycle can be closed or open therefore the modelling language must allow represent-
ing both. An example of a closed cycle would be spent fuel received from reactors
which is fed to a reprocessing activity that might feed back nuclear material to the
fuel fabrication activity and eventually end up as fresh fuel used again in a reactor.
This is represents a closed cycle.
The next section will describe the notation used which is based on an IAEA
internal paper where notation was specified for describing the physical model of a
state [1]. The notation visualizes the activity and the technology used for perform-
ing that activity. The status of the activity and coresponding technology can be
attributed as noneimplying it does not exist in the subject country. Furthermore
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Table 4.1. Elements of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle Model used to describe the front end
activities of the nuclear fuel cycle.
the scale the activity and related technology is developed can be characterized
as production or research only scale. Each status in the respective order is visu-
ally represented with colours white, green and yellow. Tables 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 show
the notation and each element of this modelling language and brief description is
provided. Examples of models shown in Figure 4.11 show technologies related to
the particular activity with one of the three colours described. For example in the
same figure Ruritania is depicted to have fuel fabrication at production scale shown
in green. Table 4.3 shows also the relations between nuclear activities which can
represent material flow. There is also an association relation which can be used
to relate activities which do not necessarily have material flowing from one to the
other.
The modelling language Nuclear Fuel Cycle Model can be used for two com-
plementary but distinct purposes:
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SemanticsNotationElement
Fuel Fabrication which is characterized with 
the activity of fabricating fuel to be used in 
Reactors. It received nuclear material from 
the conversion activity.
Spent Fuel Storage
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Water.Heavy Water 
Production
Is a reference to the activity of Mining and 
Milling which entails taking Uranium (U) or 
Thorium (Th) and preparing for fuel 
conversion.
Reprocessing
REPROCESSING
NON
AQUEOUS AQUEOUS
HEAVY WATER
PRODUCTION
SPENT FUEL STORAGE
Table 4.2. Elements of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle Model used to describe the back end
activities of the nuclear fuel cycle
SemanticsNotationRelation Element
Relation used to symbolize 
association of two activities 
other than nuclear or non-
nuclear material flow. It is also 
used to associate other 
abstract elements such as 
indicators.
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Nuclear Material Flow
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REPROCESSING
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CONVERSION
CONV.1 CONV.2
Table 4.3. Relation elements represented by arrows symbolizing the flow of nuclear
material and non-nuclear material. Undirected relation represents association of two
elements
1. It is used to represent the overall nuclear programme and provide an overview.
This is a high-level model, which can be considered as computation indepen-
dent model (CIM). It serves for mapping and depicting the overall nuclear
processes taking place in a state. It can be used as an entry model to more
detailed models and based on the classification suggested in [12] belongs to
so called knowledge management models that are to be mainly used and
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interpreted by humans i.e. safeguards analysts, inspectors.
2. It can be used to model nuclear weapons acquisition paths. Using the no-
tation to identify diﬀerent nuclear activities this modelling language can be
used to represent the weapons acquisition path. It represents a process model
based on syntax shown in the previously presented meta-model. In order to
leverage a great number of existing algorithms applicable to business pro-
cesses some of the constructs and notation is based on the BPMN. This
model consists of constructs also known in BPMN as Events: Start, End
and Gateway where logical operators such as OR, AND XOR can be used)
[75]. Nuclear Activities represented with notation as rectangles are activi-
ties such as mining and milling, fuel fabrication, enrichment, reprocessing,
reactors and research reactors. These activities can be further described at a
subprocess level using the same notation. Specific technologies used during
each activity are represented by highlighting with a predefined colour the de-
velopment scale. For example for activity Enrichment - MLIS can be selected
as the technology that can be shown as yellow if the technology is in devel-
opment phase or with green if the technology is in production. Apparently
indicating no colour means that the country does not posses this technology
and it is not potentially a part of their weapons grade material acquisition
path.
The first use case of using the model is to be descriptive of the nuclear pro-
gramme in a country whereas the second one can be used to create also prescriptive
models. The formal representation of the NFCM will be based on Pattern Theory
as presented in [13] and detailed in the next chapter of this thesis with graphical
and mathematical formalism. Figure 4.10 shows an example of the formalism us-
ing pattern theory generators to graphically represent the post-conversion nuclear
activity.
Examples of two versions of models used to provide an overview of the nuclear
programme are shown in Figures 4.11 and 4.12. Model shows a fictitious country
Ruritania where the overall nuclear programme is shown as recommended by Liu
et al in [1]. Ruritania is thought to have Enrichment, Fuel Fabrication and Reactors
that characterize its capability. The modeller can choose to use a template where
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Figure 4.9. Simplified example of the NFCM used to represent an Pu Acquisition path
in the state of Ruritania
by the activities which are not part of the states programme are also shown however
are inactive (visually shown as colourless). The other possibility is to simply display
the activities declared as present. Each of the activities is described with a set of
attributes that oﬀer specific facets of the activities and the technology used. This
was a recommendation from STR-325 where technologies and related activities are
further characterized as not being declared, in development or at research phase
only. Relation classes such as nuclear material and non-nuclear material are an
extension to the modelling primitives suggested. They represent a control flow and
describe the type of material flowing from one activity to the other giving a process-
based view of the nuclear activities. One important question the model designer
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Figure 4.10. An example of graphical formalism used to describe modelling elements
with generators based on Pattern Theory. The example shown represents the nuclear
activity post-Conversion or Conversion 2 which has nuclear material flowing to and from
the activity.
should ask especially when creating overview models (case 1) is do such models
represent aspects that cannot be obviously derived through existing information
systems and other means. It is then that use of models becomes economically and
operationally feasible.
In the second example (Fig. 4.12) a more detailed view of the nuclear process
model is shown. As previously described the modelling primitives are the same so
to avoid a great number of modelling elements. The model of Ruritania shows the
potential acquisition path for the state Ruritania. The model has a Start event
and an End Event which in the context of the acquisition path usually begins with
Mining and Milling as a starting event and Pu or HEU to symbolize the end of
the acquisition path which is equivalent to acquiring the material for building a
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Figure 4.11. Ruritania’s Nuclear Programme Overview showing the nuclear material
flow
nuclear explosive device. The red flag shown on the Fuel Fabrication:Exp or Spent
Fuel indicates a potential inconsistency. This attribute oﬀers visual representation
of activities that can be potentially abused or have some question or inconsistency
related to them. This will provide a capability of completely describing existing and
potential paths of acquiring weapons grade nuclear material. These models can be
used to describe the nuclear process in a state as is or could be (diﬀerently named
compared to the commonly known ”should be” in process modelling). The two
states are equivalent to the terminology used in business process modelling where
we model as is and should behowever not politically appropriate here. This model
can be used for all purposes required by the STR-325 where the basic paradigm says
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that the assessment of activities should address the following sequential questions
[1]:
1. What capabilities and experiences exist in a State declared nuclear fuel cy-
cle, and how would these likely be used if the State decided to pursue the
acquisition of weapons-usable material?
2. What capabilities, other than currently declared, would have to be developed
for that purpose?
3. Are there any development activities going on (declared or undeclared) in
the State that might be related to such capabilities?
4. To what extent have these development activities proceeded?
Firstly the existing capabilities can be represented through the model and then
models of missing capabilities that would potentially have to be developed can
be represented using the modelling language. Modelling method is complemented
by algorithms and mechanisms shown in the next chapter where formalism of
representing the model is used to provision mathematical structures for applying
algorithms (e.g. Dijkstra to determine the shortest path). The objective is to
not only see modelling methods as chunks that can be melted into an information
system but to also provide ”functionality to use and evaluate” [7]. It is the ob-
jective to represent the nuclear fuel cycle using formalism other than graph but
instead pattern theory. Algorithms based on this formalism can find application
in evaluating nuclear fuel programmes such as the example model for Ruritania.
4.6.2 Nuclear Facility Model
One important component in nuclear verification that determines the design of a
safeguards approach is the nuclear installations: their status (i.e. decommissioned
etc.), their purpose and relation to other facilities in the state and outside. In order
to complete the overview of the nuclear activities in a state the facility model is
referenced from the Nuclear Fuel Cycle Model to show the facilities involved in
performing the declared or potential undeclared activities. Such activities are
mapped to one ore more facilities or groups of facilities called sites. Another type
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Figure 4.12. Ruritania’s Nuclear Programme Overview showing only the association
of activities
of grouping sometimes used in devising safeguards approaches is sector. Identified
acquisition paths can point to existing facilities or non-existing facilities which
would be needed for missing activities in the acquisition path.
Nuclear Facility Modelling is based on a modelling language to represent instal-
lations relevant to Safeguards based on the traditional agreement INFCIRC/153,
the protocol additional INFCIRC/540 and states under the 66 agreement. A nu-
clear installation may be one of the following and is represented with the modelling
element ”Facility” [30]:
• Nuclear Facility - this can represent either reactors, critical facilities, plants
for conversion, fabrication, reprocessing and for separation of isotops. It can
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also represent other facilities where there is considerable amounts of nuclear
material as defined in the safeguards glossary [30].
• Uranium mine and concentration plants - explicitly mentioned since these
locations are not required to be declared under the traditional safeguards
and however under the articles of additional protocol must be declared.
• Locations Outside Facilities (LOFs) - installations outside the facility where
there is considerable amount of nuclear material.
• Other Locations - Under the specific agreement INFCIRC/66 to which very
few countries are signatory to this is equivalent to LOFs mentioned above.
For the purpose of facility modelling in this framework this type of instal-
lation is used to represent any type of installation, which is not defined as
a facility, LOF or a uranium mine and concentration plant. This modelling
element can represent any other installations co-located at the site with the
nuclear facilities [18].
Each installation whether a facility or LOF can be represented with specific
attributes of the modelling element corresponding to installation codes per de-
scriptions provided in [30]. For safeguards purposes there are also a set of phases
in the lifecycle of a facility or generally speaking a nuclear installation, from the
point when the decision is made to construct it until it has been decommissioned.
One facet of the modelling element Facility is also the life cycle phase which can
be one of the following: pre-construction, construction, commissioning, operating,
maintenance or modification, shut down, closed down and decommissioned.
Another concept important in representing nuclear and other installations in a
state is the site introduced under the additional protocol 540. It has been defined
in details in [30] and represents delimited area in the design information provided
by the state. Site is represented in the modelling language with an aggregation
element. Facilities and LOFs represented within the aggregation are considered to
be part of the site. The facility modelling language elements are shown in table
4.5.
In addition to the nuclear installation class instances of which are facilities
or LOFs there are relation classes which represent the relationship between two
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This is unrestricted element which allows for free text, images and 
other media that can be embedded.
Note
Represents logical grouping of nuclear installations. For example 
site, sector etc.
Aggregation
SemanticsNotationElement
It represents a building and any other type of location which may be 
only declared under additional protocol. It offers symbolism to 
represent any object which is not a facility or a LOF.
Other Location
Location Outside Facility. The element symbolizes also the 
operational status and type of LOF per classification defined in
INFCIRC/153 and INFCIRC/540.
LOF
A nuclear Facility. Status shown distinguishes visually between 
facilities depending on their operational status: OP for operational 
and CD for decommissioned. The code represents the type of 
facility (e.g. A for power reactors)
Facility
Status: OP
Category : A1
Status: OP
Category : I1
Table 4.4. Elements representing nuclear installations and their grouping in the of the
Nuclear Facility Model
SemanticsNotationElement
“Related” symbolizes an undefined 
relationship between any of the 
elements (installation) in the model. It 
can be used to represent assumptions 
or potential association of facilities 
within the State or outside (shown with 
a dotted line)
Related
Transfer is a relation class that shows 
the relationship between facilities, LOFs
in terms of the material flow. The 
shipping and receiving facilities are 
shown with the letters “S” and “R”
Transfer
A
Status: OP
Category : A1
B
Status: OP
Category : IS Spent fuel
R
A
Status: OP
Category : A1
B
Status: CD
Category : I
Table 4.5. Relation elements representing transfer or undefined relation between in-
stallations in a State and internationally.
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facilities, LOFs, sites or even States. Transfer relation class entails the modelling
element which represents the material transferred from one facility, site to the
other. The relation class is characterized with edges that are labeled as ”S” or
”R” symbolizing which nuclear installation is the receiving one and which is the
shipping facility. In case the same two facilities both receive and ship to each
other this is represented by creating an additional transfer relation. To represent
an undefined relationship between nuclear installations another relation Related
can be used. Notation and semantics of models are shown in table 4.5.
Site 1: Reactor Site Site 2: SF Dry  Storage Site
Site 3: Research Reactor Site
Site 4: Nuclear Institute
Site 5: LOFs
Other Locations
NPP-1
Status: OP
Category : A1
NPP-3
Status: CD
Category : A1
NPP-2
Status: OP
Category : A1
NPP-4
Status: OP
Category : A1
SFS-1
Status: OP
Category : G2
Waste
Treatment
7
Aux Bldg,
General
130
Gen Services
3
RR-1
Status: OP
Category : B1
Private
Nuclear Comp
15
Admin
buildings
8
Waste Treat
1
Hot cells
6
RR-2
Status: OP
Category : B3
S Spent fuel
R
LLW/ILW
Waste
Decommissioned
Mine
NPP-X
(Maritania)
Status: OP
Category : B3
S Spent fuel
R
LOF1
Status: OP
Category : I1
LOF-X
Status: OP
Category : I1
LOF2
Status: OP
Category : I1
LOF3
Status: OP
Category : I1
S
Spent fuel
R
S
Nuclear material
R
Figure 4.13. Example of using the Facility Modelling Language in representing nuclear
facilities and sites in Ruritania
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Figure 4.13 shows an example of the facility model where 5 sites are repre-
sented. In addition to a relation between facilities in a state there is also an
example of a relationship between a facility in Ruritania and a facility in Urania
(another fictitious state). Installations which are external to the state modeled are
represented with a dotted line. The modelling language also allows representing
buildings and Other Locations which are not per definition facilities or LOFs. This
representation is important for activities such as Complementary Access (CA).
4.6.3 Organizational Inspection Model
This modelling language is used to represent the working environment and the
organizational aspects of the inspectorate. Modelling elements are identical to el-
ements commonly used to describe organizational structure in environment such
as [76, 75]. It specifies the formal organizational units which in the Department
of Safeguards are broken down to: Department, Division, Section and Project or
Unit. It also specifies the roles and the individuals that are working within an
organizational unit. Referencing the SG objectives and inspection processes, it
represents an assignment mechanism where staﬀ are associated to the objectives
and inspection activities. An example of the inspection organizational model is
shown in figure 4.14. Some of the notation is adopted from ADONIS and PRO-
MOTE working environment mode [76, 9, 8, 41].
The inspection organization model is also supported by reference with lan-
guages which are a part of the PROMOTE method where knowledge and skills
can be modeled. Associating individual staﬀ the processes based on their skills
and knowledge profile provides a knowledge view of the resources in the organiza-
tion. Table 4.6 shows the elements of the Organizational Inspection Model.
The relation classes represented as elements of this model are: ”belongs to”,
”has role” and ”is subordinated”. As shown in the example of figure 4.14 organiza-
tional units can be broken down to sub units which are subordinates. A person can
belong to any of the units and is assigned a roles (e.g. knowledge manager) . One
person can have more than one role (e.g. section head and process owner). Termi-
nology is adapted to the working environment of the IAEA and the department of
Safeguards.
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Senior Inspector
R
Safeguards
Inspector
R
Section BSection A
Division X
Figure 4.14. Example of the Inspection Organizational Model representing a general
organizational unit at the inspectorate
Symbolizes the person who performs a certain task by being 
assigned a role and belonging to a organizational unit.
Person
Organizational unit can be a formal group in a organization such as 
Department, Division, Section or Unit.
Organizational 
Unit
SemanticsNotationElement
Role represents the job of that the person. Every person or 
performed can be assigned to a single role or more.Role R
Table 4.6. Elements of the Inspection Organizational Model.
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4.6.4 Inspection Process Model
This is a modeling language to represent the business processes of the operational
perspective. As mentioned in previous work [77] the preferred term is inspection
process model. For the purpose of this study inspection process modelling is defined
below where an important distinction is made with reference processes commonly
created and already existing in organizations such as IAEA [46]:
”the exercise of representing inspection activities and used resources
working together towards achieving inspection objectives eﬃciently and
eﬀectively in a structured and repeatable manner. Such process models
are based on reference processes however are specifically modeled for a
facility, site or state”
Horizontal and vertical swimlanes can be used to organize 
and categorize activities.
Swimlane
This is unrestricted element which allows for free text, 
images and other media that can be embedded.
Note
SemanticsNotationElement
It represents logical grouping and structuring of content on 
the diagram.
Aggregation
I-Activities represent inspection tasks executed in a 
business process.
I-Activity
Is a process that is included within another process. 
Represents symbolism for the decomposition of a business 
process. Repeatable processes can be called or complex 
process can be decomposed.
Sub process
Table 4.7. Activity and other elements of the Inspection Process Model based on
ADONIS and BPMN
It consists of elements that are common to modelling business processes using
the BPMN notation from BPMI [75]. The inspection process model is based on
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the notation and syntax used also in ADONIS [76]. It entails same elements used
in representing a business process however semantically customized for inspection
process modelling. This modelling language represents activities performed by
safeguards inspectors as specified in the safeguards approach. Elements of this
modelling language are gateways such as start, end, paralellity, decision and merge.
Moreover, activity and other elements are used to represent logical grouping of
activities and content on the drawing area (i.e. swimlane, aggregation). Elements
of the inspection process model, their notation and semantics are shown in tables
4.7 and 4.8.
Is the element where more execution paths are merged. 
It awaits one of more incoming branches to complete.Merging
Represents the symbolism for representing “AND”
gateway. All sequence flows out of this gateway are 
activated simultaneously.Parallelity
SemanticsNotationElement
It is a also referred to as complex gateway. It triggers one 
of more branches based on an evaluated condition.
Decision
Represents the process end. There can be only one end 
element in the diagram.Process end
Symbolizes the beginning of a business process. There 
has to be exactly one start element for each business 
process.
Process start
Table 4.8. Gateway elements of the Inspection Process Model based on ADONIS and
BPMN
Inspection process models in the inspection modelling framework are also uti-
lized as an entry point to knowledge management process models (KMPs), mod-
elled with PROMOTE. Based on the Process Oriented Knowledge Management
(POKM) approach and with the help of a knowledge management modelling lan-
guage provided by PROMOTE, inspection knowledge intensive activities will refer-
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ence Knowledge Management Process (KMP) models which describe KM activities
and give a process-oriented view of KM. Knowledge Intensive Tasks (KITs) and
referenced KMPs exemplified later in the chapter.
Represents a connector extending a 
note from one of the inspection 
process modelling elements.
has note
SemanticsNotationElement
Represents the sequence flow 
between activities
Subsequent
 
Table 4.9. Relation elements of the Inspection Process Model based on ADONIS and
BPMN
Other elements of the inspection process model are the relation classes which
typically in the business process model consist of the main relation subsequent.
Subsequent is also used in IPM to represent the sequence flow of activities. This
elements and has note used for relating notes with free text and images are shown
in table 4.9.
+
CA Start
1
Assign CA
!
Senior Inspector
2
Create the Team
Senior Inspector
3
Briefing
5
8
Analyse the CA
Safeguards Inspector
6
4
7
Perform Open
Source Analysis
Safeguards Inspector
7
Create CA
Package
Check Ruritania's
Political Situation
Safeguards Inspector
8
Figure 4.15. Example of a Inspection Process Model based on ADONIS and BPMN
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4.6.5 Inspection Objectives Model
Another modelling language in the set of inspection modelling languages is the
Inspection Objectives Model (IOM). Before describing the modelling elements of
this language the purpose of the language in the framework will be discussed. Fur-
thermore, a conceptual background of the language will be set forth showing how
inspection objectives are represented by having higher level objectives and func-
tional objectives at the subsequent level. Linking objectives at all layers is meant
to provide traceability, adaptability and means to measure the performance of the
inspection activities in fulfilling safeguards objectives. Furthermore, objectives can
be considered as criteria which is particularly important under the undergoing shift
to information driven safeguards.
Generally the objectives modelling or as commonly known goal modelling is
referred to in the literature [78, 67, 72] in the context of process modelling. Before
proceeding it is important to define the terms objective and goal in the context
of modelling. Also, compare the two which will reflect the choice of terminology
made to represent inspection objectives, namely the Inspection Objectives Mod-
elling (IOM).
Term Goal in the Princeton dictionary is defined as state of aﬀairs that a plan
is intended to achieve. From a more system based perspective in [79, 67] ”goals
express intentions and capture the reasons of the system to be built”. Lamswerde
defines goals as an objective a system under study must achieve. It corresponds to
an objective a system should achieve through cooperation of agents in the software
to be [80]. Objectives are also defined as statements that lead to the attainment of
goals and in Requirements Engineering (RE) related literature the two terms are
used interchangeably. One of the definitions from Webster’s is ”something towards
which eﬀort is directed: an aim, goal, or end of action”. The term objective is also
used in decision science where Keeney defines the term objective as ”a statement
of something that one desires to achieve” [81]. Also, it ”generally indicates a
direction in which we should strive to do better” [82]. Most of the researchers in
the field of requirements engineering use the term goal whereas decision science is
characterized with the term objective.
Objectives in the view of Hurri are measurable and compare to criteria. In
contrast goals are less measurable and diﬃcult to quantify their attainment [82].
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However, it is common that the two are used interchangeably. The preferred term
in this study will be objectives and it is important to look at objectives as criteria
in the context of Safeguards under IS under the absence of the traditional criteria
based on significant quantity required to build a nuclear weapon and timeliness
representing the time it takes to build it.
Some of the reasons why the term objective is preferred for the conceptual
verification framework are:
• the term objective is already commonly used in the implementation of safe-
guards to express achievements and purpose of inspection activities [45, 18,
30].
• term objectives should not be mixed with inspection goals which have a
specific meaning in the nuclear inspection domain. There are two inspection
goals which represent performance targets. Significant quantity (SQ) and
timeliness discussed in previous chapter [45].
• the purpose of the inspection objectives modelling is not focused on require-
ments engineering and software development but it rather serves as a tech-
nique for representation to assist inspection decision making and process
design.
• the term objectives can also represent criteria used for evaluating the eﬀec-
tiveness of safeguards measures.
4.6.5.1 Modelling Goals and Objectives
Modeling goals and objectives is a research field in development with years of
work performed on [8, 83, 84, 85]. Literature review shows that there are two main
applications where goals or objectives modelling is applied: decision science and
requirements engineering (RE). In requirements engineering goals provide vari-
ous reasoning schemes [86]. With the goal-oriented RE we can check whether
requirements are complete and correct ensured through the operationalization of
objectives [62].
From a RE point of view goals/objectives are grouped in two main categories
functional and non-functional. In a software engineering sense the two categories
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relate to the functional and non-functional requirements. Additionally, goals can
have attributes such as name, specification, priority and can be linked [80].
4.6.5.2 Objectives and Process Modelling
The conceptual relationship between the process modelling and objectives as a
practices on which modelling is based occurs as covered in literature [67, 80, 78, 87].
It is especially discussed in the field of RE. Requirements engineering (RE) inter-
connects activities such as domain analysis, elicitation, negotiation/agreement,
specification/documentation and evolution. All of these activities can be sup-
ported with approaches such as goal orientation in defining complete and correct
requirements [67]. Here the focus is not so much specifying requirements but rather
through an objectives-based technique to design measurable objectives and inspec-
tion processes that best contribute to strategic and lower level technical objectives.
Also, subsequently contribute to higher level objectives.
Kueng and Kawalek state that goals or objectives modelling ”is a critical step in
the creation of useful process models.” Among others it is said that goals/objectives
modelling is important because [67]:
• ”we state what we want to achieve so that we are able to define necessary
activities which business process should encompass” - in our case inspection
processes
• ”understanding of goals is essential in selecting the best design alternative”
• we can evaluate the operating quality of processes
• ”clear expression of goals makes it easier to comprehend the organizational
changes that must accompany a business process redesign.”
According to Neiger et al and the research they performed, process and objec-
tives modelling can be seen as one of the three approaches:
• State-based approach where the notion of state exists as where process models
are a dynamic ”system that moves in the space of all possible states until it
reaches the final state (goal)” [88].
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• Requirements Engineering which is very well covered and still a current field
of study. Here goal oriented view provisions for completeness in eliciting. It
related to more advanced aspects related to autonomic systems [89, 90].
• Decision Analysis approach actualised in the context of goal modelling through
work of Neiger and Churilov [91]. Structuring and linking means objectives to
fundamental objectives based on the Value Focused Thinking (VFT) frame-
work of Keeney [81]. This represents a diﬀerent approach from the two above
since the focus is not on the process models as configuration means for run-
ning workflows nor does it serve the common purpose of deriving accurate
requirements. The aim is to introduce objective-based view in decision mak-
ing related to the design of process models. The position we prefer to take
in our framework.
Value-Focused Thinking (VFT) is a philosophy introduced by Ralph Keeney.
According to Keeney ”values are what we fundamentally care about in decision
making”. Alternatives are simply the means we use to obtain our values. This
approach is based on three major principles that guide decision making in a step-
wise fashion: start with values; use values to generate better alternatives and use
values to evaluate the alternatives [81].
4.6.5.3 Lower-level Functional and Process Objectives
The next step in defining how the objectives are achieved and measured is to es-
tablish a link between the so called fundamental objectives at a more abstract
layer and the concrete activity objectives. Neiger et al make an attempt to link
the fundamental objectives to the process and functional objectives through de-
composition and refinement/reduction [92]. Fundamental and process objectives
are considered as a subset of means objectives therefore relating the two indirectly.
Work presented shows a link to the EPC processes and functions. EPC is a mod-
elling language based on petri-nets used under ARIS framework which already
contains modelling elements such as goals that can be decomposed using a frame-
work such as VFT. In ARIS functions are defined as ”technical tasks performed on
an object to support a company goal”. This approach is however presented under
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the assumption that company goals and objectives are known to the modeller in
advance and are supported by functions [93].
Korherr and List focus on the issue of goal based process modelling and tech-
nical aspects by trying to extend the meta model of both EPC and BPMN with
organizational and goal concepts allowing an enhanced ”goal-sensitive” representa-
tion of BPMN and EPC. Their work is more focused on measurement of activities
or functions which is based on the existence of goals that these activities/functions
have to fulfill. In comparison to EPC, in BPMN as specified by BPMI there is no
goal modelling element [75]. A related approach in industry known fromWhitestein
Technologies proposes a goal-oriented business process modelling and execution un-
der the name GO-BPMN. Here the objective is to extend not only business process
modelling but also business process execution. Each goal is associated to one or
more alternative plans which can satisfy the goal. Run-time execution is performed
on the best path depending on specified conditions [94, 95, 87].
Since inspection process modelling is mainly based on the BPMN notation,
semantics and syntax, inspection objectives modelling is considered as the integra-
tion layer between the domain specific nuclear process models and domain inde-
pendent inspection process models. The aim is not to change the notation with
new elements but to rather enhance the integration of meta-models.
Figure 4.5 shows the meta-model of the inspection process model and the in-
spection organization model also important for representing inspection objectives.
Processes, activities and tasks can reference at most one objective whereas the
same objectives can be references by more than one diﬀerent activity or process.
Since we also need to have means of measuring the performance against the de-
fined goals, attributes that represent criteria like questions will be embedded to
the means objectives modelled. In addition to the modelling elements of the lan-
guage the aim is to present inspection objectives that may be achievable through
alternative paths. Also the idea is to provide a procedure for the decomposition of
higher-level objectives or fundamental objectives and linking them to the inspec-
tion process and activity level objectives.
In order to provide for both refinement and decision path there has to be
formalism such as the one suggested by Neiger or Korherr and List [96]. Neiger
et al suggest logical connectors between the means objectives and the subsequent
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process and function objectives of EPC. With a level of formality objectives models
can be used for decision analysis in process design but also for automation by
inferring [89].
The lowest level of fundamental objectives is the highest level of means objec-
tives. Any leaf objectives must be connected to at least one process, activity or
task implying the execution of each contributes towards the higher level fundamen-
tal objectives. Objectives may be independent of each other or means objectives
may have independent goals that are met by means that are not related to any
of the other. This will commonly be handled by modelling a separate inspection
objectives model. The logical connectors between the objectives and processes are
represented with AND/OR refinement as suggested in [92]. The selected trajectory
of lowest level, atomic activity objectives represents the so called inspection path-
way which can be evaluated with measures for each objectives or through some
aggregation schema [16].
4.6.5.4 Safeguards Objectives
As most other organizations in the department of Safeguards there are goals of
higher level that reflect the vision of the organization and there are also more spe-
cific goals which are measurable and are fulfilled on daily basis. Under Inspection
Objectives Modelling only objectives related to the inspection activities and the
nuclear verification regime of the IAEA will be discussed. It is though not limited
to the department and can be extended as a framework across the whole IAEA.
Strategic aspects of the verification programme are discussed in more detail in
Chapter 2.
Department of Safeguards seeks objectives as defined in the strategic plan.
These objectives represent the direction which the department intends to follow
in order to meet the overall organizational goals in agreement with the mission
statement of the IAEA and the priorities set by the Board of Governors. The
identified high level objectives (here named goals) for Safeguards according to the
IAEA’ Medium Term Strategy are [17]:
1. Goal C1: Assurances to the international community of the peaceful use of
nuclear energy
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2. Goal C2: Contribute as appropriate to eﬀective verification of nuclear arms
control and reduction agreements, including nuclear disarmament
To ensure that these objectives are achieved and that eﬀorts within the or-
ganization are aligned, inspection objectives modelling should provide means of
representing the relationship between higher level objectives and lower level ob-
jectives which are measurable. Furthermore, measurable objectives need to be
integrated with inspection activities at the process activity and task level. Such
an approach oﬀers the advantage of:
• documentation of objectives and the means to meet them
• serve as a basis for goal-based requirements engineering projects in the de-
partment
• allow flexibility and adaptability of inspection processes with changes in or-
ganizational objectives
• serve as a tool for decision making during inspection process design and
evaluation
• creating measurable criteria-like inspection objectives
In order to implement such an approach there has to be a relationship between
the fundamental objectives and functional or in the case of BPMN formalism,
activity and task objectives [97, 81]. So called fundamental objectives as discussed
by Keeney represent the goals defined in a decision making context. The means
objectives represent the methods for achieving fundamental objectives. Neiger et
al extend this approach using the Value-Focused Thinking (VFT) technique with a
conceptual link to the next level of means objectives namely functional and process
objectives defined in ARIS and represented with the EPC process modelling [93].
Figure 4.16 shows the decomposition of safeguards objectives as proposed by
Eckhard et al where higher level general state objectives are decomposed to so
called technical objectives in a process that asks at each level below the predefined
General State-Level Objectives (GSLOs) the questions:
• Where does the inspection need to be done? and
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Figure 4.16. SG Objectives Structure from Eckhard et al. Safeguards Objectives are
followed by General State-Level Objectives out of which State-Level Technical Objectives
are derived. Other Safeguards Strategic Objectives are seen at the same level of the
technical activities.
• What needs to be done to meet the objective? (i.e. detection of undeclared
activities and material in a state)
The later is a rather obvious question however it relates to the first question,
which in the structure of inspection objectives is an aspect related to the facility
in question. Most of the technical objectives are based on the type of facility that
needs to be inspected. This process has generated 42 objectives, which can be
applied to one of the possible scenarios in verifying a state.
Hurri claims that the main problem when dealing with the objectives decom-
position is the generation of objectives and the structuring [82]. The generation of
inspection objectives is well covered by the facility-type-based process however it
still lacks clarity in how the objectives are structured and does not consider their
link to inspection process objectives. The more natural way of looking at the in-
spection objectives is by asking what we want to achieve and then think how were
going to do this. The ”where” part will be implicit using the structuring proposed.
In literature as it is discussed the goals are usually decomposed to lower level
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Figure 4.17. SG Objectives decomposition and the corresponding decomposition based
on VFT. Higher level models are decomposed to SG Objectives according to the scheme
proposed by Eckhard et al. SG Objectives are linked to lower level activities to provision
objectives based modelling of processes.
goals that represent the methods to achieve these. Using the VFT we could charac-
terize the GSLO objectives as fundamental objectives. They represent a hierarchy
of general objectives that add value in a specific decision context [91, 67]. Decom-
posing higher level safeguards objectives to technical objectives can be mapped
to fundamental and means objectives represented in the VFT with the casually
related means ends objective network.
Figure 4.17 shows the conceptual relation between the VFT framework and
the predefined safeguards objectives as suggested in the approach of Neiger and
Churilov [91]. In a top down manner fundamental objectives are derived from the
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state level analysis of weapons acquisition paths and legally binding agreement be-
tween the IAEA and a member state. Subsequently, means objectives are linked to
the processes and activity objectives which in the case of inspection modelling are
represented through a combination of models that show how and who performs
activities that are crucial to the attainment of inspection objectives. This will
guide the generation of enhanced objective sensitive inspection models that opera-
tionalize verification knowledge in contrast to generic reference processes presently
used.
4.6.5.5 Suggested Objective-based Approach
In order to have formalism which will allow for the NFCM activities as illustrated
in 4.17 to be translated into state level technical objectives we need to a create a
link between the elements of the nuclear fuel cycle model and the structural ele-
ments of the objectives model. The idea is to extend the inspection process model
discussed in more details before with another attribute activity objective which
will reference the objective. Therefore oﬀering an integrated modeling environ-
ment that allows for methodical inspection process modeling based on objectives
that are decomposed from higher level safeguards objectives. This needs to be
done by the domain expert based on the results of the analysis performed on the
NFCM model.
Nuclear Fuel Cycle Model has a formalised syntax as defined in the inspection
meta-model. Using the pattern theory formalism analysis will be performed with
algorithms that evaluate valid generator configurations in order to identify diﬀerent
acquisition paths of HEU, Pu. Details of representing this language with generators
is provided in the next section. The basic premises here is to move transparently
from higher abstraction layers to lower ones by transforming one model into another
without loss of semantics captured from the domain experts with the NFCM.
For example, if a certain acquisition path is discovered in a country this can be
represented by using the NFCM model. Each of the represented nuclear activities
references existing nuclear installations (facilities, LOFs). By starting with the
fundamental questions already known from work of Eckhard et al the two questions
that will lead to the decomposition and discovery of means objectives for state level
safeguards are:
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• Q1: Where is the [declared/potential ] activity taking place
• Q2: What needs to be looked at that location
The structure of the state-level objectives can be represented with a modelling
language which consists of 5 elements. These elements are based on the VFT as
well as principles adopted from other methodologies such as i*, KAOS and a new
method presented in the project BREIN [8, 85]. First element of the language is
a goal here known as objective which can be either soft or hard as defined in [85].
In the inspection objectives model this distinction is not made. Each objective
can be decomposed into subobjectives which are connected to the super-objective
through logical connectors AND/OR. The subobjectives can be met with means
objectives, a relation represented through mean-ends connectors. Furthermore,
actors who are responsible for each of the objectives can be identified. Another
element is the actor boundary which indicates the scope of responsibility for the
actor.
If we now look at the technical objectives at the state level as described by
Eckhard in [98] the mapping between these objectives and the modelling elements
of the inspection objectives model are described:
General state-level objectives (GSLO) as well as state-level technical objectives
(SLTO can be modelled using the Objective element represented by an ellipse. The
state level technical objectives can be represented using the means end connector
pointing to the means of fulfilling these objectives or the technical objectives. The
means objectives referred to in VFT can be further broken down and represent the
link to the activities of a inspection process model.
Steps required for decomposition objectives and subsequent mapping to inspec-
tion activities are:
1. Identify the objectives which need to be further decomposed based on the
generated list of objectives
2. Decompose the state-level objectives or means objectives generated from the
nuclear fuel cycle model. Decompose them to the level reasonable [72].
3. Model the network of objectives such that all state level objectives are broken
down to means objectives using the logical connectors OR/AND
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4. Reference means objectives to processes or activities.
4.6.5.6 Elements of the Inspection Objectives Modelling Language
In this section elements of the Inspection Objectives Model will be shown. Some
of the elements and corresponding notation used for this modelling language were
adapted from i* as detailed in [85]. The meta-model of this language discussed
earlier includes specific concepts related to the safeguards objectives and relies on
the decomposition of objectives and their relation to business processes presented
in work from [91].
Marks the boundary for which the actor is responsible. It groups objectives 
and means objectives.
Actor boundary
Represents a person or role that is responsible for performing the tasks for 
achieving the objectives.Actor
Means objectives represent the methods for achieving the higher level 
objectives or fundamental objectives. They are generated by asking the 
questions where and what.
Means objective
SemanticsNotationElement
Objective symbolizes fundamental and lower level goals. In the inspection 
modelling framework it represents the general state level objectives 
(GSLO) and state level technical objectives (SLTO) 
Objective
Table 4.10. Elements of the inspection objectives model. Hierarchically structured
objectives and methods for achieving them are modelled using the elements objective
and means objective
Table 4.10 shows the notation and semantics for objectives and means objectives.
Objectives are elements representing higher level objectives (e.g. fundamental as
classified in VFT). The means objectives are those that satisfy higher level objec-
tives. In the context of decision making this breakdown in adjustable to state level
objectives and technical objectives in safeguards. Finally, means objectives refer-
ence processes, tasks or a group of processes or tasks enabling operationalization
of objectives.
Furthermore, the relation classes of this model are shown. They consist of a
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Represents a person or role that is responsible for performing the 
tasks for achieving the objectives.
Is responsible
Means-end relation represents the link between means objectives 
and objectives. It symbolises the method which is used to achieve 
the objective,
Means-end
SemanticsNotationElement
Decomposition link is used to hierarchically structure objectives or 
means objectives. The horizontal link is placed on the side of the 
decomposed element.
Decomposition
 
 
Table 4.11. Relation elements in the Inspection Objectives Modelling language.
decomposition relation and means-end link. Decomposition is used to hierarchi-
cally structure the means objectives. Means end relation is used to represent which
objective is satisfied by which means objective representing methods of achieving
higher level fundamental objectives. Notation used for the relation classes was
adopted from Yu’s i-star (i*) modelling language mainly focused on goal oriented
requirements engineering [85].
4.7 Knowledge Modelling Language:PROMOTE
Modelling knowledge management is a part of a methodology PROMOTE. Under
the assumption that knowledge management has direct impact on the performance
of the business, business processes are indirectly linked to knowledge products
[65]. The PROMOTE modelling language consists of a set of languages that help
describe all aspects of knowledge management. The starting point is the business
process model which leads to knowledge products and activities that generate
these products. As described it models four dimensions of knowledge management:
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knowledge product, knowledge, knowledge processes and knowledge resource. The
language enables the process view knowledge activities where knowledge product
is a result of process. PROMOTE languages are followed by an approach which is
described in detail in [38, 39, 40].
Figure 4.18. Example of Knowledge Management Process (KMP) Model in PRO-
MOTE
Figure4.18 shows an example of a Knowledge Management Process Model in
PROMOTE. Business processes which are identified as knowledge intensive (KIT)
are referenced to KMPs that generate the knowledge product needed by the busi-
ness process. Under the inspection modelling, PROMOTE approach is also applied
for inspection processes referencing KMP that support core processes with knowl-
edge [41, 99, 9, 10]. The modelling language of PROMOTE enables identification
of the knowledge products by modelling the activities that create them and by
mapping the knowledge resources available in the organization. In the case of
inspection modelling the aim is to support Process-oriented view of KM with all
three application scenarios: process model as content, as an entry point and as
means of managing knowledge management as a process. Table 4.12 shows PRO-
MOTE models that are integrated with the models of the inspection modelling
method.
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Extension of the PROMOTE language with Ontology Web 
Language and Semantic Web Rule Language. The two can 
be used for context aware BPEL workflow execution.
OWL/SWRL
A knowledge view of the working environment where 
performers and roles are modelled by considering skills and 
profiles of employees needed to define knowledge roles.
Skill 
Environment 
Model
Represents an overview of knowledge activities, products 
and resources. It provides a bird eye view of the knowledge 
modelled.
Knowledge Map 
Model
Is used to represent knowledge space in a form of structures 
whether is topics or other concepts that can bring clarity to 
relations of object in the knowledge space.
Knowledge 
Structure Model
Used to represent the sequence of activities needed for 
creating knowledge products. 
Knowledge 
Management 
Process Model
DescriptionModel
Represent knowledge products offering both a product view 
of knowledge as well as process view  by being loosely 
coupled with business/inspection process models.
Knowledge 
Product Model
Table 4.12. Models of the PROMOTE Approach integrated in the inspection modelling
framework to represent the Knowledge Management perspective.
The approach suggested in the framework is to identify the products of the in-
spection processes that can be modeled using the PROMOTE language. Products
can be electronic or even human such as Experts. Other products can be search
engines, technical reports and other products which need to be managed as explicit
knowledge and in terms of knowledge activities that create them [8, 9].
4.8 Technology Modelling Language
This perspective of the modelling framework is rather vaguely named technology
not to restrict it to modelling only information and communication technologies.
In the domain of nuclear inspections there is also a great amount of hardware and
software which are outside of the typical information systems boundary in a organi-
zation. They serve as technology for data collection and analysis and can contain
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a great amount of knowledge in performing measurements and algorithm based
calculations for Non-Destructive Assey (NDA) analysis. More often than not such
equipment is developed by third party vendors which built and customized prod-
ucts for use only by the IAEA. Modelling methods and a model driven approach in
general can be used to bridge the knowledge gap between inspectors in performing
their duties in the field and suppliers of such equipment. Models can serve as re-
quirements to the development and enhancement of new and existing equipment.
They can also be modelled in order to aim for eﬃciency where technology can play
an important role.
Next sections briefly look at UML and other modelling languages that can
support the technology perspective of the framework.
4.8.1 Unified Modelling Language
UML in this framework is represented as the language of choice for modelling the
technology aspect. As proposed by OMG , UML models can be used to also to
represent abstractions in support of systems development. With the introduction
of MDA, this language can be used to create Platform Independent Models that
can be transformed to mode detailed models and eventually source code [100].
The historical challenge of continuous technology upgrade can be met with models
that oﬀer abstraction good enough to capture formal elements of the systems while
providing possibilities to leverage new platforms and port existing applications.
Although UML can be also used to represent business activities (or the business
layer), languages chosen and presented so far under the operational perspective are
not limited to the documentation and specification for developing systems. In the
inspection modelling framework UML models are used to represent more technical
layers. Mapping higher level models of the operational perspective to technical
models represented with the UML language is represents a challenge due to the
great number of concepts and modelling elements that need to be semantically
translated to UML models that can generate source code. Since the objective is
not to generate code, the inspection modelling framework is not limited to also
provide such a functionality. Solution to interoperability of these models is made
easier by using the necessary formalism when representing inspection models. This
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problem requires a formalisation of modelling layer which rests between inspection
operational models and UML models. A good candidate for such a formalism
is pattern theory which is based on so called generators. These constructs can
be represented also with a graphical formalism and can be mathematically rep-
resented therefore supporting transformation and integration of models not only
syntactically but also semantically by using algebraic constructs and algorithms
thereof.
+getOperator()
+getCoordinates()
-type : string
-operator : string
-coordinates : int
Facility
-state
NuclearInstallation
+getOperator()
+getCoordinates()
-description : string
-coordinates : int
LOF
prepare for inspection
conduct inspection
follow up inspectoin
inspector
report search
nuclear data report
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Figure 4.19. Simplified examples of UML models. Starting from left to right the
examples show an instance of the class, activity and a use case model.
According to OMG UML 2.0 identifies 13 types of diagrams which are grouped
into three categories. The three categories are Structure Diagrams, Behavior Di-
agrams and Interaction Diagrams. Structure diagrams represent the static ap-
plication structure and include diagrams such as Class Diagram, Object Diagram,
Component Diagram etc. The diagrams that represent behavioural aspects include
well know Use Case Diagram, Activity Diagram and the State Machine Diagram.
Interaction Diagrams on the other hand which are derived from more general Be-
haviour diagrams include Sequence Diagram, Communication Diagram, Timing
Diagram and Interaction Overview Diagram [49]. Figure 4.19 shows some exam-
ples of UML diagrams that are also applicable under the inspection modelling
framework.
Details of each type of diagram based on the modelling language will not be
covered here. Specifications and in depth description of the language and its use
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is oﬀered by OMG in [100].
Chapter5
Formalization with Pattern Theory
As discussed in previous chapters the level of formalism required for a model de-
pends on the intended purpose and expected results of its processing. As an
example of a formalism that can be used in addition to the meta-modelling al-
ready shown is the known Pattern Theory (PT). Other formalisms through the
use of graphs or petri nets are also possible however this thesis will contribute by
defining the formalization elements based on PT. As the application domain in this
research is nuclear verification the chosen model type to which the formalism will
be applied is the Nuclear Fuel Cycle Process Model (NFCM). The intention is to
process these models in order to check for their consistency or automate the gener-
ation of safeguards objectives inferred from the model. This is only one example of
processing that can be achieved based on rules such as ”if x nuclear activity takes
place then activity y can follow”. The task of automatically generating objectives
form existing models does not in itself represent a complex job however the for-
malization of rules is demanding and requires domain knowledge. This example
of formalization is meant to serve as basis for applying more complex algorithms
(e.g. stochastic approach). Moreover, the identified constructs based on the theory
should be useful for formalizing any modelling language provided that it adheres
to certain level of formalism (models as defined in OMI).
This theory stemming from applied mathematics field oﬀers graphical and
mathematical formalism, which may bring us a step forward in closing the gap
between a machine processable languages and easy to use domain/specific mod-
elling languages. Through the use of so called generators that represent atomic
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elements, in our case diagrammatic modelling language primitives, principles of
regularity can be formalized. Generators can be positive pixel values in an image,
states in Markov Chain, geometric objects such as vectors and surface elements,
or rewriting rules in language theory. Rules of transformation are the generators
(formal grammars). Transformation allowed by the rules are constrained by the
consistency that is placed using the bonds between the generating rules [101].
5.1 Pattern Theory Elements
The theory presented was first introduced by Grenander in [13]. Next a canonical
introduction will be provided presenting the algebraic constructs that can describe
the structure of the generators as well as their admissible combination into config-
urations.
Properties of a generator are defined with in-bonds, out-bonds and attributes.
To a given generator corresponds the arity ω(g). The arity tells us the maximum
number of connections to the generator and represents the sum of in-arity and
the out-arity. Generators can appear more than once in a configuration. To keep
them separate identifying marks as parts of attributes are used. Basic elements of
a generator are graphically depicted in Figure 5.1. Direction of the bonds in-wards
or out-wards can also be represented with an arrow. Properties of the generator
shown graphically can be therefore described as follows:
ωin(g) = 2,ωout(g) = 2
ω(g) = ωin(g) + ωout(g) = 4
Bv = {β0, β1, β2, β3}
Bs = {0, 1, 2, 3}
To each bond corresponds a bond value β from bond value space B. B(g) shall
be denoted by the combination of bond structure Bs and bond values Bv. For any
g ∈ G the notation Bs(g) will mean the set {bj; j = 1, 2, ...ω(g)} and Bv(g) will
mean the set {βj; 1, 2, ...ω(g)} where bj means bond coordinate.
Configurations that satisfy a certain given constraint are known as regular. A
generator with its bonds represents a structure that can be combined with other
generators to form regular or partially regular configurations. A good analogy is
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Figure 5.1. An example of a basic generator and its properties
the one that resembles the behavior of molecules which can be made of more atoms
which are held together with their chemical bonds [102]. For each two generators
the pair of bond values is either regular (true) or irregular (false). With this the
local regularity is established that can be formalized with the structure formula in
5.1.
￿
<k,k￿>
ρ[βj(gi), βj￿(gi￿)] = TRUE (5.1)
The algebraic component will express the rules of regularity whereas the op-
tionally probabilistic one the variability. Pattern theory attempts to combine these
two opposing themes. The aim of the next section will be to express the rules of
the nuclear fuel cycle modelling language or better said the process structures in
addition to the data structures formalized with meta-modelling. The possibility
of presenting the variability aspect will be also discussed. Table 5.1 shows further
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Figure 5.2. Diagramatic representation of a generator gi bonding to generator gi￿
β0,g￿ β1,g￿ β2,g￿ β3,g￿
β0,g 0 0 0 0
β1,g 0 1 0 0
β2,g 0 0 0 0
β3,g 0 0 0 0
Table 5.1. Matrix showing bonds between two generators graphically presented in
Figure 5.1. The truth value table where with 1 we denote the admissible connection
between these two generators g and g￿.
the way of representing the local constraints through a truth valued matrix.
5.2 Formalizing the Nuclear Fuel Cycle Model
(NFCM)
In this section an attempt will be made to use configurations or sub-configurations
to represent existing or potential weapons material acquisition paths modelled with
NFCM. Local regularity of connected generators (modelling primitives) will be
formalized in order for us to be able to check the consistency of modeled acquisition
paths or infer inspection objectives. Both serve as examples of intended processing
however many other algorithms are also possible.
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To represent a nuclear fuel cycle process there are 8 major nuclear activities
as listed below (i.e. Mining and Milling, Fuel Fabrication, Reactors etc.). Each of
them can be represented with a generator connectable to other generators based
on their structure (bonds) and bond value which in our case represents the nuclear
material going in and out of these activities. The relation between diﬀerent gener-
ators is based on the matching in and out-bond values. Each generator contains a
structure and based on regularity rules possible combinations of nuclear activities
in the fuel cycle can be represent as a regular configuration. These rules of regu-
larity for this example application were extracted from the Physical Model (PM).
PM is a document that defines each of the activities in the nuclear fuel cycle and
the associated indicators [103, 104, 105, 106, 107].
5.3 Required level of formalism for NFCM using
PT
When dealing with a model such as NFCM which represents the nuclear fuel cycle
and can therefore be used to model an acquisition path there are two levels of
granularity that can be considered for the formalization. The first is to take each
activity of the nuclear fuel cycle as a generator and the second is to use the spe-
cific nuclear activity technologies as the atomic elements of this modelling language
represented with generators. Technologies and materials used are represented with
the modelling elements of the NFCM where an activity is represented as a large
square whereas the technologies associates with the activity are shown as sub en-
tities and are represented with smaller size squares. An example of the model
and its elements is shown in Figure 5.3. For the purpose of applying algorithms
such as analyzing potential acquisition paths the second granularity level was de-
termined to be the appropriate one. The value assigned to the bond relating any
two generators is based on the material that is produced by one nuclear activity
and fed into the other. Based on the experiment made applying the lower level
of granularity (generators as activities) diﬃculties were encountered to formalize
the NFCM models. Diﬃculties met are generally characterized with one of more
of the following issues:
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Figure 5.3. Nuclear Fuel Cycle Model represented with a modelling language imple-
mented in ADOxx and based on the notation for describing State’s Physical Model [1]
1. Each of the technologies representing the activity mean semantically diﬀerent
things. In some cases they represent distinct technologies and in others
they are generalized. For example with the conversion activity it is often
unambiguous and impossible to express semantic correctness as to which
conversion phase is the MLIS enrichment related to.
2. Direction of the link between two activities. The aspect of bi-directional
relation cannot be formalized with the approach shown. For instance in
the example of the activities conversion and enrichment material going to
enrichment returns for conversion into fuel elements or similar. It is not
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possible to distinguish based on the bond value the direction modelled or in
other cases the two directional relation.
To address these issues the following section will apply a higher level of formal-
ism where modelling activities are actually classes of generators whereas generators
represent technologies each activity is characterized with. In other word the tech-
nology associated to the nuclear activity is the atom of the modelling language.
Technologies in the example model in Figure 5.3 are shown as smaller boxes within
each nuclear activity element of modelling. Generators as elements of the generator
class are identified with the name of the technology and are sequentially indexed
from 0 to 30 (i.e. g3, g23).
As shown below all generators gi are presented including the generator classes
they belong to Gi. There are in total 31 generators. Classes of generators repre-
sent nuclear fuel cycle phases shown to contain generators representing the associ-
ated technology. Each class corresponds to a modelling element from the NFCM
whereas the generators are the specific technology activities.
G0= {Mining and Milling}
G1= {Conv1, Conv2}
G2= {Gas cent, Gas diﬀ, AERO, MLIS, EMIS,
CHEMEX, IONEX, AVLIS, PLASMA}
G3= {Umet, UO2, MOX, EXP}
G4= {GCR, AGR, HTGR, LWGR, LWR, HWR, FAST}
G5= {Research Reactor, C.A., Pu Production, NAVAL}
G6= {Spent Fuel Storage}
G7= {Non-aqueous, aqueous}
G8= {Heavy Water}
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Nuclear fuel cycle generator space G consists of the union of all generator
spaces:
G =
￿
α∈AG
α
G = G0 ∪G1 ∪G2 ∪G3 ∪G4 ∪G5 ∪G6 ∪G7 ∪G8
Where α is called generator index.
Generators can also have attributes which together with its structure (i.e.
bonds) represent the properties of a generator [13]. Being able to also formalise
attributes of generators has an important impact in addressing problem such as
the one presented above under enumerated issue 2 discovered in the specific case
of formalizing NFCM. All generators have common attributes in NFCM therefore
a∀g ∈ G is the scale of the known or expected development which can be ”pro-
duction” or ”research” represented with the notation colours ”yellow”, ”green” on
the model level. Example of attribute formalization is shown with expression 5.2.
a(gi) = ”Research” (5.2)
The relation between the generators will be represented with the binary func-
tion ρ where the bonds that fit together are formalised. Matching bond values
represented with β is the basis for defining the relation between each generator.
Nuclear material going in and out of a nuclear activity is represented with β values
of generators connected through bond coordinates (i, j); j is called bond coordi-
nates for gi. Next, all generators of the nuclear fuel cycle phases per modelling
language NFCM will be formalised with the level of detail proposed. This is meant
to demonstrate the application of pattern theory and oﬀer a mathematical frame-
work based on this theory for formalizing any other modelling language in order
for the models to be processed through algorithms and mechanisms.
5.3.1 g0 - Mining and Milling
Figure 5.4 shows on the left side generator g0 is shown representing Mining and
Milling and its structure consisting of two bonds β0 and β1 representing potential
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Figure 5.4. Generators g0 representing Mining and Milling and g1 representing the
Pre-Conversion (Conv.1)
flow of Uranium or Thorium concentrate. On the right side is g1 the generator
representing pre-conversion. Two of its bonds link to g0 depending on the feed
material into the conversion process.
Bv = {β0, β1}
Bs = {0}
ωin(g0) = 0,ωout(g0) = 2
ω(g0) = ωin(g0) + ωout(g0) = 2
This represents the relationship based on the use of UOC or UNO3 (represented
with β0) or ThConc (represented with β1) produced through mining and milling for
the conversion 1 which converts the material to the form necessary for enrichment
or fuel fabrication.
Definition of local regularity between two generators is expressed with the func-
tion ρ shown in 5.3 as proposed in [102].
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ρ[βj(gi), βj￿(gi￿)] = TRUE (5.3)
To express the local regularity of the bond between g0 and g1 (conversion 1)
where UOC is used as feed into the pre-conversion the local regularity can be
formalised as shown in 5.4.
ρ[β0(g0), β0(g1)] = TRUEUOC (5.4)
For cases where Thorium concentrate is used as a feed material the locally
regular bond can be formalised as shown in 5.5. ρ is equivalent to a relation and
is called bond value relation [102].
ρ[β1(g0), β0(g1)] = TRUEThConc (5.5)
The matching bonds of the two activities (technologies) representing local reg-
ularity for both cases can be also expressed with a matrix shown in the example
based on the definition shown in 5.3 where j represents the and i is the generator
identifier.
ρ : [(βji), (βji￿)] = 1 (5.6)
β00 β10
β01 1 0
β11 0 1
Table 5.2. Matrix showing bonds between generators g0 and g1. It formalizes regular
bond connections based on the nuclear material and technology.
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5.3.2 g1 - Conversion 1 (pre-Conversion)
Conversion 1 also called pre-conversion includes all activities related to chemical
transformations of natural nuclear material in order to provide feed material for
isotope separation or reactor fuel fabrication [103].
Bs = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9}
Bv = {β0, β1, β2, β3, β4, β5, β6, β7, β8, β9}
ωin(g1) = 2
ωout(g1) = 8
Bond values assigned based on the nuclear material as shown in 5.7 and 5.8.
β0 = UOC ∨ UNO3 (5.7)
β1 = ThConc,β2 = UF6, β3 = UCl4, β4 = ThO2, β5 = Thmet,
β6 = UF4, β7 = UO3, β8 = Umet, β9 = UO4 (5.8)
Each of the nuclear materials and the matching technologies are represented
by bond values and the structure of generators. Next the bond relation between
conversion 1 generator and the enrichment activities is formalised.
5.3.3 g2 - Conversion 2 (post-Conversion)
Conversion 2, known also as ”re-conversion” or ”post-conversion”, includes all
chemical transformations subsequent to enrichment or reprocessing for the purpose
of manufacturing reactor fuel elements [105].
Bs = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8}
Bv = {β0, β1, β2, β3, β4, β5, β6, β7, β8}
ωin(g2) = 5
ωout(g2) = 4
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Figure 5.5. Generator representing Conversion 2 activity.
Input and output nuclear material is represented with in-bond and out-bond
values respectively are shown in 5.9 and 5.10.
β0 = Pumet, β1 = PuNO3, β2 = UF6e, β3 = UCl4e, β4 = Umetin (5.9)
β5 = UO2, β6 = PuO2, β7 = Pumet, β8 = Umetout (5.10)
β4 and β8 both show bond values with Umet nuclear material. This examples
shows them as two separate β indicating that Umet can be both input and output.
Figure 5.5 shows the graphical formalism for this generator.
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5.3.4 g3 - Gas centrifuges
Gas centrifuges use the principle of centrifugal fields for the separation of gasses of
diﬀerent molecular weight. UF6 gas is fed into mounted rotating cylinders [104].
Gas centrifuges is represented with the generator g3.
g3 = Gas centrifuges
Bs = {0, 1}
Bv = {β0, β1}
ωin(g3) = 1
ωout(g3) = 1
Its two bonds are characterized with two β values shown in 5.3.4. β0 repre-
sents the bond to the conversion 1 generator where UF6 is used as feed material.
Moreover, β1 represents the product of the gas centrifuge enrichment which is
subsequently processed in conversion 2.
β0 = UF6 and β1 = UF6(enriched)
Use of gas centrifuges is represented with the generator g3. Use of gas cen-
trifuges requires UF6 feed material which is generated during conversion 1. The
issue documented above as 1 can be resolved at this level of formalism since both
directions of the material and therefore the bond between the two generators can
be explicitly represented. This issue actually is non existent here since conversion 1
and conversion 2 represent two diﬀerent generators. Graphical formalism is shown
in figure 5.6 where g3 along with other generators represents enrichment technol-
ogy using UF6 nuclear material. All of the generators shown in figure 5.6 have in
common UF6 as material that is fed and returned to the conversion process with
higher abundance of U235 which is fissile depending on the enrichment level.
Following the graphical representation of the generator g3, expression in 5.11
restricts the configuration of generators by local constraints. Therefore a pair of
bond values (β￿, β￿￿) is regular if ρ(β￿, β￿￿) = TRUE or irregular if ρ(β￿, β￿￿) =
FALSE. The products space B×B of the bond value space B crossed with itself
given a truth valued function represented with ρ where for the bond pair g3 and
g1 local constraint is shown in 5.12.
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Figure 5.6. Generators of the Enrichment class. g3, g4, g5 and g6
ρ : B ×B → {TRUE,FALSE} (5.11)
or in this case the bond pair of g3 and g4 would be regular if
ρ[βj(g1), βj￿(g3)] = TRUE (5.12)
for g3 or use of gas centrifuges for enrichment ρ is TRUE for:
ρ[β2(conv.1), β0(gasscent)] = TRUE
ρ[β1(gasscent), β2(conv.2)] = TRUE (5.13)
Expression in 5.13 shows the bond between the conversion activity where UF6
is sent for enrichment and the same is returned for post-conversion or reconversion
represented with the generator g2. The directionality is not an issues since for both
feed materials and enrichment UF6 are formalised with separate bonds.
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5.3.5 g4 - Gaseous Diﬀusion, g5 - AERO and g6 - MLIS
Generators presented here are also depicted with graphical formalism in figure 5.6.
They are similar in the structure since they all use UF6 as feed material to the
enrichment process.
g4 = Gaseous diﬀusion
Bs = {0, 1}
Bv = {β0, β1}
ωin(g4) = 1
ωout(g4) = 1
Gaseous diﬀusion is a process depending on the average velocity of a gas
molecule at a given temperature which depends on the mass of the molecule.
235 isotope of UF6 have a higher random molecular velocity than the 238 UF6
molecules therefore provisioning for a stream of enriched 235 and depleted 235
isotopes [104].
β0 = UF6 and β1 = UF6 (enriched)
g5 = AERO
Bs = {0, 1}
Bv = {β0, β1}
ωin(g5) = 1
ωout(g5) = 1
The aerodynamic enrichment processes UF6 and light gas such as helium is
compressed and then passed through where isotopic separation is achieved by gen-
erating high centrifugal force using curved-wall geometry [104].
β0 = UF6 and β1 = UF6 (enriched)
MLIS or the molecular laser enrichment represents a technique where molecules
are excited when irradiated by laser light adjusted to the specific frequency. Due to
mass diﬀerences between the isotopes 238 and 235 shifts in vibrational frequency
allow for isotopic selectivity [104].
127
g6 =MLIS
Bs = {0, 1}
Bv = {β0, β1}
ωin(g6) = 1
ωout(g6) = 1
β0 and β1 similarly represent the bond values for this generator as shown below.
β0 = UF6 and β1 = UF6 (enriched)
Local regularity of all of the above generators and their bonds can be expressed
with the definition provided in 5.3.
5.3.6 g7 - EMIS
g7
EMIS
β1
j=1
β
2
j=2
0
j=0
3
j=3
Figure 5.7. EMIS generator can use both UCl4 and less desirably UF6
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β0,7 β1,7 β2,7 β3,7
β0,1 0 0 0 0
β1,1 0 0 0 0
β2,1 0 1 0 0
β3,1 1 0 0 0
β4,1 0 0 0 0
β5,1 0 0 0 0
β6,1 0 0 0 0
β7,1 0 0 0 0
β8,1 0 0 0 0
β9,1 0 0 0 0
Table 5.3. Matrix showing bonds between generators g7 and g1 (conversion 1).
EMIS is characterized with the use of UCl4 as feed material for the enrichment.
There is an exception for this technology since UF6 can also be used. The likelihood
compared to UCl4 is much smaller however. Figure 5.7 shows the generator for
this enrichment technology.
Structure of this generator diﬀers from the previous four shown above provi-
sioning for both UF6 and UCl4 feed material.
g7 =EMIS
Bs = {0, 1, 2, 3}
Bv = {β0, β1, β2, β3}
ωin(g7) = 2
ωout(g7) = 2
β0 = UCl4, β1 = UF6, β2 = UCl4 enriched, β3 = UF6 enriched
Regularity for EMIS can be expressed with the function ρ shown in 5.16 or
formalised with the use of a boolean matrix defined in 5.6. Example matrix is
shown in table 5.3.
ρ : [βj(gi), βj￿(gi￿)] (5.14)
ρ : [β3(g1), β0(g7)] = TRUE (5.15)
ρ : [β2(g1), β1(g7)] = TRUE (5.16)
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5.3.7 g8 - CHEMEX and g9 - IONEX
g8
CHEMEX
1
j=1
β2
j=2
j=0
Figure 5.8. CHEMEX and IONEX generators used for UCl4 enrichment
The CHEMEX short for Chemical Exchange uses kinetic and equilibrium dif-
ferences in a valency dependent extraction system.
Bs = {0, 1, 2}
Bv = {β0, β1, β2}
ωin(g8) = 2
ωout(g8) = 1
β0 = UCl4, β1 = UCl3, β2 = UCl4 enriched
Generator g8 (CHEMEX) has a bond with the generators g1 and g2. Bonds of
this generator as follows:
ρ : [β3(g1), β0(g8)] = TRUE (5.17)
ρ : [β3(g1), β0(g8)] = TRUE (5.18)
Furthermore, the bond between CHEMEX and Conv.2 (g2) can be represented
as:
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ρ : [β2(g8), β3(g2)] = TRUE (5.19)
Another enrichment process that uses uranium chloride UCl4 is IONEX. It
stands for Ion Exchange and it is called Asahi Chemical Exchange process (ACEP)
developed by Asahi Chemical industries in Japan [104].
g8 represents the IONEX generator with a structure Bs = {0, 1}. The cor-
responding bond values are Bv = {β0, β1}. It’s in and out arity is defined as
ωin(g9) = 1 and ωout(g9) = 1 with a total arity of 2. Values for the two bonds are
defined as β0 = UCl4, β1 = UCl4enriched.
Figure 5.8 shows both generators. Starting from left right g8 CHEMEX and g9
IONEX are shown.
5.3.8 g10 - AVLIS and g11 - PLASMA
These technologies are based on the principle of using Uranium in its metal form to
achieve enrichment. Similarly with other generators its structure is shown below.
g10 =AVLIS
Bs = {0, 1}
Bv = {β0, β1}
ωin(g10) = 1
ωout(g10) = 1
β0 = Umet, β1 = Umet enriched
AVLIS that stands for Atomic Vapour Laser IsotopeSeparation has a bond with
the generators g1 and g2. With β0 the bond value represented is Umet as input to
the process and β1 enriched Umet as output of the process. The truth function for
both bonds is provided in 5.20 and 5.21.
The bond represented by the Umet leaving conversion 1(g1) is defined as:
ρ : [β8(g1), β0(g10)] = TRUE (5.20)
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and subsequently enriched Umet going to conversion 2 (g2)
ρ : [β1(g10), β4(g2)] = TRUE (5.21)
11 
PLASMA
β
0
j=0
β1
j=1
10 
AVLIS
β
0
j=0
β1
j=1
Figure 5.9. AVLIS and PLASMA generators representing technologies for enrichment
of Umet.
The second generator in the group of generators that use Umet as source ma-
terial for enrichment is PLASMA. Known as the plasma separation process (PSP).
The process includes forming a plasma containing mixture of 235 and 235 U iso-
topes ions. The created plasma is confined by a strong permanent magnetic field
causing circular motion of the ions. The frequency of the circular motion of an ion
depends on its mass and the intensity of the magnetic field. Since frequencies of
the two isotopes diﬀer slightly allowing for selective collection.
g11 =PLASMA
Bs = {0, 1}
Bv = {β0, β1}
ωin(g10) = 1
ωout(g10) = 1
β0 = Umet, β1 = Umet enriched
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Also in the case of PLASMAThe bond represented by the Umet leaving con-
version 1(g1) is defined as:
ρ : [β8(g1), β0(g11)] = TRUE (5.22)
and subsequently enriched Umet going to conversion 2 (g2)
ρ : [β1(g11), β4(g2)] = TRUE (5.23)
5.3.9 g12 - Umet Fuel Fabrication
This sections introduces the first generator in the line of generators formalising
modelling elements for representing fuel fabrication technologies.
g12 = Umet Fuel Fabrication
Bs = {0, 1}
Bv = {β0, β1}
ωin(g12) = 1
ωout(g12) = 1
β0 = Umet, β1 = Umet fuel
The above definition of this generator and all other fuel fabrication generators
are also graphically presented in figure 5.10.
If we were to represent the bond between g12 and conv.2 it would be expressed
with the following:
ρ : [β8(g2), β0(g12)] = TRUE (5.24)
and subsequently Umet fuel going to reactors or critical assemblies the bond can
be presented as follows where an example of a bond to the generator representing
GCR reactors is shown.
ρ : [β1(g12), β0(g16)] = TRUE (5.25)
133
g12 
Umet FF
β
0
j=0
β1
j=1
g13 
UO2 FF
β
0
j=0
β1
j=1
g15
EXP FF
β
2
j=1
β7
j=6
β1
j=0
β3
j=2
β
4β
0
β
6
j=
3
j=7
Figure 5.10. Generators of the Fuel Fabrication class consisting of g12, g13, g14 and g15.
5.3.10 g13 - UO2 Fuel Fabrication
g13 = UO2 Fuel Fabrication
Bs = {0, 1}
Bv = {β0, β1}
ωin(g13) = 1
ωout(g13) = 1
β0 = UO2, β1 = UO2 fuel
5.3.11 g14 - MOX Fuel Fabrication
g14 = MOX Fuel Fabrication
Bs = {0, 1, 2}
Bv = {β0, β1, β2}
ωin(g14) = 2
ωout(g14) = 1
β0 = PuO2, β1 = Pumet, β2 = MOX fuel
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β0,15 β1,15 β2,15 β3,15 β4,15 β5,15 β6,15 β7,15 β8,15 β6,15 β7,15 β8,15
β01 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
β11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
β21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
β31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
β41 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
β51 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
β61 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
β71 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
β81 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
β91 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 5.4. Matrix showing bonds between generators g1 conversion 1 and g15 experi-
mental fuel fabrication.
5.3.12 g15 - EXP Fuel Fabrication
g15 = Experimental Fuel Fabrication
Bs = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11}
Bv = {β0, β1, β2, β3, β4, β5, β6, β7, β8, β9, β10, β11}
ωin(g15) = 6
ωout(g15) = 6
In-bond values and out-bond values are defined as :
β0 = Umet, β1 = UO2, β2 = PuO2, β3 = Pumet, β4 = ThO2,
β5 = Thmet, β6 = PuO2fuel,β7 = Pumetfuel, β8 = Thmetfuel,β9 = ThO2fuel,
β10 = Umetfuel, β11 = UO2fuel (5.26)
In order to represent the bond between the generators g1 and the experimental
fuel fabrication g15 a binary matrix is presented in table 5.4.
ρ[βj(g1), βj￿(g15)] (5.27)
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β0,15 β1,15 β2,15 β3,15 β4,15 β5,15 β6,15 β7,15 β8,15
β02 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
β12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
β22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
β32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
β42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
β52 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
β62 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
β72 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
β82 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 5.5. Matrix showing bonds between generators g2 conversion 2 and g15 experi-
mental fuel fabrication.
Similarly the bond between the generators g2 conversion 2 and the experimental
fuel fabrication can be shown with a binary matrix in table 5.5 based on the
following definition:
ρ : [βj(g2), βj￿(g15)] (5.28)
5.3.13 g16 to g22 - Reactors
This section includes all reactors are represented as generators of the class G4.
The structure of the generators varies depending on the diﬀerent types of fuels
that can be used in a particular type of reactor. The in-bonds vary however there
is commonly only one out-bond which represents the burned fuel headed to the
spent fuel pond or separate storage.
The first presented is GCR type of reactor that can use Umet and ThO2.
Burned fuel out of this reactor is represented with β2.
g16 =GCR
Bs = {0, 1, 2}
Bv = {β0, β1, β2}
ωin(g16) = 2
ωout(g16) = 1
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Figure 5.11. Generators representing all reactors other than FAST and research reac-
tors.
β0 =Umet fuel, β1 = ThO2 fuel, β2 = GCR spent fuel
Figure 5.11 shows all the generators of the Reactor class. FAST reactor is not
shown in the figure and will be presented separately as it is used as an example
due to its generator structure complexity. Here, also research reactors and critical
assemblies are not shown as they are a part of another class G5.
Next are AGR, HTGR type of reactors that can use UO2 and ThO2. Spent
fuel out of this reactor is represented respectively with β2 and β2.
g17 =AGR
Bs = {0, 1}
Bv = {β0, β1}
ωin(g17) = 1
ωout(g17) = 1
β0 = UO2 fuel, β1 =AGR spent fuel
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g18 =HTGR
Bs = {0, 1, 2}
Bv = {β0, β1, β2}
ωin(g18) = 2
ωout(g18) = 1
β0 = UO2 fuel, β1 = ThO2 fuel, β2 =HTGR spent fuel
Reactors that are moderated with water, so called Light Water Reactors are
defined below.
g19 =LWGR
Bs = {0, 1, 2}
Bv = {β0, β1, β1}
ωin(g19) = 2
ωout(g19) = 1
β0 = Umet fuel, β1 = UO2 fuel, β2 = LWGR spent fuel
LWR reactors represent the most common type. They can also used mixed
oxide fuel known as MOX.
g20 = LWR
Bs = {0, 1, 2, 3}
Bv = {β0, β1, β2, β3}
ωin(g20) = 3
ωout(g20) = 1
β0 = UO2 fuel, β1 = ThO2 fuel, β2 = MOX fuel, β3 = LWR spent fuel
The next type of generator is one of the few that uses Heavy Water as moder-
ant/coolant. Since light water reactor necessitates enrichment of fuel this can be
overcome with use of heavy water and natural uranium or slightly enriched fuel
[106].
g21 =HWR
Bs = {0, 1, 2, 3}
Bv = {β0, β1, β2, β3}
138
ωin(g21) = 3
ωout(g21) = 1
β0 = UO2 fuel, β1 = Umet fuel, β2 =Heavy Water, β3 =HWR spent fuel
5.3.14 g22 - FAST Reactor
Fast reactors are characterized with with high-energy neutrons causing most fis-
sions. No moderation is required and they use liquid metal as coolant. It requires
fuel of higher enrichment due to reduced fission cross-section at the higher neutron
energies [106].
g22 =FAST
Bs = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5}
Bv = {β0, β1, β2, β3, β4, β5}
ωin(g22) = 5
ωout(g22) = 1
β0 = UO2fuel,β1 = Thmetfuel,β2 = Umetfuel, β3 =MOXfuel,
β4 = Pumetfuel, β5 = PuO2fuel,β6 = FASTspentfuel (5.29)
Figure 5.12 shows the generator representing the FAST reactors. It’s in-arity
is 5 and as most other reactors the out-arity was defined to be 1 representing the
fuel spent.
To exemplify the local regularity of the bonds between a reactor and the preced-
ing fuel fabrication activity FAST reactor bonds to fuel fabrication are formalised
using the expression 5.3. Furthermore, the formalisation is expressed with a matrix
shown in table. Bonds between g22 and generators g13, g14 and g15 are shown.
In the case where UO2 fuel is used in FAST reactors the bond between UO2
fuel fabrication and reactor would be formalised as shown in 5.30.
ρ : [β1(g13), β0(g22)] = TRUE (5.30)
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Figure 5.12. FAST reactor represented by the generator g22.
The bond between fabrication of MOX fuel also used in a FAST reactor will
be similarly expressed with 5.31.
ρ : [β2(g14), β3(g22)] = TRUE (5.31)
Representing more complex relations between bonds such as the example of
FAST reactor and the fuel fabrication of experimental fuel would be be presented
with a matrix as shown in table 5.6.
5.3.15 g23 - Research Reactor
Research Reactors cover a broad range of reactors which generally speaking are
used for purposes other than energy [106].
Research reactors are represented by the generator g23 and are characteristic
with having a great number of in-bond as a result of broad range of nuclear fuels
that are used for research.
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β0,22 β1,22 β2,22 β3,22 β4,22 β5,22
β0,15 0 0 0 0 0 0
β1,15 0 0 0 0 0 0
β2,15 0 0 0 0 0 0
β3,15 0 0 0 0 0 0
β4,15 0 0 0 0 0 0
β5,15 0 0 0 0 0 0
β6,15 0 0 0 0 0 1
β7,15 0 0 0 0 1 0
β8,15 0 1 0 0 0 0
Table 5.6. Matrix showing bonds between generators g15 experimental fuel fabrication
and g22 FAST reactor.
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Figure 5.13. Research Reactor formalised as generator g23.
g23 =RR
Bs = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}
Bv = {β0, β1, β2, β3, β4, β5, β6, β7}
ωin(g23) = 6
ωout(g23) = 1
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β0 = UO2fuel,β1 = Thmetfuel,β2 = ThO2fuel,β3 = Umetfuel,
β4 =MOXfuel, β5 = Pumetfuel, β6 = PuO2fuel,β7 = spentfuel (5.32)
Bonds and the bond values shown for Research Reactors identify that this
activity relates to all type of fuel coming from fuel fabrication. This can be also
formalised here however was not included for briefness.
5.3.16 g24 - Critical Assembly
Critical Assemblies as it was the case with RR are used for purposes other than
energy production [106].
CAs are represented by the generator g24 and has identical generator structure
with the research reactors (g23) shown in Figure 5.13 and described above.
5.3.17 g25 - Pu Production and g26 - Naval Reactor
Generators representing Pu Production or g25 is diﬀerent from other reactors de-
scribed. NFCM modelling language adopted the notation suggested by Liu et al
where seems to be an inconsistency in this class of generators. Other reactors are
represented by their type based on the technology whereas Pu Production repre-
sents a generator that more represents a purpose. Pu Production will be defined
as a generator which has bonds to all generators of the fuel fabrication generator
class presented below.
g25 = Pu Production
Bs = {bj; j = 1, 2, ...ω(g12−15)}
Bv = {βj; 1, 2, ...ω(g12−15)}
Although not also documented in detail in the physical model of reactors an-
other generator left in the class of reactors is g26.
g26 = Naval Reactor
Bs = {0, 1, 2}
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Bv = {β0, β1, β2}
ωin(g26) = 2
ωout(g26) = 1
26
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Figure 5.14. Naval reactor represented by the generator g26 containing of two in-bonds
and one out-bond denoted with bond values β0,β1andβ2.
5.3.18 g27 - Spent Fuel Storage
This activity relates to the management of fuel which starts with the discharge
from a reactors ending with permanent disposal.
Irradiated fuel from the reactors is sent to a storage are which is represented in
NFCM with the modelling element Spent Fuel Storage. To formalise this element
it is represented with generator g27. Relation of this generator can exist between
on the premises that all spent fuel is sent to the storage therefore bond relation
is based on the bond relation between all out-bonds of the reactor class and the
single spent fuel generator in its class. Furthermore, there is a relation between
the spent fuel generator and the reprocessing generators defined further down.
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A generalized form of expressing the relation between this generator and all
reactors could be expressed as
g27 = Spent Fuel Storage
Bs = {bj; j = 1, 2, ...ω(g16−26)}
Bv = {βj; 1, 2, ...ω(g16−26)}
A more explicit form of expressing all the bond relations based on all types of
spent fuel sent from reactors to the spent fuel storage is shown in figure 5.15.
g27 = Spent Fuel Storage
Bs = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11}
Bv = {β0, β1, β2, β3, β4, β5, β6, β7, β8, β9, β10, β11}
ωin(g27) = 10
ωout(g27) = 1
Where bond values represent spent fuel from all types of reactors as shown in
5.33.
β0 = GCRspentfuel, β1 = AGRspentfuel, β2 = HTGspentfuel,
β3 = LGErspentfuel, β4 = LWRspentfuel, β5 = HWRspentfuel,
β6 = FASTspentfuel, β7 = RRspentfuel, β8 = RRspentfuel,
β9 = CAspentfuel, β10 = Navalspentfuel, β11 = Allspentfuel (5.33)
5.3.19 g28 - Non-aqueous and g29 Aqueous Reprocessing
Reprocessing of irradiated nuclear fuel is mainly aimed at the recovery of residual
or bred fissile material for further use (i.e. fuel fabrication). The further use of the
retrieved fissile material can be in power generation, research as well as nuclear
weapons related activities. Specific recovered material can find use in medicine and
related research. A number of routes for extracting uranium and plutonium were
explored based on aqueous and non-aqueous separation methods. Commonly used
aqueous methods are Precipitation, Ion exchange and Solvent extraction [107].
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Figure 5.15. Spent fuel storage generator represented with g27 containing in-bonds
relation to all reactors and and two out-bond denoted with bond values β11 and β12.
Figure 5.16 shows the two generators representing the reprocessing generator
class. g28 is the generator formalising reprocessing based on aqueous methods
whereas g29 is the generator for non-aqueous reprocessing. In both cases the
in-bonds are for receiving any type of fuel spent fuel from storage facilities or
reactors. The out-bonds are represented with relation bond values consisting of
uranyl nitrate UNO3 and Pu nitrate PuNO3 extracted which can be used in
Conversion 1 (g1) and Conversion 2 (g2). Structures of both methods are shown
below.
g28 = Aqueous
Bs = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11}
Bv = {β0, β1, β2, β3, β4, β5, β6, β7, β8, β9, β10, β11, β12}
ωin(g28) = 11
ωout(g28) = 2
g29 = Non-Aqueous
145
g29
NON-
AQUEOUS
β1
j=1
β
0
j=0
j=2
β
5
j=5
j=7
β 8
j=8
j=
9
β
6
j=6
β
2
j=11
j=10
β
1
2
j=1
2
β
3
g28
AQUEOUS
β1
j=1
β
0
j=0
j=2
β
5
j=5
β7
j=7
β8
j=8β 9
j=
9 β
4
j=
4
β
6
j=6
β
2
j=
3β
1
1
j=11
β
1
0 j=10
β
1
2
j=1
2
Figure 5.16. Aqueous and non-aqueous generators of the reprocessing class.
Bs = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11}
Bv = {β0, β1, β2, β3, β4, β5, β6, β7, β8, β9, β10, β11, β12}
ωin(g29) = 11
ωout(g29) = 2
for both generators the bond values are assigned are shown below in 5.34.
β0 = GCRspentfuel, β1 = AGRspentfuel, β2 = HTGspentfuel,
β3 = LGErspentfuel, β4 = LWRspentfuel, β5 = HWRspentfuel,
β6 = FASTspentfuel, β7 = RRspentfuel, β8 = RRspentfuel,
β9 = CAspentfuel, β10 = Navalspentfuel,
β11 = PuNO3, β12 = UNO3 (5.34)
Reprocessing may in some cases be sought as a part of wast management for
nuclear fuel. As a part of waste management process separating parts of the
irradiated fuel into separate components allowing for better and more appropriate
treatment based on individual characteristics [107].
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5.3.20 g30 - Deuterium/Heavy Water Production
Heavy water is used as a moderator HWR reactors described above. Production
is obtained with the enrichment of Deuterium (D) found mainly in natural water
with the form HDO. The reason this activity appears in the physical model is since
it is required for the operation of a heavy water reactor (HWR) in large quantities
and as a possible light element used in the fabrication of nuclear weapons.
HEAVY 
WATER
0
Figure 5.17. Generator representing Heavy Water Production D2O.
This modelling element has an inarity of zero and a total arity of 1 represented
with the bond value β0 = D2O which is a must for HWR reactors represented by
β2(g21).
g30 = Heavy Water Production
Bs = {0}
Bv = {β0}
ωin(g30) = 0
ωout(g30) = 1
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5.4 Acquisition path configuration
Generators creating the generator space G can be glued together and the bonds
determine which combination can hold. This resembles the behaviours of atoms
which here would be generators that are connected into molecules or in this case
configurations.
The next step is to form a configuration of generators that can bond. In the
example here representing the nuclear fuel cycle model the generators represent-
ing nuclear activities are the atoms that need to be combined in a configuration.
Acquisition path using the generators formalised in the previous section can be
represented as a combination of bonding nuclear activity generators into potential
routes of acquiring a nuclear weapon.
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Figure 5.18. Representation of the NFCM model shown above with the PT formalism.
Internal bonds make up the configuration of the physical model for the fictitious state
Ruritania. Panel on the right shows the generators used to represent the activities shown
with the NFCM model. The state enriches U and fabricates UO2 fuel which is used for a
LWR reactor. Furthermore, the state has research activities for U metal enrichment using
AVLIS. The enriched U metal is used for fabricating fuel elements that are irradiated in
a research reactor. In the presence of a Spent Fuel Storage at a research scale some of
the irradiated fuel is reprocessed using the aqueous method.
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Bonds denoted by b1, b2, ...bω represent generator coordinates which build the
configuration architecture of the model. σ called the connector represents a graph
of sites that are connected with their bonds. An example configuration for Ru-
ritania can be diagrammatically presented as depicted in figure 5.18 or can be
expressed as in 5.35. The configuration codifying the instance of the NFCM on
the left panel consists of 9 generators diﬀerently connected to each other through
their internal bonds. Generators g20 and g24 both bond to the generator g27. The
same can also be diagrammatically expressed by having two identical copies of
the generator g27 which can then be kept separately by using identifying marks as
parts of the attributes. The same is true should there be a need to use more than
one copy of a generator. It should however be clear from the context that this is
intended [13].
c = σ(g1, g2, ...gn) (5.35)
c￿ = σ(g2, g3, g10, g13, g20, g15, g24, g27, g28) (5.36)
Configuration is based on the values function ρ which defines the pair of bond
values which can be related. For example expressions 5.27 or the table of values in
5.5. It shows all two generators that can bond making up a configuration consisting
of two bonds locally regular for any couple of bonds (i, j) − (i￿, j￿) we have 5.3 is
set to be locally regular.
For a configuration to be regular in addition to local regularity it needs to be
globally regular. For this the connection type is used. Connection type can be
linear for linear chain graphs or tree for tree shaped graphs. This represents the
last piece to also define regularity. A configuration is defined to be globally regular
if σ ∈ Σ; where Σ represents the physical arrangement of generators which in the
case of a modelling language is linear. A configuration is called regular if it is
both locally and globally regular therefore for a configuration space C(R) where
R =< G,S, ρ,Σ > is referred to as regularity; where S represents similarity group
and G represents the generator space.
Comparing pattern theory to Chamsky’s formal grammar, generators of pattern
theory are the rules of transformation. They are the formal grammar. Transfor-
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mations allowed by the rules are constrained by the consistency placed with bonds
[101]. Generators are grammatical rules whereas the bond-values are subsets of
the terminals and non-terminals.
5.4.1 Probabilistic Regularity
The concept of configuration is built on combinatory idea where generators bond
to each other based on the evaluated bond relation ρ on the product of B × B.
A bond between two generators can be either TRUE of FALSE with the binary
function ρ. There is a possibility to extend this to some continuum valued function
called acceptor function that takes non-negative real numbers. This approach may
also find application in configurations representing the Plutonium (Pu) and Highly
Enriched Uranium (HEU) weapons acquisition path. This can be in particular in-
teresting to the evaluation of the path combining the nuclear indicators associated
to diﬀerent nuclear activities in order to parameterize the configuration discovering
acquisition paths which are more probable than others. This means characterizing
a bond not only as a fit of material going in and out of the generator but rather
create configurations where some bonds and stronger than other based on the avail-
able indicators collected through inspection or open source. This formalism can be
used to apply algorithms to further refine and identify most plausible acquisition
path.
The powerful concept behind this theory and its application is to build proba-
bilistic structures on top of the algebraic one of C(R). In other words there is a
possibility of having a relaxed regularity where the binary function is extended to
some continuum valued function acceptor denoted with A. If G is a finite set and
σ is a fixed as defined in [102] associating probabilities to a configuration c would
be expressed as shown in 5.37.
p(c) =
1
Z
￿
<k,k￿>
A[βj(gi), βj￿(gi￿)]
￿
i
Q(gi) (5.37)
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￿
c
p(c) = 1 (5.38)
Where Z is the constant that normalizes the probabilities so that the sum of
all probabilities is equal to 1 as shown with expression 5.38 defined in [102]. Q
represents a non-negative weight function with the role of making probabilities
not only depend upon the couplings β − β￿ but also the generators themselves.
Furthermore < k, k￿ > is short for k = (i, j) and k￿ = (i￿, j￿).
5.4.2 Self-assembling Configurations
Further to the codification of the NFCM models where PT can be used as an inter-
mediate language for transformation or analysis of inspection process structures,
it can also be considered a construction formalism. An example would be to intro-
duce in addition to the 31 identified generators described in the previous section
two more generators namely gPu and gHEU . These two generators represent the
actual acquisition of the Pu or HEU. Such generators in a process model would
be equivalent to the End event. These generators are also defined with properties
consisting of a structure characterized by bonds to other generators (nuclear activ-
ities) that can generate weapons grade material in its final stage. By introducing
these two generators in a generator space of a state, based on the binary function or
Acceptor function (as suggested above) the acquisition path can be reversly build
from simple structures into complex structures or configurations representing po-
tential acquisition paths. This may seem of no great benefit dealing with a small
state or even a more complex state on its own however may serve as a formalizm
to discover new paths on a global scale between any two or more states. Basic
building blocks or generators representing nuclear activities formalize structures
modelled by nuclear experts regardless of the notation of the modelling language
used.
Acquisition path configurations represent information structures that need to
be stored and retrieved. This introduces the need to find storage mechanisms for
configurations created which can then be queried to answer expert questions. Sim-
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Evolution on Country Model Level
Figure 5.19. Example application as a result of PT formalizm. NFCM Model-level
evolution can be analysed over a timeline for a country or group of countries. Process
structures can be seen as configurations representing NFCM models created by experts
which are comparable to other models.
ilar to the archetypes introduced with the electronic health records configuration
can represent information structures that can be queried with a predefined query
language similar to SQL.
Chapter6
Evaluation of the Approach
This chapter presents the evaluation of the the suggested approach in modelling
complex inspection processes. Conceptually the approach consists of two mod-
elling languages. First, the modelling language at the visual/concrete level that is
user friendly and used by domain experts and second a modelling language at an
abstract level that can be mathematically formalized. The complementary nature
of these languages is discussed in the next sections of the chapter. Use cases of
modelling extended with the pattern theory formalizm are considered to evaluate
the unique use of the approach to analyse models and create process models that
are knowledge based. Other possible formalizms are also discussed.
6.1 Application of Pattern Theory in Designing
Complex Processes
It is safe to say that any business entity today operates in a reality that is complex
and challenging. Understanding the environment and factors that can make or
break a business requires capturing realistic knowledge, which must be translated
to business operations performed on daily basis. Generally speaking modelling is
known to be an eﬀective way of representing reality. Specifically, process modelling
for any entity is a continuous task, which enhances the ability to adjust to a context
that is dynamic in midst of regulatory and technological changes. Recognizing such
changes and transferring this knowledge to process models still remains a challenge.
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In the absence of historical data, provision of modelling tools and methods can help
minimize the gap between business goals and processes that eventually lead to their
achievement.
In contrast to the private sector where the ultimate objective is profit, the chal-
lenge of understanding the reality in the domain of nuclear verification is likewise
great. In order to design inspection processes, safeguards analysts need to un-
derstand the nuclear activities in a state and interpret these according to IAEA’s
verification obligations. This requires that domain knowledge is used to create
inspection processes. In the past decades the nuclear verification was primarily
based on criteria related to nuclear material accountancy. The state declares the
activities and nuclear material they have to which the inspectorate responds with
inspection processes that are based on the goals of timeliness (time required to
acquire a weapons) and quantity (amount necessary to build a weapon).The new
safeguards, which is much more information driven requires dynamic, and knowl-
edge based inspection process models incorporating both quantitative and qualita-
tive findings. Here we create a model- based approach to facilitate understanding
of patterns related to nuclear activities in a country and applying this knowledge
for designing inspection processes that are agile. Specifically the approach here
suggests the use of domain specific models such as the nuclear fuel cycle model in
order to benefit at the business (inspection) process design level.
Understanding domain specific models created to describe nuclear activities in a
country is a pre-requisite to the subsequent step of designing inspection processes.
Such an approach can be applied to any other type of inspection processes that
is considered knowledge intensive and complex. In the context of nuclear inspec-
tions two use cases will be evaluated, Process Analysis and Process Configuration
discussed below.
6.1.1 Process Analysis
This use case covers the requirement of using nuclear process models for under-
standing the objectives of the verification regime in a country. These objectives are
subsequently used for designing processes that fulfil them. In order to model in-
spection processes or in cases where they exist improve them we start by analysing
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the domain specific nuclear fuel cycle model. These models are created by safe-
guards analysts to both document and synthesize understanding of the processes in
a country. This is a requirement for planning verification activities. Pattern theory
as a graphical and mathematical formalism is used to represent process structures
as patterns. Specifically of interest are patterns that show potential weapons ac-
quisition paths. In the terminology of PT these patterns are considered regular
configurations in the domain of interest. Moreover regular configurations combine
generators into structures according to the rules that can be deterministic or ran-
dom. Configurations represent the unobservable image, which is formal enough to
be processed whereas the observable image (i.e. model) is domain expert friendly.
In this context let us define some simplified query scenarios that will support de-
cision making for modelling inspection activities:
Query Scenario 1: Find all potential acquisition paths for country X. Based
on the rules of local regularity between generators that represent nuclear activities
(modelling elements) this query can be answered. Graphical formalism to repre-
sent a generator for the pre-conversion activity is shown in Figure 6.1. Structure
of this generator defines the possible connections or bonds to other activities. The
top panel of Figure 6.1 shows the truth table constraining all possible connec-
tions between generators g1 (pre-conversion) and g7 (Enrichment through EMIS).
This particular generator has in-arity of 2 and out-arity of 8. Rules of regular-
ity represented through the generator structure were based on nuclear material
that is generated as a result of one activity and required as an input to another.
In the example above UCl4 (Uranium Tetrachloride) which is generated during
pre-conversion is an input to enrichment activity using EMIS (Electromagnetic
Isotope Separation). Another material that can be used as input is UF6 (Uranium
Hexafluoride) however it is less desirable. Stronger bonds between generators can
be also formalized in pattern theory by relaxing regularity described in the next
query scenario.
By starting with two constant generators (gPu) (gHEU) representing the events
of actually acquiring Pu or HEU necessary for a weapon, a path can be built in
a reverse order as per activities modelled by the domain expert. Depending on
elements shown on the model the query result can be 1 or n potential acquisition
paths. High level steps of the mechanism to answer such a query are as follows:
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β0,7 β1,7 β2,7 β3,7
β0,1 0 0 0 0
β1,1 0 0 0 0
β2,1 0 1 0 0
β3,1 1 0 0 0
β4,1 0 0 0 0
β5,1 0 0 0 0
β6,1 0 0 0 0
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Figure 6.1. Truth table defining local regularity between generator g1 (pre-conversion)
and generator g7 (EMIS enrichment). On the bottom panel the corresponding structure
of the generators representing the activities are shown.
Step 1 - Identify all elements in a model representing nuclear activities
Step 2 - Map elements found in Step 1 to generators (g1, g2, g3...)
Step 3 - Identify all generators that have a bond to the generators gPu and
gHEU .
Step 4 - For each generator identified in step 3 find bonds to all other generators.
Iterate until no new bonds are discovered.
The query may return no results should there be no nuclear activities modelled
that are in the final stage of the acquisition path. Also to limit the number of
potential paths the user can choose to restrict the query such as Find all potential
Pu acquisition paths for country X. The position taken is that it is of no relevance
if the modelled nuclear activities are declared (regularly done by each country)
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or undeclared activities - suspected by the expert to be present in a country (e.g.
through open source, satellite imagery etc.). They represent understanding of
analysts as a result of synthesize performed using inspection data and open-source
information. Modelling environment and notation of the language is user friendly
and familiar to experts in order to facilitate the transfer of knowledge useful for
us. Moreover, the patterns represented with configurations of generators are not
visible to the modellers and are machine interpretable.
Query Scenario 2: Find the most plausible (probable) acquisition path for
country X. As discussed previously in addition to the formalization with the use
of metamodels an additional level of formalism can be achieved with the Object
Constrained Language (OCL). However, such an approach requires us to step away
from the graphical representation that is more in line with model based approach
and comprehensive in the case of pattern theory. With generators and their bonds
we can formalize not only data structures but also rules that allow generators to
be combined into more complex structures. Generators seem to be also a good
formalism for transformation to object-oriented data structures. Each element
is described by a generator and subsequently each generator in a configuration
represents an instance of the generator class whereas the behaviour of the object
(methods) would be defined by the generator bonds.
What is exceptional about pattern theory, which can help us answer the above
question, is that the binary relation between generators and therefore the corre-
sponding modelled activities can be relaxed. Based on the binary function Rho the
stringent condition can be relaxed to probability measures. The binary function
that accepts only true or false values can be extended to a continuum valued func-
tion Acceptor A(). Probabilities can be associated to configurations by a structured
formula shown in expression 5.37. P(c) describes the joint probability distribution.
This way the we can ask what the conditional distribution of a random subCon-
figuration c = (g1 − Conv1, g7 − EMIS) is given the remainder configuration.
In order to answer the question/query as in the previous example there has to
be also a mechanism to answer questions placed against the model. The two high
level steps would be:
Step 1 - get results from Query 1
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Step 2 - input vectors and attaches weight to define probabilities based on the
findings of inspectors.
Pattern Theory formalization can be used for the application of Bayesian Infer-
ence. Given the activities the network can be used to determine the probability of
the presence of a weapons acquisition path. A good example would be using the so
called indicators as classified by the IAEA and assigned states Strong (S), Medium
(M) and Weak (W). These variables can be assigned to activities modelled and
assessment of an acquisition path would be in terms of the probability distribution
over the event of acquiring Pu or HEU. Ability to apply complex algorithms is large
with pattern theory such that questions can be more specific Find an acquisition
path for Pu in Country X given indicators a, b and c.
In order that the results of these questions are used for designing inspection
processes there has to be a framework by which results can be incorporated in the
design of quality inspection processes.
The new information driven safeguards is expected to be objective driven rather
than criteria driven. What this means is that objectives which are learnt from the
domain specific models have to be used to match processes that will help meet these
objectives. The integrated Safeguards Modelling Method (iSMM) does not envis-
age any automated creation of objectives using the inspection objectives model.
The results of the analysis performed on the Nuclear Fuel Cycle Model are used
to support the decision of safeguards analysts in designing inspection processes.
Objectives identified and modelled using the Inspection Objectives Model are an-
notated to inspection processes and tasks that will help create the link between
the two layers. To achieve this the thesis proposes the Value-Focused Thinking as
a framework that will guide breaking down higher level objectives to more detailed
and technical objectives in order to create a link to the processes and tasks that
fulfil these. Such a approach does not only guide the design of inspection processes
but also oﬀers means of introducing metrics for measuring how well objectives are
met.
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6.1.2 Process Configuration
Formalization of process models with Pattern Theory is not limited to nuclear pro-
cesses can also be applied to any other type of process models. A brief example is
shown in Open Models Feasibility Study. In the case of the iSMM the language for
modelling business processes is conveniently named inspection process modelling
language (IPM). The constructs and the metamodels of the two are the same.
Small diﬀerences exist on the notation and attributes of the modelling elements.
Each of the modelling elements in IPM can be likewise formalized by creating
generators mapping to each modelling element. For example elements such as
Activity, Parallelity, Merge will be represented by generators g1, g2 and g3. As
it was in the case of using patterns for analysing models, inspection processes
models can be formalized as configurations combining bindable generators into
process structures. The interesting aspect about defining the generators and their
structure through bonds here is that the same rules of regularity could apply to any
business/inspection process model regardless of the notation used (EPC, BMPN
etc.). They would be generic in the domain of interest with bond structures that
define binary relations between the generator such as g0 (Start), g1 (Activity), g2
(Parallelity) and so forth.
Here patterns are more seen as means of validating the process models in terms
of their structure and composition and should provide guidance for modelling. Ab-
stract processes named ”inspection pathways” map out the sequence, timing and
expected outcomes in terms of safeguards objectives. The idea is to standardize
inspection processes that are cost-eﬀective. Based on the example of so called
clinical pathways which describe the treatment for a patient, inspection pathways
are instruments that describe the common way of dealing with known problems
in the domain of verification. The structure of a pathway that is rich with heuris-
tics and procedural knowledge can be used as templates to create process model
instances which can then be specifically adjusted to the situation at hand. They
represent formalized structures of higher order that facilitate faster modelling but
also improve the quality of created models. It has to be said that with generic
formalization of the elements used in modelling inspection/business processes se-
mantics cannot be ignored (i.e. names of the activities). There will be an apparent
semantic loss should modelled elements and their combination simply be mapped
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to generators represented as configurations. An example configuration consisting
of generators Start, Activity 1, Activity 2, Activity 3, End would require that a
generator is used more than once and that identifying marks of the elements (e.g.
name) is preserved. Pattern Theory has also a provision that the same generator
can appear more than once in a configuration. To keep them separate identify-
ing marks as parts of attributes are used. The result is a formalization which
defines the relationship rules between any two elements in the model. Moreover,
it represents pathways as regular configuration structures that are modelling lan-
guage independent and mathematically formalized for the application of complex
algorithms.
Query Scenario 1:Find all inspection pathways that lead to objective Y. Any
such query would require that the model is explicitly associated to a objective Y.
Or at least elements in the model are. By formalizing the process models called
pathways with PT it is the configuration which is associated to an objective. This
allows for a result to the query that covers all models that have the same process
structure as the configuration c. In a way we prefer to know about the process
structure rather than the details of the model.
Query Scenario 2:Find diﬀerences between inspection Pathway R and Model
Instance Z. The objective of such a query is to find out all the changes that need
to be applied to model instances based on any regulatory or technological change
which is reflected in the inspection pathways. New pathway configuration is com-
pared to the configuration of model instances to identify diﬀerence in the structure
that are helpful for identifying any shortcomings.
6.2 Pattern Theory and Other Formalizms
There are various formalization approaches that could be also used to achieve
the any of the evaluated use cases. Their application depends on the problem at
hand. Pattern theory contains graphical formalism similar to using graphs with the
important distinction that generators compared to nodes representing elements of
a model would be typed (Activity, Parallelity, etc.) and can carry other attributes
that can add semantics to the formal representation. Using graph theory in this
context can be said is semantically inferior to pattern theory. A property of a
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generator is its structure admitting for the definition of so-called bonds, which
define connections to and from a generator. In a model a generators can be a
primitive that represents a pixel of the modelled elements (image) or conceptually
the element itself. In our case generators represent modelling elements which in
the example chosen are the activities that can lead to the acquisition of a weapons
grade nuclear material.
Pattern theory as introduced originally had a purpose of identifying patterns
rather than what is commonly known as pattern recognition. Taking this as a
starting position it is important to note that in the context of representing models
created by domain experts this formalism serves the transformation of models into
patterns that can be analysed by various algorithms and mechanisms. Formal-
ized in a precise language that will allow us to transform user-friendly models to
mathematically concise elements. As cautiously noted by Grenander in [102] Ein-
stein was thinking more about physics when he claimed that the most remarkable
thing about the universe is that it can be understood. However, languages are a
biological product. What he refers to is natural languages so this observation can
only be partially applied to modelling languages shown here. In our case models
represent subjective understanding that we take for granted and try to oﬀer means
to mathematically formalize the same. This requires that languages used by the
modeller are expressive enough in addition to us being able to codify them into
analysable patterns.
6.2.1 Formal Grammars and Graphs
Formal grammars attempt similarly to understand language structures in a logical
way in terms of primitives (i.e. word classes). Rules are used to describe how to
form strings according to the language syntax. More precisely production rules are
applied to generate strings that are recognized by the language. Moreover context-
free grammars use precise mechanisms to describe the methods by which phrases
are built from smaller block structure of sentences. When dealing with models
that are created using predefined modelling languages we try to do more of the
same in order that our models are understandable according to the defined syntax.
Since the overall approach of the study is to use models or diagrammatic means
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for representation, a good example of a formalism is graph grammars. It extends
the theory of formal languages in order to deal with the structures more general
than strings such as graphs. By describing structures in a simplified way nodes in a
graph correspond to substructures whereas the edges show the relationship between
them. Grammars are the operations on the graph. In Bardohl [70] graph grammar
formalism is used to represent visual languages. Abstract syntax is used to describe
the concrete syntax of the visual modelling elements . On one hand graphs are
used to show the structure of the visual sentences. On the other hand grammars
are the operations on them. These operations represent graph transformations.
The so-called pattern graph on the L (left) and the replacement graph on the R
(right) of the rule are used to formalize the transformation. Figure 6.2 shows a
simplified representation of modelling elements post-conversion and EMIS in the
NFCM model using a logical structure graph as proposed in [70].
Figure 6.2. Logical structure graph representing the visual elements pre-conversion
and EMIS.
Figure 6.2 shows an attributed graph where nodes represent the two elements
of the modelling language namely the pre-conversion activity and EMIS for en-
richment of the material generated by the previous activity. The relationship is
also shown as a node representing the association of these two elements. This
representation shows the structure and the building blocks however it is short
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of operations that need to yet be defined. This representation in comparison to
pattern theory is shown in the next Figure 6.3 where the same two elements are
formalized with generators of the theory. The two modelling elements each map
to a generator. Their properties are the bonds that represent a structure set de-
scribing the possible connections between these generators. The figure shows how
the two generator bonds are closed to represent the regular connection constrained
through the binary function or the less stringent Acceptor() function.
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Figure 6.3. Pattern Theory formalizm representing the bond between the pre-
conversion and EMIS generator.
As it can be observed generators of the pattern theory are also nodes of the
graph however they also contain a structure as a property. In other words the
generators are the grammars. They represent grammars placed on a graph. In
this way we can represent the logical sentence structure but also can formalize
all possible connections to neighbouring generators. This formalism is not appar-
ent with graph grammar where rules or operations would have to be explicitly
represented in a non- graphical way to support the graph. Furthermore, another
important property of a generator is that it can carry attributes. This being very
useful for typing generators according to the visual elements to which they map
to. It can be said that PT graphical formalizm allows for easy transformation of
concrete syntax to abstract due to the visual similarity of the modelling elements
and the generators. Graphs oﬀer also a level of visualization however are short of
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the connection rules obvious in the case of generators and their bonds.
6.2.2 Petri Nets as a Representative Formalization Lan-
guage
Petri net is another abstract formal model that can be used to represent visual
languages. Some research was performed in this area where Petri nets are linked
to graph grammars to formalize animations of the visual modelling environment.
The use of grammars as an intermediary formalism to represent visual elements
speaks that nets may not be best at representing visual models [108].
A Petri net graph contains two nodes, places and transitions. Arcs connect
nodes. If the arc is directed from a place to a transition it is considered input. It
is treated as an output if the arc is directed from a transition to a place. There
can only be a connection between a place and a transition never from a place to
a place or transition to a transition. Places and transitions can be thought of as
conditions and events in the respective order.
In addition to this static representation of Petri nets, behaviour can be modelled
with so called tokens that places. They fire transitions, namely trigger events. Only
when all places have a token the linked transition can be fired moving the tokens to
the end of the output arc. This serves a useful representation of the behaviour of
a system dealing with issues such as concurrency. But is not limited to computer
systems and has found application in many fields such as molecular biology etc.
Let us briefly look at an example of a simplified Petri net representing two
activities of the nuclear fuel cycle as shown before with the use of graph gram-
mar and pattern theory. Figure 6.4 shows a Petri net of the modelling elements
pre-conversion and EMIS. Here we see that modelling elements representing the
activities are mapped to a transition node where as the subsequent relation which
is based on the nuclear material is represented by places. Nuclear material used
by the activity is represented as a condition to the event of pre-conversion or
enrichment with EMIS.
The static representation of the net in Figure 6.4 shows how UOC (Uranium
concentrate) or ThConc (Thorium concentrate) as a result of mining activity can
be used as an input to pre-conversion. The UF6 or UCl4 that is an output of
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UOC
ThCon
Pre-conversion
UF6
UCl4
EMIS
HEU
Figure 6.4. Petri net representation of the pre-conversion and EMIS. Modelling ele-
ments were mapped to transition nodes whereas the relations were represented as places.
The grayed out transitions represent the missing events not obvious with this formalism.
the transition node pre-conversion is then used as an input to the transition node
EMIS. Possible enrichment activities are numerous therefore there would have
to be a transition node for each which would make the net less comprehensive
something that can be better represented with pattern theory generators and their
bonds. The structure representation with the net adds little information to a graph
representation of the acquisition path activities shown before. Moreover, it can be
said that in the case of pattern theory there is a convenient one- to-one mapping of
the visual modelling elements to generators, which is less so in the case of a Petri
net where the visual model is transformed to two types of nodes.
Petri nets have also behavioural properties, which can be used to simulate
models of the system under study. This was briefly explained in the introduction
where the tokens are used to represent states and transitions to new states. Taking
the models created with the NFCM to represent acquisition paths, Petri nets can
be used to also represent an acquisition path by triggering possible events in the
net to reach the weapons grade materials Pu and HEU. The so-called reachability
property can help answer questions such as what markings are reachable in the
Petri net or what sequence of transition firings are possible [109]. Therefore, these
properties of the net can help us also answer questions such that we identify the
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alternative paths of reaching weapons grade material. Despite this characteristic of
a petri net that is applicable it can be said that simulation of the kind is important
when dealing with automata in representing
Although main use of Petri nets is deterministic literature shows also extensions
to the net to deal with non-deterministic measures. Timed and Stochastic Petri
nets can be used to also to add nondeterministic time through randomness of the
transition. Random probability distribution is used to time nets and the graph can
be used as a Markov chain. Such techniques applied on the net can help us answers
some of the questions which were answered by pattern theory. For example the
question related to the most probable path of acquisition of HEU and Pu in a
country. Very much like the suggested approach with Pattern Theory.
6.3 Conclusion
As mentioned at the beginning of this section Pattern Theory is more about iden-
tifying patterns or generating patterns that represent realistic structures. These
in our case are constrained by the modelling language. What is unique about the
formalized acquisition paths is that the generated patterns resemble also the visual
model created by a domain expert. They represent signatures that are regular and
can be treated also for variability. Configurations represent also probabilistic struc-
tures, which allow for expressing variation. Similarly stochastic Petri nets are also
able to achieve the same however it is not envisaged in the originally introduced
formalism by Petri and therefore any such extension makes it more complex in con-
trast to pattern theory. Moreover, the ”connectionism” apparent in pattern theory
emphasizes the combinatory nature of pattern theory where primitive elements are
assembled into configurations. Petri net both as a model or a representation of
a model has to be complete in order for us to be able to formalize it. This is
not necessarily so with PT. The ”constructionism” of the theory as described in
the open models feasibility study lets us create relations also between independent
generators characterized with bonds. To illustrate this one can imagine that two
modelling elements that are displayed on a diagram without any connection be-
tween them would still be interpretable by pattern theory. From the structure of
the generators we know if the two elements can bond. Moreover each generator is
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has its own identity. This is not the case with Petri nets where two independent
petri nets would have to be created. The relation between any two elements would
have to be explicitly defined. In the case of PT where visual elements map to
generators we also know the rules / grammar of their bonding represented on the
generator. The ability to generate patterns is one of the principles on which the
theory was built. Figure 6.5 shows a generator as a building block envisaged in
the theory and what the equivalent of it would be in a Petri net (an excerpt of the
net).
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Figure 6.5. On the left panel the typical generator formalism for a nuclear activity
mapped to the corresponding modelling elements is shown. The β values correspond to
the input nuclear material. On the right panel the equivalent of a elementary block (gen-
erator) is illustrated to demonstrate the missing definition with the Petri net formalism.
Furthermore, Pattern Theory allows probability distributions to also allow for
variability of the represented structures. As exemplified before probability distri-
butions can be used to characterize the local bindings between generators as being
more probable than other possible bindings. On larger scale configurations can be
seen as regular structures that are also measured in terms of their probability in
comparison to similar configurations. Such a notion in Petri nets would translate
to bindings between transitions and events where the relation between them is de-
pendant on places. It is worth mentioning here also the regularity principle present
in pattern theory. A regular configuration warrants a valid structure that can be
analysed since we know that all the connections followed local regularity. In the
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presence of configurations the formalism also allows for the Q non-negative weight
function defined on the graph that makes probabilities not only depend only on
the couplings β-β￿ but also generators themselves.
Pattern theory represents a formalism that is graphically very descriptive for
representing process structures while allowing for definition of regularity in addition
to variability. Between purely graph representations and graph grammars which
are rule intensive and formalisms such as Petri nets that are unique in studying
behavioural properties, pattern theory finds its place as a mixture that strikes the
optimal balance of both properties. It serves as an intermediary language between
domain specific languages and formal languages.
Chapter7
Modelling Environment and Example
Case
This chapter discusses the implementation environment of the iSMM. It also presents
some application scenarios based on the suggested approach presented in the pre-
vious chapters. Modelling languages of which the framework consists are concep-
tually independent of the platform and technology however the work done here
is based on the BPMS paradigm and the meta-model ADONIS primarily used
for business process engineering. ADONIS represents a tool for holistic Business
Process Management by helping streamline business processes, organizational re-
structuring aiming eﬀort and cost reduction [76]. For the implementation of the
inspection modelling method ADOxx which represents an evolution of the ADONIS
was used. The next section presents ADOxx platform and gives implementation
details.
7.1 ADOxx platform
”ADOxx platform is a metamodelling-based development configuration environ-
ment to create domain-specific modelling tools” [110]. This platform is considered
to be scalable, adaptable supporting multi user support. It represents a web-
enabled environment oﬀering a holistic approach for capturing conceputal elements
into methods that are machine processable.
Figure 7.1 shows the envisaged architectural context. Conceptual architecture
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Figure 7.1. ADOxx Architectural Levels and Responsibilities c￿BOC Group
is divided into a library level, tool level and platform level. Tool customizers,
developers and the actual platform developers are shown as the responsibilities
necessary for implementation on this platform.
The new platform allows for advanced customization of the tool with an open
architecture enabling end to end of modelling methods that oﬀer functionality. By
creating formal languages not only real world structures are represented but also
processed [110].
For the inspection modelling framework an new application library was created
in the platform consisting of modelling languages that formalise the inspection
concepts. Traditionally in the ADONIS environment based on the BPMS paradigm
libraries consist of two components, the BP (Business Process) and WE (Working
Environment). One was meant to deal with process models and cover all the
elements of the dynamic models whereas more static models were created in the
WE library (e.g. models representing organizational structures). This separation
of the two represents no technical limitations in integrating models from each
within the library or other libraries. As shown in figure 7.2 libraries BP and WE
library consist of classes contained in a model types. Instance of a model type is
a model. At each layer shown there are attributes (i.e. library, class, model or
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Figure 7.2. Application Library in ADOxx c￿BOC Group
object).
The inspection modelling framework based on the concepts introduced earlier is
represented with a great number of models. For the inspection modelling method
a dedicated library was created with the languages necessary to formalise a safe-
guards approach. For the inspection modelling framework as a whole three libraries
including the inspection method are necessary. PROMOTE library that contains
all modelling languages of the approach and a library which represents the tech-
nical layer with languages such as UML, BPEL etc. At present there seems to be
a limitation in integrating application libraries in ADOxx however models can be
easily moved from one library to another. For sake of simplicity the approach here
was to limit the implementation by integrating two libraries namely the inspection
modelling method and PROMOTE which is extended for other model types such
as OWL, UML etc.
ADONIS meta-model was extended also for models represents inspection views.
The (BP and WE discussed above) have been used as the super classes under
which all elements of the inspection modelling method are created. In the case
of Inspection Process Model based on the Business Process Model elements of the
class hierarchy are duplicated with slight notational changes in addition to new
attributes.
The ADOxx meta class container provides attributes which are inherited by all
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subclasses important to the visual representation of the modelling elements in the
modelling language. Inspection models were combined with the business process
modelling language based on the notation of BPMN and ADONIS. These processes
are named inspection processes and reference other inspection specific models such
as inspection objectives, nuclear fuel cycle model, the organizational model and
the nuclear facility model. Each of the modelling elements represent an implemen-
tation class under the ADOxx. They are characterized with attributes which can
accept accept values defining the semantics of each modelling element [110]. Fig-
ure 7.4 shows an extract of the classes of the inspection modelling method at the
implementation level. Each of the classes inherits the attributes such as GraphRep
and AnimRep which can be used to define the notation and animation properties
of the modelling element using the ADONIS scripting language. Graphical repre-
sentation in the ADONIS script is provided under Appendix A. The figure shows
Figure 7.3. Extract of the Inspection Modelling Meta Model as an extension of the
ADOxx c￿BOC Group
172
also links between classes which is easily implementable in ADOxx by using the
Interref attribute of each created class.
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Figure 7.4. Extract of class diagram for inspection modelling method. It shows an
extract of the classes newly created in ADOxx and their attributes. Some of the classes
and attributes were excluded from the diagram.
Once the classes are defined the next step is to define their cardinality which
can be done using ADOxx script. The attribute
7.2 Modelling Interface
Model types as defined in the administrative interface of the ADONIS can be
created using the interface shown in figure 7.5. As depicted depending on the
selected model type (objectives and facility model in the example) models can
be created with the defined notation. Relation between the modelling elements
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is created using the relationships also defined in the meta model. Next figure
shows a snapshot of the administrative interface that allows for the creation of the
attributes in the ADONIS meta model.
Figure 7.5. Screenshots of the ADONIS interface for creating Models and administring
the modelling library.
The interface allows you for the creation of diﬀerent versions and inter-referencing
between models. The same models created can be easily published on the Intranet
allowing inspectors to navigate through the process models and other models avail-
able.
7.3 Example Case: Ruritania
This section provides an example of the approach applied to a fictitious state
called Ruritania. As described in the previous chapters there are two separate
oﬃcial documents named Safeguards Approach and State File that are meant to
capture all state related factors, the physical model of the state and the way
safeguards is implemented. Based on inspections performed and knowledge of the
department about this state an approach is created that is integrated meaning it
uses the optimal combination of measures that are eﬀective and eﬃcient in assuring
the non-diversion of declared material and the absence of undeclared material and
activities. For the sake of simplicity details related to the agreement with the state
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and other technicalities are left out.
The Safeguards Approach for the state is commonly captured in a document
where the objectives are stated as well as the measures to meet these objectives.
The state is looked at as a whole rather than at the facility level a common approach
under the traditional safeguards. A model based approach is exemplified here
using the modelling languages of the iSMM to recreate a state-level approach for
Ruritania while integrating it with the state related information also represented
through models.
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Figure 7.6. Physical Model overview diagram and the the facility model diagram side
by side. Activities of the physical model can be inter-referenced to the elements of the
Facility Model.
Figure 7.6 shows on the left panel the physical model of Ruritania which is
created using the modelling language NFCM. The physical model of any state is
commonly represented as s static image attached to a document which can not
be queried or interrogated. By using a modelling language each element of the
model and the relations between the elements can be analysed and represented in
a diagrammatic form using the ADONIS interface. This allows the domain experts
to easily and regularly update such a models and integrate them with other models
of the method.
In the example case the physical model as shown in Figure 7.6 consists of
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nuclear activities such as post-conversion (conv.2), gas cent, UO2, Exp and Spent
Fuel Storage and LWR (each activity described in deital in chapter 5). All these
activities are available in a state as declared by the state and are graphically
represented with green colour should they be at Production Scale. Any activity
present in the state which is thought by the modeller to be existent can also
be represented regardless if declared. The other set of nuclear activities such as
AVLIS, Research and Aqueous are shown in yellow to indicate that they are at
Research Scale only. The scale of this activity can be set using the attributes of
each element that can be entered using the dialog named notebook. The physical
model represents an overview of all main nuclear fuel activities and can be then
further described in detail with other models. Each of the activities of the fuel cycle
shown in the diagram have a reference to facilities and other locations modelled
with the use of the nuclear facility model shown on the right panel of Figure 7.6.
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Figure 7.7. Example acquisition paths for Pu in the state of Ruritania. Mapping of the
inspector created model is shown as a generator configuration which is used for analysis
and stored in a repository for analysis using algorithms.
A potential acquisition path modelled is shown in Figure 7.7 where for state
Ruritania the path is represented as a process model consisting of subsequent
nuclear activities to reach the acquisition of Pu. Performing complex analysis
of this acquisition path can be done by mapping the modelling elements to the
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generators of pattern theory. Concrete modelling elements are mapped to abstract
generators as shown in Chapter 5. The potential of this formalization is that
it allows for further analysis not available in the modelling tool. Paths can be
analyzed as generator configurations that are regular or less so. This may introduce
information about the most probable paths or even paths that are most likely to
be taken based on indicators discovered. To demonstrate this one acquisition path
modelled is shown as a generator configuration. Such a formalizm in the case
of Ruritania will not only help identify wether all the paths are regular but also
provide us with valuable information about possible relations with other activities
in the state or outside this state. Comparison of configurations within the state or
even other states can be provided in order to find any possible related activities
among them.
The ability to analyse the models through the formalization explained and
subsequent results lead us to the next model of iSMM which is the Inspection
Objectives Model. This model captures the inspection objectives based on the
analysis of the physical model and related models. In the safeguards approach
these are usually stated in general terms. Here the model of the objectives that
are hierarchically connected represent diagrammatically the general Safeguards
objectives and lower level objectives for the state. Each of the objectives is broken
down to means objectives necessary to achieve these higher level objectives. For
example in Figure 7.8 the objectives for the state of Ruritania are shown with
elipses and the means to achieve these with boxes. In the example it can be seen
that some of the objectives need to be achieved by multiple means. The means
objectives are then linked to the inspection processes. Actors are shown with a
person notation symbolizing the responsible entity for the given objectives. Actors
can be roles, organizational units or systems.
In order to ensure that each objective is met, all means objectives have to link
to one or more inspection processes. For instance objective 2 is met with means
objectives CA and DIV. These are both inspection processes that are detailed with
the Inspection Process Model (IPM). IPM is a modelling language is similar to the
business process modelling languages with an extension that provisions for the link
of each process and task to the objectives.
Finally the organizational model represents the team that is necessary to per-
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form any of the tasks specified under the inspection processes. Organizational
model and the inspection process model represent the work plan in terms of how
the Safeguards approach is implemented in Ruritania. Figure 7.9 shows the two
models side by side. This gives a full overview of the operational aspects not only
in terms of the tasks but also the roles in the organization that will ensure the
correct implementation of each process. The process models and the organiza-
tional models are not generic reference models but represent specific activities to
be performed eﬀectively in a specific the state.
As defined in the conceptual framework this modelling method was based on
there are also perspectives of KM and Technology to be represented with domain
independent models. The idea is to also identify the knowledge required in per-
forming any of the activities of thee inspection process. Moreover, modelling the
technology available and required in performing any of the inspection processes
in Ruritania makes explicit the relationship between inspection processes and the
technology used. The modelling language chosen to represent knowledge is PRO-
Inspection Objectives in Ruritania
Detection of the diversion of nuclear material Detection of the misuse of the facilities and undeclared material and activities
Objective 1
Objective 2 Objective 3 Objective 4
Verification
of declared
material at
facilities
annual
transit
matching
DIV CA ES Open
Source
Satelite
Imagery
Figure 7.8. Safeguards objectives in the state of Ruritania. Inspection Objectives
Model is used to represent the objectives and the means objectives based on the acqui-
sition paths identified as well as other state related factors.
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MOTE. It identifies the knowledge products necessary in performing the tasks of
the inspection process. It also allows for the definition of skills of roles identified
under the inspection organizational model. This is an extension to the current safe-
guards approach whereby knowledge requirements for implementing the safeguards
approach in a state is considered an integral part. By identifying the knowledge
needs and available knowledge critical to the process a balance sheet is created for
Safeguarding the state of Ruritania.
Another domain independent modelling language is UML which is used a lan-
guage to model the technology associated to the state level safeguards approach.
Any technical representations of the technology applied can be represented with
UML or similar modelling languages. Such details are commonly available in a
form of drawings and scattered around which in this case would be readily avail-
able for use by those who implement the safeguards as well as those who provide
technical services. They represent valuable information about technology and other
technical services as requirements embedded in the Safeguards Approach. It can
+
Seni or Inspector
R
Safeguards
Inspector
R
Section BSection A
Division X
+
CA Start
1
Assign CA
!
Senior Inspector
2
Create the Team
Senior Inspector
3
Briefing
5
8
Analyse the CA
Safeguards Inspector
6
4
7
Perform Open
Source Analysis
Safeguards Inspector
7
Create CA
Package
Check Ruritania's
Political Situation
Safeguards Inspector
8
Figure 7.9. Simplified example of an inspection process that meets the objectives
identified for this state. This model references the Inspection Organizational Model
shown in the bottom panel. The roles and the organizational structure is modeled.
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facilitate eﬃcient use and development of new technology to accommodate changes
in the approach.
7.4 Conclusion
The presented case is for a fictitious state as it is not possible to disclose realistic
data about any member state of the IAEA. It however demonstrates the application
of the modelling method in generating a safeguards approach for a a state. It is
not suggested that the IAEA currently does not have the necessary tools and
means to document the strategy of implementing safeguards in a state however
the example shows the advantages of the model-based method of representing
verification aspects in comparison to current practices which is mainly based on
formal documents and tacit knowledge.
All technology necessary in implementing safeguards can be 
identified and made explicit. This does not only include equipment 
but also software, hardware and other tools available to ensure the 
implementation of the state-level safeguards approach. 
Technology requirements not explicitly documented.
Visual representation of models are an effective way of capturing 
knowledge from domain experts and sharing understanding of 
issues. 
Not easy to share knowledge
Knowledge awareness through knowledge management models. A 
link between state level objectives and knowledge requirements. 
Ability to identify and manage knowledge associated to a specific 
safeguards approach.
Knowledge requirements associated to a state level approach 
not available.
Models stored in a repository represent structures that can be 
queried and searched for. Process structures formalized with PT can 
be analysed using stochastic techniques. 
Images, data that can not be processed
Consistent modelling notation. Lingua franca for representing 
operational aspects. Increased usefulness of process models.
Inconsistency in the format of the safeguards approaches. 
Process models not commonly used.
AfterBefore
Dynamic content that can be easily navigated and published on the 
portal. Navigation of models by reference links that can easily be 
published using any proxy technology.
Static content hidden in documents and procedures. Content 
not easily navigated, discovered easily referred to efficiently.
Model-based representation visualizing aspects of the approach such 
as objectives, the physical model, acquisition paths and inspection 
processes. 
Text based format – approaches summarized in formal 
documents and procedures. Images as attachments. State 
related files separately stored on the LAN.
Table 7.1. A summary of the benefits introduced by iSMM in the example case
The benefits of the modelling method presented go beyond the ability to gen-
erate diagrammatic models out of safeguards related concepts. It oﬀers and en-
vironment that provisions easy modelling, publishing and integrating information
available in the organization. The content generated represents an evolution of
the date-cantered culture to a more information based approach. Some of the
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benefits of iSMM after its implementation are presented in Teble 7.1. The use of
models does not exclude the need of formal documents and procedures however it
represents a more eﬀective way organizing information, capturing knowledge and
sharing the same within the department.
Chapter8
Conclusion and Future Research
The research question studied is how modelling methods can be used to repre-
sent complex processes. Characteristics of such processes are studied based on
the example of nuclear inspection. In contrast, these processes require extensive
domain knowledge and cannot be acquired oﬀ the shelf as it is the case with ref-
erence business processes. Knowledge intensity associated to inspection processes
is related to the important product resulting from this process, namely the assur-
ance of the peaceful use of nuclear technologies. Ability to perform inspections in
a dynamic and unpredictable environment places emphasize on eﬀectiveness over
eﬃciency. The challenge is to capture domain knowledge as it becomes available
and eﬃciently turn it into operations.
The position taken is that for any modelling approach that is meant to capture
knowledge from domain experts and translate it to eﬃcient and smart operations
three major components have to exist. The ability to a) express the understanding
of situations and concepts, b) validate this knowledge by sharing it and finally
c) apply the same in processes improvement. Domain specific process models
are created, shared and analyzed in order to create eﬀective inspection processes.
This descent from domain concepts to tasks performed on daily basis is the main
challenge in any model-based approach. A level of formalizm needs to exist in
defining the modelling languages in order to process the models created. The
approach suggested is to start with easy to use domain specific models created by
experts who use them to represent understanding of the subject domain. These
models are then used to create operational models that are aligned with operational
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objectives. Formalization suggested helps make use of the models not only by
humans but also systems.
Throughout the study the principles of modelling were adopted from the breadth
of ongoing research in the field. Model Driven Engineering which is more oriented
towards software engineering in addition to other frameworks such as Open Models
Initiative were considered. The model-based approach presented here was realized
with a unique modelling method dedicated to the nuclear verification domain. The
technique is enriched with domain specific modelling languages that are used to
represent the nuclear fuel cycle in a state as a precondition to the design of ef-
fective inspection process models. In order that we add intelligence to the design
of inspection processes there is a requirement to formalize domain specific models
extending the level of formalizm achieved through meta-modelling. The evaluated
Pattern Theory was identified as the language that has great potential in formaliz-
ing process structures. Moreover, it provisions for probabilistic analysis of process
structures named configurations in the theory. Comparison of this formalism with
other formalisms such as Petri nets is also evaluated in order to pinpoint the unique
properties of this language which shows to strike the optimal balance between user
friendly graphical languages and rule-intensive formal languages.
Further research is recommended on the subject of Pattern Theory formal-
ization. The basic concepts of this language were introduced however additional
research needs to be performed for building a framework that can achieve the
transformation of any model to formal elements of the theory. Similar work was
done with graph grammars and petri nets and could be extended to pattern theory.
Transformation of the models to patterns and their analysis requires a framework
that translates concrete visual language elements to abstract components of the
theory. These components can also eventually be transformed to object-oriented
structures. Furthermore, an interesting area of research is defining a mechanism
to query process structures represented as generator configurations. Similar to
the archetypes in the open Electronic Health Records and the Archetypes Query
Language. Such a query language can be used to interrogate process structures.
Another area of research suggested is related to objectives-based modelling. A
link between modelled high-level objectives and daily activities of the process needs
to be further defined. Such a mechanism is required for organizational objectives
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to have a considerable impact on the design of processes. Metrics for measuring the
compatibility of processes with objectives needs to be established. An interesting
application in this area of research would be developing services that use objective
models to autonomously identify alternative paths of reaching the same objective.
AppendixA
Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations
Acquisition path analysis - the analysis of all plausible acquisition paths or
acquisition strategies for a State to acquire nuclear material usable for the
manufacture of a nuclear explosive device [30].
AERO - Aerodynamic Enrichment.
AGR - Advanced Gas-Cooled Reactor.
Aqueous - Type of Reprocessing.
AVLIS - Atomic Vapour Laser Enrichment.
C.A. - Critical Assembly is a form of a research reactor.
CHEMEX - Chemical Exchange Enrichment.
EMIS - Electromagnetic Isotope Separation Enrichment.
EXP - Abbreviation for Experimental Fuel.
FAST - Fast Neutron Reactor.
Integrated Safeguards - the optimum combination of all safeguards measures
available to the IAEA under comprehensive safeguards agreements and addi-
tional protocols to achieve maximum eﬀectiveness and eﬃciency in meeting
the IAEAs safeguards obligations within available resources [30].
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IONEX- Ion Exchange Enrichment.
Gas diﬀ - Gaseous Diﬀusion Enrichment.
Gas cent - Gas Centrifuges Enrichment.
GCR - Gas Cooled Reactor.
Heavy Water - D2O Deterium used as a Neutron moderator.
HTGR - High Temperature Gas Cooled Reactor.
HWR - Heavy Water Reactor.
LWGR - Light-water Graphite-Moderated Reactor.
LWR - Light Water Reactor.
Mining and Milling - Uranium ore is mined and sent to a mill to dissolve it
from other materials.
MLIS - Molecular Laser Enrichment.
MOX - Mixed Oxide Fuel. MOX fuel contains plutonium blended with natural
uranium, reprocessed uranium and depleted uranium.
NAVAL - Type of Reactor used by the U.S. Navy.
Non-aqueous - Type of Reprocessing.
Physical Model - Physical model of a nuclear fuel cycle a detailed overview
of the nuclear fuel cycle used for acquisition path analysis by the IAEA.
PLASMA - Plasma Enrichment.
Post-conversion - sometimes known as Conv2, Conversion 2 or reconversion
encompasses all chemical transformations subsequent to enrichment or re-
processing in view of manufacturing reactor fuel elements.
Pre-conversion - also known as Conv1 or Conversion 1 encompasses all chemical
transformations of nuclear material in order to provide feed material for
isotope separation or reactor fuel fabrication.
186
Safeguards Approach - a set of safeguards measures chosen for the imple-
mentation of safeguards in a given situation in order to meet the applicable
safeguards objectives. It can be developed for a facility type or state as a
whole under Integrated Safeguards [30].
Umet - Uranium Metal. Enrichment of Uranium Metal.
AppendixB
ADOxx documentation of the
Modelling Method
B.1 Sample script for the graphical representa-
tion of the Facility element in the Nuclear
Facility Model
==========================================
GRAPHREP
ATTR "Name" y:.7cm w:c:2.5cm h:t
FONT "Helvetica" h:16.0pt bold color:black
AVAL d1:"Domestic"
IF (d1="No")
PEN style:dot
ELSE
PEN style:solid
ENDIF
AVAL t1:"Status"
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IF (t1 = "Operational")
FONT "Helvetica" h:7.0pt color:black
FILL color:yellow
RECTANGLE x:-1.4cm y:-.7cm w:2.8cm h:1.4cm
TEXT "Status: " x:-1.16cm y:-0.5cm
TEXT "OP" x:.1cm y:-0.5cm
TEXT "Category: " x:-1.16cm y:0.1cm
ATTR "Description code" x:0.1cm y:0.1cm
ENDIF
AVAL t1:"Status"
IF (t1 = "Decommissioned")
FONT "Helvetica" h:7.0pt color:black
FILL color:lightgray
RECTANGLE x:-1.4cm y:-.7cm w:2.8cm h:1.4cm
TEXT "Status: " x:-1.16cm y:-0.5cm
TEXT "CD" x:.1cm y:-0.5cm
TEXT "Category: " x:-1.16cm y:0.1cm
ATTR "Description code" x:0.1cm y:0.1cm
ENDIF
==========================================
B.2 Sample script for the graphical representa-
tion of the Fuel Fabrication element in the
Nuclear Fuel Cycle Model
==========================================
GRAPHREP
FILL color:lightblue
RECTANGLE x:-1cm y:-.7cm w:3.2cm h:.4cm
FILL color:white
RECTANGLE x:-1cm y:-0.25cm w:0.8cm h:1cm
RECTANGLE x:-0.2cm y:-0.25cm w:0.8cm h:1cm
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RECTANGLE x:0.6cm y:-0.25cm w:0.8cm h:1cm
RECTANGLE x:1.4cm y:-0.25cm w:0.8cm h:1cm
FONT "Arial" h:9pt bold color:black
TEXT "FUEL FABRICATION" x: 0.5cm y:-.7cm w:c:2cm h:t
FONT "Arial" h:9pt color:black
TEXT "U met" x:-.6cm y:.2cm w:c:2cm h:t
TEXT "UO2" x:0.23cm y:.2cm w:c:2cm h:t
TEXT "MOX" x:1.05cm y:.2cm w:c:2cm h:t
TEXT "Exp." x:1.8cm y:.2cm w:c:2cm h:t
AVAL t1:"U met declaration"
IF (t1 = "Production facility")
FILL color:lightgreen
RECTANGLE x:-1cm y:-0.25cm w:0.8cm h:1cm
TEXT "U met" x:-.6cm y:.2cm w:c:2cm h:t
ENDIF
AVAL t2:"U met declaration"
IF (t2 = "Research-scale only")
FILL color:yellow
RECTANGLE x:-1cm y:-0.25cm w:0.8cm h:1cm
TEXT "U met" x:-.6cm y:.2cm w:c:2cm h:t
ENDIF
AVAL t3:"UO2 declaration"
IF (t3 = "Production facility")
FILL color:lightgreen
RECTANGLE x:-0.2cm y:-0.25cm w:0.8cm h:1cm
TEXT "UO2" x:0.23cm y:.2cm w:c:2cm h:t
ENDIF
AVAL t4:"UO2 declaration"
IF (t4 = "Research-scale only")
FILL color:yellow
RECTANGLE x:-0.2cm y:-0.25cm w:0.8cm h:1cm
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TEXT "UO2" x:0.23cm y:.2cm w:c:2cm h:t
ENDIF
AVAL t5:"MOX declaration"
IF (t5 = "Production facility")
FILL color:lightgreen
RECTANGLE x:0.6cm y:-0.25cm w:0.8cm h:1cm
TEXT "MOX" x:1.05cm y:.2cm w:c:2cm h:t
ENDIF
AVAL t6:"MOX declaration"
IF (t6 = "Research-scale only")
FILL color:yellow
RECTANGLE x:0.6cm y:-0.25cm w:0.8cm h:1cm
TEXT "MOX" x:1.05cm y:.2cm w:c:2cm h:t
ENDIF
AVAL t7:"Exp declaration"
IF (t7 = "Production facility")
FILL color:lightgreen
RECTANGLE x:1.4cm y:-0.25cm w:0.8cm h:1cm
TEXT "Exp." x:1.8cm y:.2cm w:c:2cm h:t
ENDIF
AVAL t8:"Exp declaration"
IF (t8 = "Research-scale only")
FILL color:yellow
RECTANGLE x:1.4cm y:-0.25cm w:0.8cm h:1cm
TEXT "Exp." x:1.8cm y:.2cm w:c:2cm h:t
ENDIF
AVAL t9:"U met potential inconsistencies"
IF (t9 = "Yes")
FILL color:red
POLYGON 3 x1:-0.68cm y1:-0.23cm x2:-1cm y2:0.1cm x3:-1.0cm y3:-0.23cm
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ENDIF
AVAL t10:"UO2 potential inconsistencies"
IF (t10 = "Yes")
FILL color:red
POLYGON 3 x1:0.11cm y1:-0.23cm x2:-.21cm y2:0.1cm x3:-.21cm y3:-0.23cm
ENDIF
AVAL t11:"MOX potential inconsistencies"
IF (t11 = "Yes")
FILL color:red
POLYGON 3 x1:0.92cm y1:-0.23cm x2:.6cm y2:0.1cm x3:.6cm y3:-0.23cm
ENDIF
AVAL t12:"Exp potential inconsistencies"
IF (t12 = "Yes")
FILL color:red
POLYGON 3 x1:1.72cm y1:-0.23cm x2:1.4cm y2:0.1cm x3:1.4cm y3:-0.23cm
ENDIF
AVAL t13:"Referenced nuclear process"
IF (t13 <> "")
FILL color:white
ELLIPSE x:-.90cm y:-0.90cm rx:0.1cm ry:.1cm
FILL color:black
ELLIPSE x:-.65cm y:-0.90cm rx:0.1cm ry:.1cm
FILL color:white
ELLIPSE x:-.40cm y:-0.90cm rx:0.1cm ry:.1cm
ENDIF
IF (t14 = "")
ATTR "Name" x:0.5cm y:1cm w:c:3cm h:t
ELSE
ATTR "Referenced nuclear process" x:0.5cm y:1cm w:c:3cm h:t format:"%m"
ENDIF
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